Clearing away the legal mist of the family business by Hammoud, Hania
  
Université de Montréal 
 
 
 
Clearing away the legal mist of the family business 
 
 
 
par Hania M. Hammoud 
 
 
 
Faculté de Droit 
 
 
 
Thèse présentée à la Faculté́ des études supérieures et postdoctorales  
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Doctorat en Droit (LLD) 
 
 
 
Septembre, 2016 
 
 
 
© Hania M. Hammoud, 2016

  
 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté de Droit 
 
 
 
Cette thèse intitulée: 
 
Clearing away the legal mist of the family business 
 
présentée par par Hania M. Hammoud 
 
 
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : 
 
 
Pierre Noreau 
Président-rapporteur 
 
 
Nabil Antaki 
Directeur de recherche 
 
 
Stéphane Rousseau 
 Membre du jury 
 
 
Dennis Jaffe 
Examinateur externe 

  i 
Résumé 
L’entreprise familiale est omniprésente; en effet, c’est l'épine dorsale de la vie d'entreprise. 
Elle est le moteur du développement socio-économique et de la création de richesse dans 
toutes les nations. Elle apparaît incomparable à l’entreprise non familiale, et unique quant à 
ses caractéristiques, éléments constitutifs, défis et perspectives. Cependant, la taxonomie 
légale distinctive de cette entreprise se révèle absente et oubliée partout dans le monde, soit 
dans les pays du droit Civil ou de Common Law. Ce manque de reconnaissance juridique 
induit à régler les différends et les litiges survenus en suivant les voies légales classiques; ce 
qui prouve, généralement, une source d'injustice tant à l'individu qu’à la famille, et suscite des 
répercussions sociales et économiques remarquables. Par conséquent, afin de concevoir les 
dynamiques authentiques de cette entreprise, nous avons adopté la théorie de l'écosystème des 
quatre cercles qui permettra aux juristes de percevoir cette entreprise avec un regard singulier, 
désormais, en tant qu’une entreprise familiale et non plus en tant qu’une simple entreprise. En 
outre, cette mosaïque placera la «famille» au niveau de partie prenante « royale » qui subvient 
aux besoins de l’entreprise et fournie le «capital familial»; ce dernier renvoie souvent aux 
intangibles tout en évoquant les éléments fondamentaux moteurs qui orientent et dominent 
cette entreprise, et la transforment en une copropriété collective mixte plutôt qu'une propriété 
individuelle. Somme toute, une telle classification engendrera une définition juridique 
distinctive de l’entreprise familiale, ainsi que des arrangements légaux et structurels et des 
conséquences primordiales. 
 
Mots-clés : Entreprise familiale, Théorie de l’écosystème, Familiness, Intuitu Familiae, 
Patrimoine par affectation, copropriété collective mixte. 
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Abstract 
Family business is omnipresent as the backbone of the corporate life. It is the engine driver of 
the socio-economic development, and the fundamental source of wealth creation in all nations. 
Incomparable to nonfamily counterparts, family business reveals unique in its characteristics, 
constructs, challenges, and prospects. However, the legal differentiated taxonomy of this 
enterprise reveals absent and forgotten across the globe, whether in the common law system or 
the civil law system. The lack of the legal recognition of its uniqueness induces jurists to 
resolve disputes and litigations via the conventional legal channels. This often discloses as the 
source of injustice for individuals as well as the family, and echoes significant social and 
economic consequences. Correspondingly, in order to conceive the authentic dynamics of this 
enterprise, we have embraced the four circles ecosystem theory, which shall allow jurists to 
visualize this enterprise with a singular eye as a family business, no longer as a business. 
Besides, this pattern shall reveal the “family” as the “Royal Stakeholder” and the main 
provider of the “Family Capital”. Thus, the latter unveils the intangibles as the fundamental 
drivers that guide and control this enterprise, and then turn it into a mixed collective co-
ownership, rather than an individual ownership. Ultimately, this classification generates the 
distinctive legal definition of the family business as well as the relevant arrangements, 
structures, and unavoidable consequences. 
 
Keywords: Family business, Ecosystem Theory, Familiness, Intuitu Familiae, Patrimony By 
Appropriation, Mixed Collective Co-ownership 
  iii 
Table of contents 
Résumé  ................................................................................................................................ i 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents  .............................................................................................................. iii 
List of Figures  ................................................................................................................... ix 
List of acronyms  ................................................................................................................ x 
Dedication  ......................................................................................................................... xi 
Acknowledgements  ......................................................................................................... xii 
Introduction  ................................................................................................................ 13 
Part I: The Significance of the Family Business ............................................ 25 
1.  The Peripheral Implication of the Family Business ....................................... 25 
1.1 Economy and family business .................................................................................... 26 
1.2 Society and family business ....................................................................................... 28 
  1.2.1 Family business and the community ..................................................................... 28 
  1.2.2 Family business and internal stakeholders ............................................................ 30 
1.3 Politics and family business ....................................................................................... 32 
  1.3.1 The decision-making process and politics ............................................................ 32 
  1.3.2 The joint-interests between family, business and politicians ................................ 32 
1.4 The cultural impact on the family business  ..............................................................  33 
  1.4.1 Individualism versus collectivism ......................................................................... 37 
 iv 
  1.4.2 Culture and law ...................................................................................................... 39 
    1.4.2.1 Family and constitutional law .......................................................................... 40 
    1.4.2.2 Culture and corporate law  ............................................................................... 42 
1.5 Legal systems and family business ............................................................................ 45 
  1.5.1 Judicial differences ................................................................................................ 45 
  1.5.2 Family law ............................................................................................................. 51 
    1.5.2.1 Family interest .................................................................................................. 53 
    1.5.2.2 Family patrimony / property ............................................................................. 55 
    1.5.2.3 Succession & inheritance Law ......................................................................... 59 
  1.5.3 Fiscal Law and family business    .......................................................................... 61 
  1.5.4 Business legal institutions ..................................................................................... 66 
    1.5.4.1 Patrimony with legal personality ...................................................................... 69 
    1.5.4.2 Patrimony by appropriation .............................................................................. 71 
  1.5.5 Fiduciary institutions ............................................................................................. 75 
    1.5.5.1 The common law trust ...................................................................................... 76 
    1.5.5.2 The foundation .................................................................................................. 79 
    1.5.5.3 The fiducia ........................................................................................................ 81 
    1.5.5.4 Islamic waqf ...................................................................................................... 84 
  1.5.6 Corporate governance ............................................................................................ 86 
2. The Attributes of the Family Business ............................................................... 92 
2.1 The strengths of the family business .......................................................................... 92 
  2.1.1 The outperformance of the family business .......................................................... 92 
  2.1.2 The informal decision-making process ................................................................. 93 
  v 
  2.1.3 The long-term perspective of the family business ................................................ 94 
2.2 The pitfalls of the family business .............................................................................. 95 
2.3 The challenges of the family business ........................................................................ 99 
  2.3.1 Conflicts between family members ..................................................................... 100 
  2.3.2 Lack of governance structure definition .............................................................. 107 
  2.3.3 Succession planning deficiency ........................................................................... 112 
3. Family Business Theories .................................................................................... 117 
3.1 The narrow theories .................................................................................................. 117 
  3.1.1 The rational approach .......................................................................................... 117 
  3.1.2 The founder-focused approach ............................................................................ 118 
  3.1.3 The stages approach ............................................................................................. 118 
3.2 The systemic theories ............................................................................................... 121 
  3.2.1 The dual-system theory ....................................................................................... 121 
  3.2.2 The three-circle approach .................................................................................... 123 
  3.2.3 The open-system approach .................................................................................. 125 
  3.2.4 The fourth circle theory ....................................................................................... 127 
  3.2.5 The ecosystem approach ...................................................................................... 129 
3.3. The added value of the ecosystem approach ........................................................... 138 
  3.3.1 The legal repercussions of this approach ............................................................ 139 
  3.3.2 “Individuals” versus “Family” ............................................................................ 141 
Part II: The Distinctive Legal Identity of the Family Business ............. 147 
1. Family Business Stakeholders ............................................................................ 148 
 vi 
1.1 Stakeholders as individuals ...................................................................................... 150 
  1.1.1 Individuals as family members ............................................................................ 152 
  1.1.2 The genealogical development in the family business ....................................... 155 
    1.1.2.1 Controlling-owner – The founder’s stage  ..................................................... 156 
    1.1.2.2 The second generation- Sibling partnership ................................................... 158 
    1.1.2.3 Cousin shareholding stage .............................................................................. 160 
  1.1.3 Individuals in business ......................................................................................... 161 
    1.1.3.1 Business ownership ........................................................................................ 161 
    1.1.3.2 Business directorship - Governance ............................................................... 167 
     a) The duties of directors  .......................................................................................... 168 
     b) The remuneration of directors ............................................................................... 170 
     c) The relationship between the family and the board of directors .......................... 172 
    1.1.3.3 Business management/employment ............................................................... 172 
1.2 The family as a stakeholder ...................................................................................... 175 
  1.2.1 The legal nature of the family ............................................................................. 176 
  1.2.2 The family authority within the family business  ............................................... 180 
2. Family Business Capitals ..................................................................................... 182 
2.1 The financial capital ................................................................................................. 187 
  2.1.1 The family financial resources ............................................................................ 187 
  2.1.2 Legal measures to unveil the family business ..................................................... 191 
2.2 The family human capital ......................................................................................... 194 
2.3 The social/relational capital ...................................................................................... 201 
  2.3.1 The internal bonding network- Family ties ......................................................... 204 
  vii 
    2.3.1.1 The role of trust in the family business .......................................................... 206 
    2.3.1.2 The nature of trust within the family business ............................................... 208 
    2.3.1.3 The legal consequences of  “family trust” ..................................................... 210 
     a) The ”Intuitu personae” & “Intuitu pecuniae” ....................................................... 210 
     b) The “Intuitu familiae” & “Affectio societatis” ..................................................... 211 
    2.3.1.4 Trust and fiduciary relationships  ................................................................... 214 
     a) The nature of fiduciary relationships .................................................................... 220 
      I. Fiduciaries are agents or stewards? ....................................................................... 222 
      II. The beneficiaries .................................................................................................. 225 
     b) Different types of fiduciary relationships ............................................................. 226 
       I. Ownership system  ............................................................................................... 227 
      II. Business system ................................................................................................... 229 
    2.3.1.5 Unjust enrichment or constructive trust ......................................................... 232 
  2.3.2 The external bridging social network .................................................................. 236 
2.4 The moral capital ...................................................................................................... 239 
2.5 The intellectual capital .............................................................................................. 245 
  2.5.1 The patronymic name .......................................................................................... 245 
    2.5.1.1 The reputation ................................................................................................. 247 
    2.5.1.2 The legal perspective of the patronymic name .............................................. 249 
  2.5.2 The know-how and trade secrets ......................................................................... 259 
3. The Legal Taxonomy of the Family Business ................................................. 268 
3.1 The legal nature of the family business .................................................................... 270 
  3.1.1 The distinctive nature of the family business ownership .................................... 274 
 viii 
    3.1.1.1 Family patrimony ........................................................................................... 275 
    3.1.1.2 The royalty- ownership ................................................................................... 276 
     a) The right of receiving dividends ........................................................................... 277 
     b) The royalty-shares liability .................................................................................... 278 
     c) The preemptive right ............................................................................................. 278 
  3.1.2 Governance structure of the family business ...................................................... 279 
3.2 The legal definition of the family business .............................................................. 280 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 289 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ ccxcv 
  ix 
List of figures 
           Page 
 
Figure 1     The rational approach           118 
Figure 2     The dual system theory          121 
Figure 3    The three-circle            124 
Figure 4      The open -system           126 
Figure 5               The Four circle           128 
      The ecosystem   
 Figure 6.1                    Microsystem                  132-133 
 Figure 6.2                    Mesosystem           134 
 Figure 6.3                    Exosystem                             134-135 
 Figure 6.4                    Macrosystem                      136 
 Figure 6.5                    Chronosystem              137-138 
Figure 7                  Stakeholders categories            149 
 x 
List of acronyms 
 
CCQ                        Civil Code of Quebec  
SME                        Small and Medium Enterprises 
GDP                        The Gross Domestic Product 
ITA                          Income Tax Act  
GCC                        Gulf Cooperation Countries 
CO                           Controlling Owner 
SP                            Sibling Partnership 
CC                           Cousin Consortium 
  xi 
Dedication 
This life achievement is dedicated: 
To those who have shaped me to draw my path...Those to whom I always refer. 
To my one, unique, and only, to the one embedded in me, 
my first source of Inspiration & Reinforcement; 
To my Father, Leader, Mentor, Colleague, and Soulmate. 
The one I miss today, but I can tell he has been guiding me all the time through his 
ingrained and priceless words, values, and principles. 
To my exceptional Mother who has inbred my soul with morals, beliefs, and 
assertiveness. 
The one who empowered and supported me to become the woman and the researcher I 
am today. 
To those who always give meaning to life, 
My Siblings, Rania, Bayane, Ramez, Amane, & Rabih 
With whom I share the strongest Bonds, Pledges, Secrets, Stories, Souvenirs and 
Aspirations. 
To my in-laws for extending our family with Love, Trust, Compassion, Respect & 
Gentleness. 
To my new source of Creativeness, 
My lovable Nieces & Nephews for crafting a meaningful reason for existing & standing 
tall. 
To my extended family, Hout & Hammoud, for nurturing in us the sense of Belonging, 
Connectedness & Identity. 
To my beloved Friends, Colleagues, & Ethical Jurists, 
& 
Lastly, 
To my country of origin “Lebanon” & my adoptive country “Canada” 
 xii 
Acknowledgments  
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all people who supported me in so many 
ways to complete this dissertation. I owe a big thank you for their backing, wisdom, time, and 
encouragement; each person from his and her own perspective, position and occupation. 
 
First and Foremost, I give thanks to the Almighty for giving me courage, perseverance, and 
strength to realize this dissertation. 
 
I am profoundly grateful and indebted to Professor Nabil Antaki for his invaluable support, 
painstaking supervision, constant empathy, compassion, fatherhood, and inspiring guidance. 
Without his meticulous scrutiny and acumen, it would just have been impossible to bring this 
thesis in the present form. 
 
I express my sincere gratitude to our Dean Professor Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens	for 
his support, reassurance, and encouragement as a Professor, Vice-Dean and Dean. 
My deepest appreciation to all professors who re-engineered successfully my legal thinking 
and analysis, namely, Professors: Fayez Hajj Chahine, Pierre Noreau, Ejan Mackaay, Michel 
Morin and Stéphane Rousseau. 
 
Also, a great thank you for the valuable input of Professor Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall 
Law School), Pr. Pramodita Sharma (University of Calgary), Dr. Kirby Rosblock (Genspring), 
Dr. Dianne Welsh (University of North Carolina Greensboro), Dr. Pascale Michaud (Former 
president of BFF), Dr. Judy Green (President, Family Firm Institute), Pr. Denis Jaffe, Mrs. 
Nan-B and Mr. Phillippe de Gaspé Beaubien (Business Families Foundation), Mr. Bernard 
Logié, Mr. Walid Chiniara, Former Minister Dr. Khaled Kabbani, Mrs. Jouman El Asmar 
(Proofreader), Ms. Rima Hajjar, and Ms. Nada Tamim. 
 
Lastly, I cannot forget all family business owners & consultants for sharing with me their 
private stories that allowed me to highlight the primordial constituents of this enterprise, and 
helped me shaping this dissertation practically.
  
 
Introduction  
Business and family collide whenever the necessity of earning a living and supporting the 
household urge the family to develop the business.1 Thus, from the earliest times, throughout 
the pre-industrial and industrial periods,2 and in all cultures, even those that are described 
market-oriented, the family enterprise has been prominent.3 It is considered the backbone of 
the corporate life in all nations;4 since it contributes efficiently to both rural and urban 
economies.5 Despite its omnipresence, still family owners appear sometimes schizophrenic; 
they reject any classification of their business as a “family business”, although, the latter is 
most often labeled by their family name,6 viz. their eponyms.7 Additionally, they introduce 
themselves, particularly within the collectivistic cultures, by their businesses in order to echo 
their family achievement and legacy. Contrarily, they may also ignorantly fuel their enterprise 
with negative connotations. Therefore, the misconception discloses on the genuine identity of 
the family business and the significant role it plays at the macro level (economic, social, 
political) as well as the micro level (the family and the individual). 
                                                
1 Ramona K Z Heck et al, “The family’s dynamic role within family business entrepreneurship” in Panikkos Zata 
Poutziouris, Kosmas X. Smyrnios & Sabine B. Klein, eds, Handbook of research in Family business, 1st ed 
(USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006) 80. 
2 Andrea Colli, The History of family business 1850- 2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 8. 
3 David Bork, Family Business Risky business - How to make it work, 2nded  (USA: Bork Institute for Family 
Business, 1993) at 1. 
4 Supra note 2. 
5 Supra note 1. 
6 Frank Hoy & Pramodita Sharma, “Navigating the family business education maze” in Poutziouris, Smyrnios & 
Klein, supra note 1, 11 at 17. 
7 Thomas M. Zellweger & Joseph H. Astrachan, “On the emotional value of owning a firm” (2008) 21:4 Family 
business review 347 at 349. 
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According to scholars’ estimates, the majority of independent businesses in the world are 
family owned and/or managed businesses.8 They account for 65 to 80 per cent of all 
worldwide businesses, and for about 40 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies.9 Moreover, 
these businesses are amongst the most enduring enterprises and account for about 70 per cent 
to 90 per cent of global GDP.10 However, the statistics, amongst others, always depend on 
how researchers define family businesses. Thus, the question of definition is  “the first and 
most obvious challenge” 11 scholars and researchers face. Therefore, countless are the 
endeavors to draw up the right definition for this enterprise. Suggested definitions vary 
between restrictive and inclusive classifications; some prevail family over business, or vice 
versa, others emphasize family members’ ownership or their involvement in management or 
governance, while others accentuate the generational transfer.  
Thus, despite the variation of analysis, the consensus of the scholars approves that family 
business is different from a non-family business. Moreover, they admit that all family 
businesses are alike in all countries; they share common characteristics, same problems, 
                                                
8 Paul Westhead & Marc Cowling, “Family firm research: The need for a methodological rethink” (1998) 23:1 
Entrepreneurship, Theory & Practice 31. 
9 Ralph Chami, “ What is different about Family Businesses” (2001) International Monetary Fund, online: 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/01/70 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0170.pdf> 
10 United Kingdom, Barclays wealth Insights, Family Business: In safe Hands? By Fergal Byrne (London: 2009) 
8, online: Barclays wealth Insights < online: The University of Vermont 
https://www.uvm.edu/business/vfbi/documents/2009BarclaysFamilyBusinessInsights.pdf at 4. 
11 Joseph H Astrachan, Sabine B Klein & Kosmas X. Smyrnios, “The F-PEC Scale of Family Influence: A 
proposal for solving the Family Business definition problem”(2002) 15:1 Family Business Review 45. 
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issues, and interests,12 but vary extensively in their objectives, values, cultures, and 
motivations. Notwithstanding this accord, the main reason for failing to approve, 
consensually, the definition of the family business resides in focusing mainly on comparing a 
family business to non-family counterparts. However, this has engendered vagueness and 
ambiguity that lead to a deadlock. Yet, such an impasse could never be overcome unless the 
following question is answered distinctly and regardless of other types of enterprises; namely,  
“What makes a business a family business?” 
It was agreed that family business combines two paradoxical systems and rationalities,13 
namely, the family and the business. Each system exhibits a high degree of complexity on its 
own. The rules of the family system are “qualitatively different” than those that govern 
business’ operations.14 Thus, the interaction between the family and business creates 
heterogeneous constructs15 that are inherently dynamic in nature.16 They combine in order to 
“produce a joint-system operating according to rules, which derive from the needs of separate 
                                                
12 Gallo Laguna de Rins & Miguel Ángel, "Family business in Spain: Research findings" in John L Ward & Drew 
Mendoza, Global perspectives on family business, (Chicago: Loyola University Chicago, Family Business 
Center, 1995) 45. 
13 Llyod P Steier, “Variants of agency contracts in family-financed ventures as a continuum of familial altruistic 
and market rationalities” (2003) 18 Journal of Business Venturing 597 at 598. 
14 Harvey S James Jr., “What Can the Family Contribute to Business? Examining Contractual Relationships” 
(1999) 12:1 Family Business Review 61. 
15 James J Chrisman, Jess Chua & Pramodita Sharma, “ Current trends and future directions in family business 
management studies: Toward a theory of the family firm” (2003) Coleman White Papers Series, Online: 
CiteseerX <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.43&rep=rep1&type=pdf>  at 10. 
16 Gaia Marchisio, Deborah Shepherd & Christines Woods, “A time-based theory of entrepreneurship for family 
business: The ooda loop” (Paper presented at 10th annual World Family Business Research Conference, 2010) at 
13, online: <http://lums.lancs.ac.uk/files/familybusiness/20110.pdf>  
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parts but adapt to the needs of the whole”.17Accordingly, the family business develops a 
unique meta-system that differs in terms of structures, relationships, roles, values, norms, 
principles, mechanisms, rights, obligations, opportunities, and challenges.18 Hence, it reveals a 
distinctive identity that does not and cannot operate as non-family counterparts.19 As such, 
the inquest of this leads us by probing:  
“What are the distinctive features of this meta-system?” 
Seeing that, the family shapes20 and permeates21 the business differently; it provides it with a 
special aura that creates a potentially challenging enterprise.22 In addition, it was conceived 
that the stability or instability of the family could have a great impact on the inter-personal, 
social, and business relationships.23 However, the question that may arise in this respect:  
How does the family affect the business? Alternatively, vice versa, how does the business 
affect the family? 
                                                
17 Peter Davis, “Realizing the Potential of the Family Business” (1983) 12:1 Organizational Dynamics 47. 
18 Supra note 9 at 4. 
19Alex Stewart & Michael A. Hitt, “Why Can’t a Family Business Be More Like a Nonfamily Business?: Modes 
of Professionalization in Family Firms”, (2012) 25:58 Family Business Review 58 at 68. 
20 Jess H Chua, James J Chrisman & Pramodita Sharma, “Defining the Family Business by behavior” (1999) 23:4 
Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice 19-39, online: Center for Entrepreneurial Management and innovation 
http://www.cemi.com.au/sites/all/publications/Chua%20Chrisman%20and%20Sharma%201999.pdf at 22. 
21 Dennis T Jaffe, Working with the ones you love: Conflict resolution & problem solving strategies for a 
successful family business (Berkley, CA: Conari Press, 1990) at 16. 
22 Ibid. 
23 IFC & OECD, Global Corporate Governance Forum, Practical Guide to Corporate Governance: Experiences 
from the Latin American Companies Circle -Experiences from the Latin American Companies Circle 
(Pennsylvania, Washington D.C: IFC & OECD 2009) at 134, online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43653645.pdf>  
  17 
Particularly, it is worth noting, each incident could reveal a source of vulnerability and threat, 
or be seen as strength and an opportunity, for both systems.24It depends on numerous factors, 
namely the generational development or the “multiple social identities”25 within both the 
family and business. However, the influence of the family on business rides on the extent and 
mode of family members’ involvement within the business,26 their togetherness, and their 
adherence to family values, as the “dynastic motive”.27 Considering that, all these dynamics 
determine the direction and success of the business.28  
Yet, the family business is recognized as a multi-generational organization. Thus, it was 
conceived that it represents a “state of becoming” rather than a "state of being".29 It crosses 
many transitional ownership and control stages; starting from the survival controlling founder 
stage, to concentrated sibling partnership, then the cousin consortium institutional or dynasty 
stage.30 Thus, such developmental stages bear a multitude of concerns and queries: 
                                                
24 Robert A Pollak “A transaction cost approach to families and households” (1985) 23:2 Journal of Economic 
Literature 581 at 587. 
25 Curtis F Matherne, J Kirk Ring & D‟Lisa N. McKee, “Multiple Social Identifications and the Family Firm” 
(2011) 13:1 Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management 24 at 25, online: Institute of behavioral and applied 
management <http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/articles/vol13/Article_2_Matherne.pdf>  
26 Pramodita Sharma, “Stakeholder mapping technique: toward the development of a family firm typology” 
(Paper presented at the Academy of Management’s annual conference in Denver, 2002) at 2, online: Wilfrid 
Laurier University <https://legacy.wlu.ca/documents/842/2003-01-MOB.pdf>  
27 Supra note 19 at 66. 
28 Supra note 21. 
29 Peter Davis & Douglas Stern,  “Adaptation, Survival, and Growth of the Family Business: An Integrated 
Systems Perspective” (1988) 1:1 Family Business Review 69 at 70 
30 Dennis T Jaffe & Sam H Lane, “Sustaining a family dynasty: Key Issues facing complex multigenerational 
Business- and Investment-owning families” (2004) 17:1 Family Business Review 81 at 82. 
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Can a family business adopt a unique legal form of business across generations while 
operating? Or should it change its legal form whenever a generational development 
occurs? 
As such, family businesses have no one model that fits all. They diverge in terms of sizes, 
resources, and their financial and competitive strategies. Thus, they range from a corner store, 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), to large corporations. They also operate locally, 
regionally, or internationally, and differ between closely held and publicly held companies.31 
Correspondingly, they adopt different legal forms; as they may take the form of a sole-
proprietorship, partnership, Limited Liability Company or a corporation. Nevertheless, family 
business structures could take the form of a pyramidal ownership structure, Zaibatsu or 
holding, or a horizontal structure in terms of companies’ affiliation or “Keiretsu”,32 or even a 
“family trust” within the common law system, or Family “Fiducia” within some countries of 
civil law, or “Family Waqf” according to the Islamic Sharia system. In addition, like every 
business decision, the process of determining the appropriate legal form of an enterprise 
occurs by “weighing the costs and benefits associated with each form”.33 Usually, the choice 
of the best legal form of the family enterprise shall meet the conditions, interests, intentions, 
                                                
31 William B Joyce, “On the importance of family in Family firms” (2007) 6:4 International Business & 
Economics research journal, online: The Clute Institute 
<http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/IBER/article/view/3358> 1. 
32 A keiretsu is a set of companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. It is a type of 
business group. There are three types of keiretsu: Horizontally diversified business groups, vertical 
manufacturing networks, and vertical distribution networks. See also: Wikipidea, sub verbo “Keiretsu” online:  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keiretsu> 
33 Deborah L Murphy & Edward Murphy, “Protecting the Limited Liability Feature of Your Family Business: 
Evidence from the U.S. Court” (2001) 14: 4 Family Business Review 325. 
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and apprehensions of the owners (partners or shareholders). Often, family members take into 
consideration the benefits of each form in terms of easiness to establish it, the legal process 
complications, the requirements that guarantee business sustainability, taxes burden, liabilities 
(limited or unlimited), and business governance structure and control. 
Accordingly, it reveals disputably, what would be the most convenient legal form that 
protects the rights and obligations of the family business stakeholders? Moreover, how 
can the rights, obligations, and liabilities incurred by family members as individual(s) 
who own individually or collectively the business and/or run it and /or govern it, be 
defined? 
Subsequently, could the family business be established under a structure and adopt a 
legal form that differs from any non-family business forms and structures? 
Furthermore, the generational development of the family business accentuates the motives of 
family members to join the business. In general, it is acknowledged that only trust and interest 
gather people in business. So the question that may arise in this context, what incites family 
members to gather under the umbrella of the family business? Is it trust or interest? In other 
word,  
Is it the “intuitu personae” or the “ intuitu pecunae”? Or,  
is there any other specific motive that drives family members to connect with and join 
the enterprise? 
Likewise, it is a truism that “the affectio societatis” is the common willpower that incites 
partners or shareholders to merge into one company, whether it is a partnership or a 
corporation. Moreover, it discloses as the fundamental construct that differentiates the 
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company from any other organization. However, the question that can take place in this 
regard,  
Is the “affectio societatis” the only common will that incites family members to merge 
into the family business? Or,  
Is there any particular intentional construct that bonds and assembles family members 
under this enterprise? 
Nonetheless, the business world stands between two primacies: “Shareholders’ primacy” that 
highlights the interest of shareholders while other stakeholders are protected through their 
contracts and “Stakeholders’ primacy”, which considers the interest of various stakeholders as 
the main asset of the company.. However, a corporation is defined as “an organic entity with 
multiple and shifting constituents. The best interests of the corporation will not be reducible to 
a simple formula or a set of fixed interest. It is not that shareholders' interests will not count or 
that bondholders' interests will become paramount, but that directors will have to give their 
best efforts to look at the overall impact of their decisions on creditors, suppliers, consumers, 
local community, and workers. After all, large corporations today are social and cultural 
entities as much as exclusively economic ones - shareholders are one kind of stakeholders”.34 
Accordingly, we may inquire:  
What defines a stakeholder in a family business? Is there a unique range of stakeholders 
for this enterprise?  
Hence,  
  What would be the legal effect of this categorization? 
                                                
34 Allan Hutchinson, “Why shareholder primacy?” Globe and Mail (11 June 2008) online: Globe and mail 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/why-shareholder-primacy/article1056012/?> 
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Subsequently, seeing the family impact within the family business,  
Which primacy shall prevail within this enterprise, is it the family or the business 
interest? 
Thus, appropriately, it is approved that most decisions and dealings concluded within the 
family business are governed by the contractual independence, informality, and deviation from 
some legal constraints. This could lead the discussion further towards the corporate veil that 
shields the family business; particularly when the family and business grow and become more 
complex.35 
Is it tolerable to lift the veil piercing theory when need be? 
Although it “allows plaintiffs to recover directly from shareholders of defendant corporations 
who would otherwise enjoy the benefit of limited liability”,36 still it bears, indisputably, an 
equitable common law remedy that usually applies when fraudulent act occurs. Nonetheless, 
this leads us to inquire:  
Is this theory applicable within the context of the family business? If yes, what would be 
its effects? Fundamentally, is this theory applicable within the civil law system? Or are 
there other equivalent remedies applicable in this regard? 
Nevertheless, family businesses are exposed to a wide range of environmental contingencies, 
such as the social, cultural, economic, institutional, and legal regimes, viz. the common law 
                                                
35 Supra note 23 at 127. 
36 Dante Figueroa, “Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States and Latin America” 
(2012) 50 Duquesne Law Review 683 at 686, online: Social Science Research 
Network<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148799>  
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and civil law systems.37 Overall, these factors absolutely affect the arrangements, operations, 
and decisions within the enterprise. However, despite the environmental dissimilarities across 
the globe, family businesses still face the same challenges that affect their longevity across 
generations. Yet, it is worth noting, the main challenges that threaten the family business’ 
endurance reveal in the undefined governance structure in addition to the succession dilemma. 
Both cases most often reveal the source of conflicts and litigations between family members. 
Moreover, they emerge increasingly, and analogously, within the common law and civil law 
countries. Since the judicial authorities resolve family business disputes through the orthodox 
legal channels, as a non-family business, they usually do not alleviate the resentful feuds 
between family members. However, despite the difference between the judicial mechanisms 
and approaches adopted in both systems, still they seek justice and fairness. In this respect, the 
questions that may arise:  
What are the legal standards that help judicial authorities resolve a family business 
conflicts that arise between family members differently, seeking the protection of both 
family and business? 
Moreover, are these standards applicable in both systems, namely the common law and the 
civil law system? 
In spite of the economic and social significance of the family business, and the increasing and 
extensive interest of all scholars from diverse disciplines - particularly in management, 
psychology, and economy, law researchers and jurists, in general, disregard the uniqueness of 
this enterprise. Therefore, a vast hole occurs in the legal literature that leads to a 
                                                
37 Llyod P Steier, “Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and 
entrepreneurship in East Asia” (2009) 26 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 513. 
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jurisprudential dearth in the civil law system, and the common law system as well. Although, 
the latter shows more flexibility while considering the distinctive mechanisms of the family 
business, yet the judicial decisions consider this enterprise as an exception. As one legal 
commentator has observed, “corporate law casebooks are astonishingly devoid of any 
systematic consideration of family dynamics…. The family owned and controlled firm is 
either absent or treated as an exception ... in prominent theories of the firm…. The most 
straightforward explanation for the oversight is doctrinal: as a matter of business enterprise 
law, affective ties among shareholders are irrelevant.”38 
Accordingly, since both traditions do not recognize the uniqueness of the family business, it is 
convenient to harvest and collect the different judicial mechanisms, measures, and legal 
institutions adopted in both the common law and civil law system, regarding the family 
business, in order to shed light on the judicial authority conviction vis-à-vis this enterprise. 
Therefore, it reveals appropriate to emphasize the significance of a family business at the 
macro level that shows the reason behind the interest of all scholars and researchers in 
studying this enterprise. Besides, it is convenient to highlight the attributes and the main 
challenges the family business encounters. Consequently, overviewing the multi-disciplinary 
literature could reflect the theoretical development regarding the distinctiveness of this 
enterprise, and permit translating the findings of the literature legally. Consequently, it will be 
easier to depict the legal form of the family business by underlining the main constructs that 
categorize this enterprise as a family business, then,  we can end up with the relevant  legal 
definition.  
                                                
38 Benjamin Means, “ Non-Market Values in Family Businesses” (2013) 54 William & Mary Law Review 1185 
at 1193, online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031624> 
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Aptly, espousing a systematic approach will allow us to emphasize the most significant 
interrelated internal and external dynamics, constructs and factors that affect its longevity 
across generations, and identify the family business properly. 
It is worth noting that this dissertation exposes as a conceptual legal paper, so it is not 
restricted to any legal origin or territory. Despite their convergence, it perceives all legal 
systems equally, as a rule that seeks regulation, stability, and justice. Moreover, seeing the 
complexity of both family and business systems, and the variety of legal institutions that 
govern each of its components, dynamics and mechanisms, I anticipate shedding light to each 
of the aforementioned without digging deeper into their specifics. I will resort to them to the 
limit that the legal and judicial means would eligibly allow demarcating and elucidating the 
distinctiveness of the family business. In addition, it is important to note that the terms 
enterprise, firm, and business are used interchangeably.  
Accordingly, this dissertation will be divided into two parts: 
PART I :  The significance of the family business 
PART II: The distinctive identity of the family business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Part I: The Significance of the Family Business 
 
Several studies highlight the difference between family and non-family businesses based on 
their characteristics. Family business is perceived through the combination of property and 
values,39 rather than amassing financial assets, seeking profits, and expansion. It reveals the 
vehicle that serves the business and social communities where it operates and integrates.40 
Therefore, the impact of the family enterprise is not limited to the family or business 
thresholds, but it extends to the macro level, specifically the economic, social and even 
political spheres. Accordingly, it is appropriate to highlight the peripheral impact of the family 
enterprise, the attributes that accentuate its significance, as well as the challenges encountered 
internally.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
39 Josep Tàpies, “Conclusion” in Josep Tàpies & John L Ward, eds, Family Values and Value Creation – The 
Fostering of Enduring Values within family-owned businesses (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 260 at 264. 
40 Miguel Angel Gallo, “Power as Service in Family Business” in Tàpies & Ward, ibid, 55 at 59. 
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1. The peripheral implications of the family business 
The peripheral significance of the family business relates to the external environment in which 
it operates; such as the market and its impact on the economy, the society, and even the 
political arena, through which some families build their political network relationships.  
1.1 Economy and family business  
The economic and social prominence41 of family businesses has encouraged scholars to point 
out that the basic economic and social building blocks in analyzing the economy are, "neither 
the individual worker, nor entrepreneur, nor corporations, but rather the families that create, 
control and operate businesses".42 They play a crucial role in social development43 towards 
building a stable economy.44 Social theorists relate this role to the family system, being the 
real engine that stimulates family businesses to take risks, to invest in human and financial 
capitals, and to provide continuity and social security.45 Therefore, they were portrayed as a 
“parallel economy”.46 Even in the most advanced economies, family enterprises are still a 
reality. Scholars show that they account for 65 to 80 per cent of all worldwide businesses, and 
                                                
41 William Bellet et al, “Family business as a field of study” (International Family Business Program Association 
(IFBPA) Task Force Baylor University, Waco, TX, 1996) [Unpublished] at 3. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ignacio Socías Piarnau, “Building blocks of society - There can be no sustainable development without support 
to families” (September 2, 2013) 23 The Family Watch, at 2, online: International Federation For Family 
Development <http://iffd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IFFDPapers23EN.pdf>  
44 Veaceslav Arion & Ninni Lehtinen, Statistical assessment research of business populations in Finland 
(Master’s Thesis, University of Jyvaskyla, School of Business and Economics, 2001) at15. 
45 Supra note 14 at 63. 
46 Supra note 41 at 2.  
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for about 40 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies.47 They exist as one of the main 
contributors to Gross domestic product (GDP)48 in all countries, and play a crucial role in 
creating employment and developing local economies. In this respect, the European 
Parliament in its own-initiative draft report on “family businesses in Europe” approves and 
recognizes that “family businesses are the single biggest source of employment in the private 
sector and that therefore what is beneficial to continuity, renewal and growth in the family 
business sector is conducive to continuity, renewal and growth in the European economy”.49 
Seeing that, they promote economic stability within the community they serve. Particularly, 
their in-depth knowledge and expertise in the industry in which they operate,50 along with 
their long-term investments, and entrenchment to their homegrown base, allow them to 
undertake risks and responsibilities, and easily adapt to the market. Therefore, it was 
conceived that in response to market failure, the family is considered “the interface between 
the market and the business”.51 They are powerful, and their strengths are endless and 
                                                
47 Supra note 9 at 3. 
48 Gross domestic product: The gross domestic product (GDP) is one the primary indicators used to gauge the 
health of a country's economy. It represents the total dollar value of all goods and services produced over a 
specific time period - you can think of it as the size of the economy. See also: Investopedia, online: Investopedia 
<http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/199.asp#ixzz3eZzgeAxf> 
49 European family Businesses, News Release, “Time for the Commission to act on family businesses” (8 
September 2015), online: European Family 
Businesses<http://www.europeanfamilybusinesses.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications/niebler-report-press-release-
08092015-2.pdf> 
50 Fernando Casado, “The Impact of Family Business on Society” in Tàpies & Ward, supra note 39, 197 at 209. 
51 Andrea Colli & Mary Rose, “Family Business” in Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan Zeitlin, eds, The Oxford 
handbook of business history, 1st ed (NY: Oxford University Press, 2008) 194 at 197.  
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widespread. Thus, it was rightly noted that if these closely-held family enterprises were to become 
extinct, “it would be a socio-economic disaster to our way of life”.52  
1.2 Society and family business 
Socially speaking, family enterprises are more effective in business than non-family 
counterparts.53 Family decision makers are typically less driven by money, returns, profits, and 
financial values. Being motivated to keep their reputations, they combine the traditional role 
of the family as a social unit,54 and the entrenchment to their legacy,55 along with the sense of 
ensuring their business longevity. This is particularly achieved through their relationships with 
external stakeholders (the community) and internal stakeholders (family, employees, clients, 
and others)  
1.2.1 Family business and the community 
Family enterprises are not just businesses; instead, they are embedded with all necessary 
touchstones to be active members within their communities.56 They are socially 
conscious57and more responsible than non-family businesses. Therefore, the reciprocal 
                                                
52 Leon A Danco, Beyond Survival, A Guide for Business Owners and Their Families, 8th ed (USA: Predictable 
Futures, The Business Family Centre, 2003). 
53Supra note 21 at 29. 
54 Marta Berent-Braun et al, “Family ownership, innovation and other context variables as determinants of 
sustainable entrepreneurship in SMEs: An empirical research study” (2010) 30:19 Frontiers of Entrepreneurship 
Research, at 9, online: Knowledge web on SMEs and Enterpreneurship < http://www.entrepreneurship-
sme.eu/pdf-ez/H201006.pdf >  
55Supra note 53.  
56 John A Davis, Elye L Pitts & Keely Cormier, “ Challenges Facing Family Companies in the Gulf Region” 
(2000) 13:3 Family Business Review 217 at 220. 
57 Supra note 41 at 6. 
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enduring relationships are easily nurtured within their social environment. However, the 
strong sense of responsibility towards the community is not limited to the family business 
founders, it is also diffused to all subsequent generations.58 The lingering closeness and 
attachment is translated through the actively long existence of the family business in the 
market. Also, their commitment is usually justified by being engaged in serving the 
surroundings, sharing prosperity with them, and avoiding any activity that may destroy or 
threaten a good rapport between the tripartite: the family, the business, and the community.59 
In return, the latter rely profoundly on family enterprises as a resource for business transactions, 
from which various stakeholders can benefit; namely employees, clients, financial institutions, 
suppliers.60 Therefore, in addition to fulfilling financial objectives, family business decisions 
always enclose the following apprehensions: 
 1) To comply strongly with business and family ethics, which reflect the family image within 
the society and the market.  
2) To adopt a long-term business strategy that takes into account its sustainability across 
generations.  
3) To recognize the environmental and social needs; so to be involved in philanthropic 
activities and social causes,61targeting closely tied stakeholders to the family such as family 
                                                
58W Gibb Dyer, “Examining the “Family Effect” on Firm Performance” (2006) 19:4 Family Business Review 
253 at 263. 
59 Supra note 54 at 9. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Lorraine M Uhlaner, H J M (Annemieke) van Goor‐Balk, & Enno Masurel, “Family business and corporate 
social responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms” (2004) 11:2 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development 186 at 187. 
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members, sports clubs, places of worship, religious foundations, charities, services and civic 
organizations. 
1.2.2 Family business and internal stakeholders 
Family enterprises forge self-reliant people in healthy communities.62 Although, family spirit 
in business is not limited to family members, rather, it ranges within all echelons of the 
enterprise, and expands to non-family stakeholders. Having the sense of paternalism, family 
business owners often deal with non-family stakeholders as their extended family members, 
particularly non-family employees. 63 Most of them usually aim at establishing personal and 
trustworthy relationships with their workforce, in the best interests of the business. Moreover, 
employees rely on family owners for their self-security, as great backers, mainly during 
financial, economic crises and difficult times. In response, loyalty, responsibility, and 
accountability spread between and among the enterprise, the individual worker, and the 
community.64 For this reason, family businesses have lower employee turnover rates, and are 
usually slower to lay off people in a downturn than non-family businesses. Additionally, 
satisfying their employees has its particular impact on customer contentment. Therefore, it was 
concluded that family enterprises as niche-focused, play an immense role in creating positive 
interactions with their clients, 65 offering high quality,66 preferable, and approachable customer 
                                                
62 Supra note 41 at 4. 
63 Supra note 61 at 188. 
64 Supra note 46. 
65 Amy R Lyman, “Customer service: Does family ownership make a difference?” (1991) 4:3 Family Business 
Review 303. 
66 Ernesto J Poza, Family Business, 4th ed (USA:  South-western Cengage Learning, 2014) at 4. 
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service.67 Nevertheless, the obsession of family members to build a family business legacy, 
and their desire to survive, incite them to make significant sacrifices, and sustain long-term 
losses to sometimes save their enterprises and the community around it. 68 As such, they may 
take pay cuts and suspend dividends if necessary. However, these decisions sound alien for 
non-family companies, and difficult to apply from a neutral business perspective.   
Moreover, despite their role as job creators on a larger scale than non-family counterparts,69 
the principal concern of family businesses resides in designing jobs for family members, on 
whom they rely to keep business in the family. Therefore, they offer a constructive means to 
break in for those fortunate enough to have such opportunities in their families;70 particularly 
when labor markets are constricted and skilled managers and professionals are lacking, 
especially in developing countries.71  
Furthermore, family businesses offer lucrative and attractive opportunities for women,72 
seeing their limited success in filling “the senior ranks of most large, publicly-held 
corporations”;73 thus, women roles as family members are sometimes implicit and invisible in 
family enterprises.  
                                                
67 Supra note 41 at 6.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Christian Michael Adendorff, The development of a cultural family business model of good governance for 
Greek family businesses in South Africa (PhD thesis, Rhodes University, 2005) at 46. 
70 Craig E Aronoff & John L Ward, “Family-Owned Businesses: A Thing of the Past or a Model for the Future?” 
(1995) 8:2 Family Business Review 121at 126. 
71 Supra note 14 at 65. 
72 Supra note 41 at 6. 
73 Steven Prokesch, “Renewing Traditional Values” The New York Times  (June 10, 1986) online: The New York 
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/10/business/renewing-traditional-
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1.3 Politics and family business 
What lies behind the door of the family and business usually extends to politics. However, the 
rapport between family businesses and politics is of twofold, namely the decision-making 
process and the joint-interest of families, businesses, and political leaders.  
1.3.1 The decision-making process and politics 
The economic and social role of families and their businesses have a great impact on 
accommodating “the discord between dynasty and democracy”.74 The decision-making 
process is ingrained in the family and subsequent generations. In consequence, the decision-
making process within the company is usually nothing more than the projection of the family 
decision-making process, which is also stretched out to the political sphere. Therefore, dealing 
with the community and the political life is no more than an extension of the discipline 
applicable at home. 
1.3.2 The joint-interests between family, business and politicians 
Within a competitive market, money and power intertwine; so family and personal 
connections with politicians reveal a mutual interest for both sides. They usually invest in and 
build them on a strong basis, namely trust and credibility. On one hand, these rapports allow 
families to access key information that could increase business profits, favorable benefits, and 
                                                
values.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/F/Families%20and%20Family%20Life&pagewanted=
2&pagewanted=print>  
74 Supra note at 5.  
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opportunities.75 In addition, these connections enable families in business to influence the 
governmental decision-making process, in order to create favorable regulations to the industry 
and the community as a whole. 76 On the other hand, politicians are likely to claim reciprocity 
in return for the special support provided. They may request political campaign sponsorship, 
lobbying, collaborating, and alerting the government, or appointing retired government 
officials as directors. Hence, it was declared that when “the captain of industry no longer runs 
business,  [he] “ no longer runs politics”.77 However, it is worth noting, politics’ control over 
family companies vary between jurisdictions, depending on the degree of bureaucracy, and the 
legal enforcement of property rights through which politicians and governments can induce 
families to invest in the “ political capital” and bargain so as to reach their objectives.78  
1.4 The cultural impact on the family business 
Regardless of the stage of development of a country’s social system,79 the family and social 
culture still play an important role in the economic growth of a society.80 The culture reveals 
as the human constructed complex system that reflects the implicit patterns in the collective 
                                                
75 Hsi-Mei Chung, Hung-Bin Ding, “Political connections and family business diversification” in Cary L. 
Cooper, Sydney Finkelstein, eds, Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions -Volume 9 (UK: Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, 2010) 135 at 136. 
76 Ibid at 138. 
77 Mark S Mizruchi,  “ Berle and means revisited: the governance and power of large US corporations” (2004) 33:  
Theory and Society 579 at 3. 
78  Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, “ Introduction” in Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, Convergence and 
persistence in corporate governance, 1st ed (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1 at 22. 
79 Gary S Becker, “Family Economics and Macro Behavior” (1988) 78:1 The American review 1 at 10. 
80 E Richard Gold & Tal Srulovicz, “Commercializing University research: beyond Economic Incentives” in F 
Scott Kieff & Troy A Paredes, eds, Perspectives on Commercializing Innovation (NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015) 560 at 561. 
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mindset.81 Hence, it parallels the enduring behaviors, ideas, attitudes, traditions, knowledge, 
beliefs, art, morals, customs, capabilities, and habits acquired and shared by a large group of 
people, as members of the society,82 and transmitted over generations. This set of mental 
programs consists of three elements: universal, collective, and individual programs,83 all of 
which control the individual’s responses in a given situation.84 The universal program is 
common to all human beings irrespective of gender, ethnicity, nationality, and color. The 
collective program is the one shared between the individual and others in the community. The 
individual program is unique to each person and consists of a mix of the inherited values; the 
values formed by the surroundings, and those shaped by the person.85 In our context, the 
universal program can be understood by the culture of the society in which the family business 
operates, while the collective program is the family culture, and the individual program is the 
personal culture, independently from the family. However, there is not a single and 
homogeneous culture around the world. Since history varies, the corpus of traditions that 
affects the functioning of human societies differs. Moreover, national cultures diverge in their 
                                                
81 Pramodita Sharma & S Manikutty, “ Shedding of unproductive resources in family firms: Role of family 
structure and community culture” (2003) Best-unpublished paper award winner at the annual conference of 
Family Firm Institute, Toronto, at 9, online: CiteSeerX< 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.201.1565&rep=rep1&type=pdf >  
82 Detmar Straub et al, “Toward a Theory-Based measurement of Culture”(2002) 10:1 Journal of Global 
Information Management 13-23 at 14, online: Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades 
<http://www.icshu.net/downloads/Unesco/Straub,%20Loch,%20Evaristo%20et%20al.pdf> 
83 Ahmed Hamdoun Al-Soufi, Cultural Differences Between Arabs and Danes- The Intracultural Diversity’s 
Effect on Intercultural negotiations (Master thesis, AARHUS University, EU Business and Law, 2005) at 14, 
online: AARHUS University <http://pure.au.dk/portal-asb-student/files/1841/000140603-140603.pdf > 
84Geert Hofstede, “Cultural constraints in management theories” (1993) 7:1 Academy of Management Executive 
81 at 89. 
85 Supra note 83. 
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subcultural systems, which intersect and diverge around several factors; such as sub-
geographies, family systems, ethnicity, gender, governance institutions, markets, economic 
imbalances, religious and legal systems.86Therefore, various cultural dimensions affect not 
only societies at large, but also families and businesses. At the macro level, these dimensions 
embrace the power distance,87 uncertainty avoidance,88 masculinity versus femininity,89 long-
term versus short-term orientation,90 and individualism versus collectivism.91 However, the 
major dimension that is important to emphasize in our context is the difference between two 
broad cultural groupings, the individualistic and collectivistic cultures, and their impact on the 
                                                
86 Vipin Gupta & Nancy Levenburg, “A Thematic Analysis of Cultural Variations in Family Businesses: The case 
project” (2010) 23:2 Family Business Review 155 at 166. 
87 Power distance is related to different solutions to the basic problems of human inequality. It is the extent to 
which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power to be distributed 
unequally. See also supra note 81. 
88 Uncertainty avoidance is related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future. It is the 
extent to which a culture programs its members to feel either comfortable or uncomfortable in unstructured 
situations. Attempts to avoid uncertainty in cultures are manifested through devising of rules, procedures and 
codes of behavior, and through institutionalizing these codes. See ibid. 
89 Masculinity vs. femininity is related to the division of emotional roles between men and women. It refers to the 
distribution of roles between genders and manifested by the values highly regarded: such as aggressiveness, 
competitiveness, seeking after material success and power vs. tenderness, cooperation and seeking softer values 
in life. See ibid. 
90 Long- vs. short-term orientation is related to the choice of focus of people’s efforts: the future or the present. It 
is the extent to which a culture programs its members to accept delayed gratification of their material, social and 
emotional needs. See ibid. 
91 Individualism vs. collectivism is related to the integration of individuals into primary groups. It is the degree to 
which individuals are supposed to look after themselves or remain integrated into groups, usually around the 
family. These groups protect them in times of adversity in exchange for unquestioning loyalty to the group. See 
ibid. 
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individual’s behaviors and decisions. Also, they are the most identified in the literature, due to 
their visible dissimilarities between eastern and western countries.92  
At the micro level, four cultural dimensions can affect the structural decision-making process 
in family and business, namely authority versus liberty and equality versus inequality.93 The 
former is a relationship based on the decision-making process, and governance in both family 
and business. The latter determines succession and inheritance mechanisms, and regulates the 
distribution of property between family members; whether it should be based on an equal 
share between siblings, or the parents can reign freely on it, and favor one child over others, or 
the property is indivisible. However, it is worth noting, when the inheritance system is 
religious-based, it operates as “a convenient proxy for culture”. 94 In this case, parents are 
bound by its principles and rules in all matters related to family relationships, such as 
protection of incapable (minors, orphans, and others), polygamy, business, and wealth 
property according to the Islamic Sharia system for instance. Accordingly, culture and law are 
unquestionably intertwined to affect people’s decisions within the community.  
                                                
92 Briony D Pulford, Angela Johnson & May Awaida, “A cross-cultural study of predictors of self-handicapping 
in university students” (2005) 39 Personality and Individual differences 727 at 733, online:  University of 
Leicester <http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/psychology/ppl/bdp5/pdf/PAID2005.pdf>  
93 Supra note 81 at 3. 
94 Amir N Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H Schwartz, “Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance” (2005) 
25:2 International Review of Law and Economics 229 at 232. 
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1.4.1 Individualism versus collectivism 
The individualistic culture is “the unique cosmological belief of the West”, 95 and the main 
engine of markets’ growth.96 It places a low emphasis on broad social networks of extended 
families and friends; where the self is separated from others, as an end in itself.97 The person 
is, therefore, more important than the group. Thus, people think in terms of “I”, and focus on 
the individual rewards and actions. The behavior of individuals tends to be measured by their 
own likes, dislikes, personal fate, achievements, competition,98 and the cost-benefit analysis.99 
They tend to separate diverse scopes of life, such as family, business, and leisure, pursuing 
their personal interests. Therefore, they easily initiate new dealings,100 and involve in 
negotiations straightforwardly. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship, as other 
business rapports, tends to be contractual in nature.101 While in the East, the collectivistic 
culture prevails.102 Their behavior is largely regulated by in-group beliefs, common attitudes, 
values, norms, and traditions.103 Also, “in-group fate [and] achievement, [..] integrity, 
obedience and security” 104 are more accentuated. All in all are naturally based on extended 
                                                
95 Rohan Williamson, “The role of culture in Finance” in H Kent Baker & John R Nofsinger, eds, Behavioral 
Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets (USA: Wiley, 2010) 631 at 635. 
96 Supra note 80. 
97 Supra note 83 at 15. 
98Supra note 92 at 728. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Gert Jan Hofstede, Catholijn M. Jonker & Tim Verwaart “Individualism and Collectivism in Trade Agents” in 
Ngoc Thanh Nguyen et al, eds, New frontiers in applied artificial intelligence (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008) 
492 at 495. 
101 Supra note 81 at 17.  
102 Supra note 98. 
103 Supra note 82 at 14.  
104Supra note 98. 
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families, 105 whereas the set of family patterns shapes the actions of individuals within the 
society.106 Business relationships in collectivistic communities tend to be established between 
family members and friends, and it is more likely to preserve the rapports over business and 
the integration into the family. Moreover, individuals learn to overlap all spheres of life with 
the same extended group of people, as the burden of reputation predominates strongly.107 They 
seek the group’s interests over the individual’s interests. Furthermore, relationships with their 
employees are most often informal and verbal; they rely on a sense of obligation towards the 
community or the family. 
However, despite the aforementioned divergences, family businesses exist at the heart of both 
cultures, and face the same challenges and problems. The difference resides in the family 
business culture influenced by the surrounding community,108 which conducts family 
members, unconsciously, toward embracing the approaches and mechanisms that harmonize 
with their cultural concerns and primacies, in order to deal with these challenges efficiently, 
and allow the family to stay in business. 
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1.4.2 Culture and law  
The legal system is presumed to be in harmony with the social culture to interact mutually, as 
it is nothing but the product of social forces and relations.109 However, scholars diverge in 
their standpoint towards law and its rapport with culture; while positivists perceive law as “an 
autonomous system of officially sanctioned and logically derived rules and procedures”, 110 
others consider law as an anthropological document, “one of the most important expressions 
of the “spirit of a people”, [...] a continuous thread in an evolving culture”.111 Moreover, it is 
deemed placed in the “center of social life rather than at the margins”; it is more the 
“expression of broader social forces in the transformation toward modernity and as a channel 
for developing social sensibilities, interests and actions”.112 A culture is the bedrock of its 
customs; whereas common repetitions of consensual practices take place in a particular social 
setting, and emerges as mandatory. So, it reflects as “the raw material of law”, 113 one of its 
sources of law. It reflects “the perseverance of the communitarian aspiration”,114 and 
reproduces the existing attitudes and informal practices into law, to disclose “the interactional 
foundations of enacted law”.115 
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1.4.2.1 Family and constitutional law  
Despite the cultural divergence, all countries consider the family as the bedrock of the society, 
and it “is entitled to protection by both the society and the State”.116 This position is also 
legally interpreted by many countries, and emphasized constitutionally. However, it is more 
likely mentioned in the constitution of the civil law systems, than in the common law system 
that takes the family for granted, as it is more a question of fact rather than law; seen as a 
series of relationships between individuals. In this respect, it was quoted “the legal concept of 
the family as a collection of separate legal individuals rather than an organic part of the body 
politic.”117 Although, amongst common law countries, the Republic of Ireland reveals as an 
exception, for instance, since, it imposes a constitutional obligation over the state to protect 
the family, and guard the institution of marriage with particular care. According to section 
41.1.1°-2°: 
The State recognizes the family as the natural primary and fundamental unit 
group of Society, and as a moral institution, possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law. The state, 
therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the 
necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation 
and the State.118  
 
For the civil law countries, family policies and measures reflect their position regarding the 
family. For example, in France, it is stated in the constitution of 4 October 1958, that the 
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preamble of the constitution of October 27, 1946 completes and confirms the human rights 
determined and defined by the declaration of 1789. In the preamble of 1946, it was stated, 
“The nation shall provide the individual and the family with the conditions necessary to their 
development.”119 The significant point in this statement reveals in the distinction between the 
family as a group and the individual. Since each of them requires a distinct approach in 
harmony with the relevant needs and desires.  In like manner, the article 15 of the constitution 
of United Arab Emirates declares: “The family is the basis of society. It is founded on 
morality, religion, ethics, and patriotism. The law shall guarantee its existence, safeguard and 
protect it from corruption.”120 Moreover, countries differ in their approach towards protecting 
the family and its collective interest, even in countries of the same legal tradition. This is 
usually echoed through  “family policies”, which are more evident in civil law systems than in 
common law systems. Moreover, some authors differentiated between three categories of 
countries based on the visibility of the family policy more than on its content. 121 These 
categories are as follow:  
1. Countries that adopt an explicit and comprehensive family policy, such as Sweden, 
Norway, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and France. 
2. Countries with less visibly explicit but additive viz. hitchhiking from other policies, 
such as Germany, Finland, and Denmark 
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3. Countries with an implicit or reluctantly expressed family policy, such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. 122 
 The aforementioned overview, in addition to many other countries,123 show how nations 
accentuate the value of the family and stipulate the necessity to adopt the essential measures to 
protect it. They perceive it only from the socio-economic perspectives and strictly limit it to 
the nuclear family, more to the spouses jointly, who cooperate for the well being of the 
family.124 As such, family policy measures and concerns do not exceed to the business sphere 
as within the context of the family business, although, family and business are correlated in 
the latter. 
1.4.2.2 Culture and corporate law 
It was argued, “[...] We are not materialists. Culture and ideology, not only value 
maximization and self-interest, [but also it] might influence a country’s choice of corporate 
law.”125 So, law and culture intermingle and shape each other reciprocally; 126 “culture affects 
legal systems just as laws affect changes in culture”.127 Hence, a culture allows us to 
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understand the internal law that controls individuals within their family and business, in terms 
of behaviors and decisions. For instance, French and most Arab countries are embedded in an 
implicit culture, oriented toward the past, 128 whereas people are rooted into traditions. They 
“emphasize the context and operate in an analog manner, in a continuum”.129 Legal 
institutions are sacred; hierarchy and centralized authority describe their families as well as 
their organizations.130 Contrariwise, the explicit culture presides in North America, and the 
legal system focuses more on the person than the legal institution.131 People focus on the 
present and the future, 132  and companies are embedded into innovations.133 They endorse 
functionality by establishing horizontal and contractual relationships, 134 and  easily accept 
outsiders. Therefore, for instance, the mainstream in this region is to appoint independent 
directors to the company board. Besides, in Germany and Japan, for example, the cooperative 
and egalitarian cultures are one of the reasons that generated the co-determination, which 
gives employees unique participatory rights in the decision making process of companies, and 
to be represented on the company boards. 
However, despite this reciprocal liaison between culture, customs, and law, still the 
recognition of the family business as a distinctive legal institution shows an inconsistency and 
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a disconnected legal appropriation within cultures. As such, the legal circumstances do not 
correspond to the dominant groups of this enterprise, who create powers and meanings 
spontaneously on a daily basis; those who accentuate the uniqueness of this enterprise 
throughout their fixated implicit and informal practices that maintain their family and business 
stratifications.135 Yet, family enterprises are into law, considered amongst other forms of 
business, and operate according to the conventional and neutral channels of law, they are away 
from law as a specific and distinctive form of business. In this respect, law does not 
orchestrate with the existing social practices; neither participates in the constitution of a well-
defined and structured family business culture in the people’s mind, practices, and social 
relations. Therefore, the consciousness of family business actors cannot apprehend customized 
legal actions and arrangements that dictate, protect, and promote their interests, which 
convene with the distinctiveness of this enterprise and emphasize its constructs and 
mechanisms lucidly. Therefore, law discloses sometimes as dysfunctional within the family 
business context, since it does not recognize the role of the family within the family business, 
nor create the apposite balance that regulates the business interaction between family 
members, in order to preserve the continuity and stability of this viable enterprise. It fails 
establishing the framework of the family business, by providing a tight grid of normative and 
legal arrangements that help families and their members to overcome jumbled and unexpected 
events in their enterprise. Besides, the lack of legal regulation does not allow lawyers 
functioning efficiently, as it restrains their reasonable arguments, missing the family-business-
oriented routes that support their position while handling the relevant legal problems. Such a 
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status reflects the court’s normative identity, as they prevail the conventional legal approaches 
of arguing and persuasion applied on all businesses over weighing the family business rules 
embedded in practice, and its dynamics through which this enterprise operates. Consequently, 
considering the uniqueness of this firm, law and culture belong to two distinct shores. 
Therefore, the dialectic between the practice of the family business and law shall take place in 
order to articulate this enterprise as a distinctive legal institution. 
1.5 Legal systems and family business 
Family businesses operate within different legal environments that have a great impact on 
their daily operations, and affect their longevity amongst generations. Seeing that various legal 
systems rule the world; two major systems govern most nations, namely the common law 
system, and the civil law system. The common law system finds its origins in England, as an 
Anglo-Saxon common law system, while the civil law system carries   Romano-Germanic 
roots. Yet, the countries that adopt the same legal system, whether the common law or the 
civil law, still differ from each other; seeing each country has its own community,  and 
culture. They seek similar public objectives, such as ensuring justice, but they operate 
differently in terms of their legal means, institutions, procedures, and enforcement. 
1.5.1 Judicial differences 
It was concluded that the common law system is linked to a lower formalism of judicial 
procedures, and a greater judicial independence than the civil law system.136 The main 
difference resides in the priority of legal sources. The common-law system prevails 
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jurisprudence; judges respect, apply, and interpret the legal statutes, but they are also endowed 
with a large power to make the law.137 Yet, judicial opinions138and precedents are the primary 
source of law, as defined by the binding principle of “Stare decisis”,139which governs the 
hierarchy of courts. Accordingly, the common law system was described, “the fruit of organic 
growth rather than a more or less complete blueprint of life.”140 It is considered an "open",141 
adaptable, and “modest”142 system that reflects the “realities of life”,143 and depends on 
changing circumstances and cases. The case-by-case system develops a sense of general rules 
and internal reasoning,144which allows judges and courts to create new rules for new facts.145 
The judicial process is investigational, seeking to espouse the proper balance between the law 
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and new social norms, in which it is rooted. 146 In terms of evidence, the common law is based 
on the principle of witnesses’ cross-examination. Thus, judges usually go through a detailed 
examination of the case, and uphold the oral evidence over the written one. Lawyers are more 
pragmatic and inductive.147 Vis-à-vis the contract, in the common-law system, judges are 
limited to the literal and precise terminology of the contract, the reasonable expectation of the 
promises, and/or the so called “parol evidence rule”.148 They do not extend their scope to 
interpret the law out of this sphere, nor by searching the parties’ intent and imposing 
additional implied obligations on them, or interfering to correct, review or amend the contract. 
In the event of litigation, a party shall provide evidence of the negotiations in order to prove 
that the terms of the contract are different from the written one.149 
Conversely, the civil law system is founded on the separation of powers between the 
legislative power that passes law and the judicial authority, which applies a comprehensive 
codified regulation. 150 Therefore, courts rely on political institutions and economic forces to 
draw laws. Consequently, judges establish the facts of the case and apply the effective 
legislative codes as the primary source of law, rather than creating it; they are endowed with a 
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discretionary power over the precedents, and consider it as secondary in importance.151 Their 
role is limited to clarifying the law content, interpreting it; and when the latter reveals 
ambiguous; they explore the intention of the legislator through the “preliminary address” of 
the law.152 So, the civil law systems’ countries adopt a systematic, authoritative, and guiding 
statute of broad coverage.153 It consists of connected concepts and rules,154 which deal with all 
situations based on a limited number of general principles that often lack details. Therefore, 
lawyers seem more inclined to be conceptual and deductive.155 The freedom of contract along 
with the parties’ intentions, governs the proceedings; contracts are binding and final, despite 
the changes that may considerably occur after the conclusion of the contract. 156 Judges are not 
restricted to a contract’s terminologies and expressions; rather, they rely on its interpretation, 
on the parties’ intentions, 157as well as their will when the contract was concluded.158 They 
only enforce contractual responsibilities within the constraints of public interests. In Quebec, 
for instance, the judicial authority is not limited to the literal meaning of the words of the 
contract; rather its interpretation shall be observed in view of the common intention of the 
parties, the nature of the contract, and the circumstances in which it was formed, and the 
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interpretation given by the parties, and usage.159However, it is noteworthy, individuals in 
Germany are bound by standards of conduct and ethics, in addition to the contract stipulations. 
Moreover, considering the law cannot predict all possible situations, and its function resides in 
developing new rules and tackling problems in society, judges can fill the gaps that may 
occur.160 Therefore, they can interfere and modify the contract in three major cases, based on 
the notions of good faith and fair dealing. They complement it according to what was provided 
by the parties (Ergdnzungsfunktion – supplementary function"), or amend it if it is 
inappropriate and inconsistent with the fair dealing (Schrankefunktion-barrier function), or 
adapt it to new circumstances (Korrekturfunktion – correction function).161 
Correspondingly, legal rules in the common law and civil law systems reflect nothing but the 
tradition that is deeply rooted in the country, the role of law in the society, the culture and the 
way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. However, despite their 
differences,162 both lead for nothing but justice. Moreover, their common ground reveals that 
in the context of family business, there is a lack of legal recognition of this firm’s 
distinctiveness. Nevertheless, seeing there is no one model that fits all family businesses, since 
they diverge between various legal forms, family cultures and organizations, the common law 
system proves to be more adaptable to resolve their variable conflicts and litigations between 
parties over generations than the civil law system; seeing that the latter courts’ adjudications 
are more restricted to codes and written rules. In this context, it was noted:  
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In countries of the Romano-Germanic family,[...] in which doctrinal writing is 
held in high esteem, the legal rule is not considered as merely a rule appropriate 
to the solution of a concrete case. Through the systematizing efforts of the 
doctrinal authors, the legal rule has risen to a higher level of abstraction: it is 
viewed as a rule of conduct, endowed with a certain generality, and situated 
above the specific application which courts or practitioners may make of it in any 
concrete case...163 
 
Accordingly, family businesses require nothing more than a transparent, well-organized, and 
implemented legal environment, which guarantees its longevity, decreases litigation rates 
between family members, and protects the family wealth. These circumstances can exist, 
whether in the common law or civil law system, only through the legal recognition of the 
uniqueness of this enterprise. Thus, based on the mechanisms applied in each system, the 
corporate contracts, evidences, and facts will be submitted, perceived, and analyzed 
differently. Consequently, the courts can then settle a sustainable, unchallenging justice. In 
this context, we refer, for instance, to the decision of the court of cassation in Bahrain, number 
280 in 2006, issued on August 1, 2007. The court dismissed the company contract concluded 
between family members for its simulation, as it was proved that the patriarch was in full 
control of the company, while the offspring have never participated in the decision-making 
process as shareholders, or shared the company profits. 164 
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1.5.2 Family law  
Family law is always subject to the continual tension between order and movement, stability 
and change. It calls for altruism, solidarity, and economic welfare that diverge from 
competition, division, and meritocracy. Family law usually regulates marriage, divorce, 
custody or filiations, succession, inheritance, wills and gifts, along with all the relevant rights, 
obligations, privileges and entitlements. Its rules are usually translated through two main 
patterns, namely the status and the contract.165 Family status in family law only deals with the 
fact of being a spouse, or a cohabitee by choice,166 by adoption or by guardianship,167or that is 
created by birth process168 being a parent and a child. However, this law always disregards the 
status of grandparents, siblings, in-laws, cousins, nieces, nephews, aunts, and uncles as family 
members. Although, whatever the status within the family is, it always engenders a variety of 
moral rights and duties depending on the type of family members’ relationship. Besides, the 
family status plays a major role vis-à-vis the inheritance rules. 
In terms of contract, family law regularizes two types of contracts: The explicit contracts and 
the implicit contract. The explicit formal contracts might be bilateral or unilateral, such as 
marriage, and testamentary will. However, there is a hidden and overlooked contract that is 
usually concluded implicitly between family members. This contract encloses the shared rules, 
values, beliefs, perceptions, and expectations among family members.169 Undeniably, it is the 
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invisible hand behind any decision made within the family context. It underlines the unspoken 
roadmap that leads family members in their interrelationships; it reflects in their behaviors and 
attitudes. Moreover, it promotes and persists as the family culture, enclosing traditions, creeds, 
rituals, and resources, transmits throughout generations.170 Furthermore, it covers the affective 
core duties and rights towards the family and towards each other, depending on their status 
within the family. Therefore, it was conceived that the family “is richer in facts than it is in 
law”.171 Indeed, the common law and civil law systems are alike in their concerns regarding 
family law, but they differ in their perspective towards the types of relationships, and the 
established powers within the family.172 However, it is worth nothing, naturally, family norms, 
conceptions, and obligations are deep-seated in the religious traditions of all countries. For 
instance, catholic and protestant teachings permeated the general culture that provides a moral 
and sacred basis for family law in the western world. Similarly, Islamic Sharia teachings are 
one of the main sources of law in the Arab world and many countries in the Far East, (e.g. 
Indonesia, Malaysia). Many countries accommodated Sharia law, as a source of the civil law, 
such as the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Countries); others still consider its separateness; thus, they 
apply the mixed system, namely religious teachings and civil law, for example Lebanon and 
Egypt, 173 whereas the religious law is a mandatory distinct regulation, depending on the 
individuals’ beliefs, in addition to the civil law system.  
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However, since the family law deals with far-reaching of family matters, it is pertinent to 
analyze three main points relevant to the family business context, namely the family interest, 
the family patrimony, and inheritance and succession.  
1.5.2.1 Family interest 
Common law countries barely recognize “the interest of the family”, contrary to the civil law 
system, the main source and foundation of family law,174 whereas, the “interest of the family” 
is a legal and guiding principle that creates a balance between the good policy and fairness. 
Although, depending on the jurisdiction, the perception of this principle is more often 
restricted towards the best interest of the minor,175 or the rights and duties of marriage176 and 
equality between spouses.177 For instance, in France, it was mentioned within the context of 
the matrimonial community property, that each spouse is liable for the failure to properly 
manage and administer family assets. In case of the spouse’s refusal, or a missed approval, 
whenever his/her consent is required for a certain transaction, the court shall examine whether 
the transaction is in the interest of the family. 178 Also, the latter is perceived if a married 
couple seeks to change their matrimonial regime.179 The Italian legal perspective observes the 
interest and the orientation of family life, by obliging spouses to collaborate for welfare 
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concerns.180 In Germany, the interest of the family is emphasized through the paternal 
authority; hence, the father is the head of the family and its representative, and he is not 
allowed to act for his self-benefit.181 In Canada, the “interest of the family” is mentioned in the 
civil code of Quebec, within the context of rights and duties of spouses in marriage182 or civil 
union,183 and within the context of the partnership of acquests, the administration of property, 
and liability for debts.184 It is observed as compensable. However, it is worth nothing, all 
social measures taken in Quebec seek to protect the general interests, and do not aim at 
protecting the family itself. They are usually developed in response to particular crises, or 
perceived problems, such as issues of poverty, gender inequality.185 In the same line, the paid 
maternity leave in Canada is categorized under the unemployment policy rather than family 
concerns. Also, in England, for instance, the interest of the family is highlighted within the 
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protection of the matrimonial home against its sale in case of bankruptcy.186 Consequently, 
“family law”, in general, reveals as founded on property, financial perspective, and contract 
whether in terms of matrimonial, parent-child relations, or succession laws. Based on the 
aforementioned, the question that may arise, can the “ interest of the family” principle, surpass 
the threshold of the narrow perspective, limited to marriage and parenthood, and extend to the 
family business context?  
Seeing that, the concept of the “interest of the family” is legally acknowledged, whether 
specifically or through the “public interest” principle, and considering that the economic 
aspect transpires genuinely through it, this principle can be easily stretched out to the family 
business context. Particularly, the interest of the family always prevails in the first generation 
or over generations, whenever a risk threatens the family reputation and legacy.  
1.5.2.2 Family property or patrimony  
Within the context of property and its consequences, the civil code of Quebec recognizes the 
institution of “family patrimony” between two individuals, married or joined in civil union.187 
                                                
186 Supra note 178 at 49.  
187 Art 414 CCQ: Marriage entails the establishment of a family patrimony consisting of certain property of the 
spouses regardless of which of them holds a right of ownership in that property. 
Art 415 CCQ: The family patrimony is composed of the following property owned by one or the other of the 
spouses: the residences of the family or the rights which confer use of them, the movable property with which 
they are furnished or decorated and which serves for the use of the household, the motor vehicles used for family 
travel and the benefits accrued during the marriage under a retirement plan. The payment of contributions into a 
pension plan entails an accrual of benefits under the pension plan; so does the accumulation of service recognized 
for the purposes of a pension plan. 
This patrimony also includes the registered earnings, during the marriage, of each spouse pursuant to the Act 
respecting the Québec Pension Plan (chapter R-9) or to similar plans. 
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Through this institution, couples can share the family property equally and divide it at the 
demise of their partnership, whether upon the death of a spouse, divorce, separation, or the 
dissolution of their civil union or annulment of the marriage or civil union; regardless of their 
matrimonial regime, with or without children. Accordingly, the family patrimony reflects the 
consecration of the personal, physical, emotional, and financial assets by sharing the property 
accumulated jointly, during the period of union or marriage, irrespective to whom the formal 
title belongs.188 Its enactment is nothing more than a translation of the informal law, viz. the 
customary norms that already existed in Quebec.189 In fact, this institution seeks the economic 
balance between couples more than the interest of the family. Seeing, it was introduced in 
order to protect the creditors against any withdrawal, based on the separation of patrimony 
between spouses. It helps judges not to vacillate between the institution of enrichment without 
                                                
The earnings contemplated in the second paragraph and accrued benefits under a retirement plan governed or 
established by an Act which grants a right to death benefits to the surviving spouse where the marriage is 
dissolved as a result of death are, however, excluded from the family patrimony. 
Property devolved to one of the spouses by succession or gift before or during the marriage is also excluded from 
the family patrimony. 
For the purposes of the rules on family patrimony, a retirement plan is any of the following: 
 — a plan governed by the Supplemental Pension Plans Act (chapter R-15.1) or by the Voluntary Retirement 
Savings Plans Act (chapter R-17.0.1) or that would be governed by one of those Acts if one of them applied 
where the spouse works; 
 — a retirement plan governed by a similar Act of a legislative jurisdiction other than the Parliament of Québec; 
 — a plan established by an Act of the Parliament of Québec or of another legislative jurisdiction; 
 — a retirement-savings plan; 
 — any other retirement-savings instrument, including an annuity contract, into which sums from any of such 
plans have been transferred. 
188 Supra note 113 at 799.  
189 Supra note 113 at 798.  
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cause, or the occult partnership between spouses.190 Nonetheless, the family patrimony is 
limited to the following properties: 1) all residences used by the family (including condos, 
cottages, apartments and other dwellings); 2) the furniture used by the family to furnish or 
decorate the residences; 3) the motor vehicles used for family transportation; 4) the rights 
accrued in a pension plan during the marriage or civil union; 5) the earnings registered during 
the marriage or civil union under the Act respecting Quebec Pension Plan or equivalent 
programs.191 Conversely, the following property is excluded from the family patrimony: 1) 
property that was a gift or a bequest to one of the spouses either before or during the marriage 
or civil union; 2) any increase in the value of such property during the marriage or civil union; 
3) property used exclusively by one of the spouses (computer, musical instrument, artwork); 
4) businesses and farms (except the residential portion); 5) cash and bank accounts; 6) 
savings bonds, treasury bonds, shares and other investments (except the Registered Retirement 
Savings Plan (RRSPs); 7) profit-sharing plans; 8) supplementary pension plans for high-
income earners; and non-registered annuity contracts.192Moreover, in terms of family property, 
the Family Law Act193 applicable in Ontario, for instance, recognizes the institution of family 
property between married couples to share the property value that occurred during their 
marriage. The division of this shared property, determined previously, takes place only when 
they separate or if one spouse dies. So, each spouse is endowed with the so-called 
                                                
190 Ibid. 
191Minister of Justice of Quebec, online: Justice Quebec 
<justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/generale/patrimoine-a.htm> 
192 Ibid. 
193 Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3.  
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"equalization payment". 194 Notwithstanding, these rules are not applicable to a common-law 
relationship, unless the partner claims a share in the property and brings evidence that he/she 
has contributed, financially or in any other way, to the spouse’ property, who was unjustly 
enriched at the claimant’s expense.195  
Accordingly, based on the above-mentioned, the question that may be posed; “Is it possible to 
pronounce the “family patrimony” or “family property” to the family business by analogy?”  
Love and money,196 and the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial assets, are the main components 
that resemble marriage to family business. In addition, the informal, emotional decisions, 
which reveal sometimes irrational, are the foremost traits in common between both 
institutions. Seeing, the “family patrimony/ property” institution mirrors nothing but the 
informal customary norm, which was reproduced in a well-defined formal legal status. In 
addition, it recognizes the right of each spouse to share the cumulative riches during the period 
of marriage, regardless of the legal title of the property. All these aspects show the similarities 
of circumstances that could lead easily to recognize the “family patrimony” for the family 
business. Despite the latter, the family in terms of patrimony or property is reduced to married 
couples, irrespective of the offspring or any other family member. As such, the legal 
recognition of this institution shall be customized to the distinctiveness of this enterprise, and 
extend the family concept to all family members tied to the family business as well. 
Consequently, it shows the natural legal path that guarantees the stability of the family, as well 
                                                
194 Ibid. 
195Cleo- Family Law Series, online: Community Legal Education Ontario 
<http://www.cleo.on.ca/en/publications/propertydiv/property-division-common-law-couples> 
196 Supra note 113 at 796. 
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as the enterprise over generations. Since, firstly, the “family patrimony” can underline the 
major role played by the family unit, as the chief resources’ provider for the family business. 
Then, it can create a balance between the individual’s patrimony as a family member, and the 
patrimony of the family as a group. However, seeing the family is not a legal person, so the 
patrimony may be appropriated to the family, for the purpose of business continuity, as it will 
be explained later on. 
1.5.2.3 Succession and inheritance law 
The religious norms in all countries, in addition to the questions of marriage, custody, and 
pensions, have a significant impact regarding inheritance law. Inheritance law is implemented 
upon the death of the person. It concerns the distribution of the deceased’s properties to heirs, 
intestate successors, or the will’s beneficiaries.197 As such, it reflects the transmission of 
property, as a process of restructuring the social and personal relationships within the social 
system. It is foreseen throughout life, based on parental and/or blood relationships. In this 
respect, it was cited that “Transmission mortis causa is not only the means by which the 
reproduction of the social system is carried out […]; it is, also, the way in which interpersonal 
relationships are structured”.198 Moreover, it was reasoned, the inheritance constitutes “a 
family co-property based on the law of succession ab-intestat".199 In a civil law system, the 
law determines the designation of the inheritors and the restrictions of the testamentary 
successions.200 So, inheritance rules are mandatory within the civil law system. For instance, 
                                                
197 Marie Goré, “Inheritance law” in Bermann & Picard, supra note 171 at 289.  
198 Supra note 179. 
199 [c]'est sur une idée de copropriété familiale que se fonde le droit de succession ab intestat", ibid.  
200 Supra note 197.  
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in France or Italy, inheritance aims at accumulating and maintaining a family’s physical 
capital, by applying equal inheritance rights amongst siblings, as inspired by Catholic 
teachings that are also embedded in the common culture. However, in the Arab countries, 
religious rules are mandatory, and their principles are imperatively applicable in terms of 
inheritance, where Islamic systems govern the Islamic communities.  
By contrast, in the common law system, the freedom of testation is restricted to mandatory 
equal heirship between siblings, with or without will, despite the option of “free portion” 
offered as gifts inter-vivos. However, it is necessary to distinguish between common law 
countries. For instance, in England, where monarchy norms and primogeniture prevail, the 
property ought to be exclusively transferred to males in the family; so as to avoid the division 
and the coparcenary of the property with the females. Consequently, the property remains in 
the family. Such a preference has been eliminated nowadays. While in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, history shows that gender discrimination has never taken place in terms 
of inheritance. 
Referring to the family business context, inheritance law has a great impact on ownership 
transfer and succession, as well as on the productivity and longevity of the family business. 
"One of the obvious facts of human society is that people die and institutions remain".201 Rigid 
inheritance law or primogeniture, even equal sharing rules, most often generate conflicts 
between family members and endanger the survival of the enterprise. Since, family business 
inheritance very often risks “division, reduction, and misallocation of family enterprise 
                                                
201 Judith N Cates & Marvin B Sussman, “Family Systems and Inheritance” (1992) 5:2 Family Business Review 
205. 
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assets”.202 Moreover, the new inheritors, the new decision makers, may lack the competence 
and interest, so they could fail running the business effectively; and then decrease the value of 
the enterprise and affect its reputation. Mostly, upon the predecessor’ exit, successors consider 
the family business as their individual property, rather than the family property. Yet, it is more 
than something owned, it is more “a trust, as a legacy [family is] responsible for”.203 
Therefore, considering the tremendous impact on the endurance and path of the family 
business across generations, it is primordial to re-think the legal intestacy means that can 
guarantee its constancy and endurance. Seeing, as it was conceived as “an inheritance to be 
protected and handed on. It is the outcome of the next and each generation’s commitment to 
the last.”204 Nevertheless, it is worth nothing, the inheritance of the family business is 
interlinked with inheritance taxes governing generational transfers. 205 
1.5.3 Fiscal law and family business 
The impact of the fiscal law on the family business is obvious in all jurisdictions and in any 
legal systems;206 particularly in terms of estate taxes and inheritance taxes. The former are 
levied upon the value of the whole estate of the testator, while the latter are levied upon the 
individual recipients of inheritances,207 and vary depending on the value of inheritance 
                                                
202 Michael Carney, Eric Gedajlovic & Vanessa M Strike, “Dead Money: Inheritance Law and the Longevity of 
Family Firms” (2014) 38:6 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice- Family Business Special Issue 1261. 
203 Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, “The Role of Family in Family Firms” (2006) 20:2 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 73 at 76.  
204 Ibid at 75. 
205 Supra note 202 at 1263 
206 Pramodita Sharma, “An overview of the field of family business studies: current status and directions for the 
future” (2004) 17:1 Family Business Review 1 at 19.  
207 Supra note 202 at 1265. 
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endowed to each heir. In general, family business leaders are inclined to minimize any type of 
tax payment, in order to “|retain the fruits of their labour within their family and business”.208 
As for the estate and inheritance taxes, some family business owners disregard the need to 
alleviate the burden of inheritance or estate taxes and to plan their exit and their succession 
from the business. Considering that, it is hard for them to accept that time is running out on 
them, or they are reluctant to yield control to the younger generation.209 They may consider 
them incapable to replace them, or maybe they lack the foresight to take the necessary 
measure that guarantees the family business longevity. At the end, these delays expose the 
inheritance and estate taxes most often as burdensome, which may hinder heirs from 
expanding the family business and impede its economic development. 210 Also, sometimes 
inheritance and estate taxes, and deficient liquidity, could be the reason behind the heirs’ 
decision to erode the family business, or to sell it in order to pay these taxes. 211 Although, in 
Canada for instance, there are no inheritance taxes; instead, Canada imposes a capital gains tax 
at death. Pursuant to the section 70(5) of the Income Tax Act (ITA),212 a person who dies is 
deemed to have sold all capital assets at fair market value immediately before death. So, the 
resulting financial returns are taxed as capital gains for the year of death as “terminal tax 
return”.   
                                                
208 Supra note 206 at 5. 
209Donald E Kuratko, Helga B Foss & Lucinda L VanAlst,  “IRS estate freeze rules-implications for family 
business succession planning” (1994) 7:1 Family Business Review 61, at 62. 
210 Supra note 202 at 1264.  
211 Michael J Brunetti, “ The estate tax and the demise of the family business” (2006) 90:10-11 Journal of Public 
Economics 1975 at 1985.  
212 Income Tax Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp) 
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By contrast, the US federal estate law applies the inheritance taxes, but embraces explicit legal 
measures that alleviate the ownership transitions, and allow family companies to survive 
sparingly. 213 Generally, primary, it permits a tax–free estate transfer to a surviving spouse; 
though, it will be taxed upon the death of the latter. Secondly, each person is permitted to pass 
up to $5.43 million of property (including bequests and gifts) to any heirs free of tax; 
effectively $10.86 million for a couple.214 Also, the exemption applies between married 
couple; thus, the “portability” allows the unused estate tax exemption in the first spouse’s 
estate to be passed to the surviving spouse.215 
Also, it is worth mentioning, that on one hand, the Internal Revenue Code, section 2032 A, 
limits the value placed on certain properties used in the business, thus decreasing the amount 
of taxes owed. On the other hand, section 6166 allows the estate tax, where estate consists 
                                                
213 26 U.S Internal Revenue Code - Part IV– Taxable estate used to denote explicitly the § 2057 (e) for Family-
owned business interests, before its repeal on December 19, 2014. In this section, two specific provisions were 
enacted for the express purpose of easing the transfer of the family business at death. According to § 2057(e), the 
Qualified family-owned business interest category embraced the interest of:  a proprietor in a trade or business 
carried on as a proprietorship, or (B) the interest in an entity carrying on a trade or business, (i) if at least—(I) 50 
per cent of such entity is owned (directly or indirectly) by the decedent and members of the decedent’s family, 
(II) 70 per cent of such entity is so owned by members of 2 families, or (III) 90 per cent of such entity is so 
owned by members of 3 families, and (ii)for purposes of sub-clause (II) or (III) of clause (i), at least 30 per cent 
of such entity is so owned by the decedent and members of the decedent’s family. For purposes of the preceding 
sentence, a decedent used to be treated as engaged in a trade or business if any member of the decedent’s family 
is engaged in such trade or business.   
214 The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2013 set the estate tax exemption at $5.25 million for 2013 (effectively 
$10.5 million for a couple) and indexed that level for inflation in future years.  It set the top rate at 40 per cent.  
See Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-5, Revenue Procedure 2013-5, January 2013, online: 
IRS<http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-13-15.pdf> 
215 Chye-Ching Huang & Brandon DeBot, “Ten Facts You Should Know About the Federal Estate Tax” (March 
23, 2015) online: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) 
<http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-8-15tax.pdf>  
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largely of interest in closely held business, to be paid in installments over a period of 
approximately 15 years (5 years deferral and 10 years installments)216 if more than 35 per cent 
of the decedent’s estate consists of interest in a closely held business. 217 Subsequently, the 
legislator takes into consideration the financial challenges and the burden of taxes on closely 
held companies in general, on family members, and on family businesses specifically. Yet, 
family business owners may resort to some legal techniques that guarantee the longevity of the 
enterprise, and alleviate the burden of levies. As such, they may recourse to the estate-freeze 
or to establish any of the fiduciary institutions, such as a “Foundation” or “Trust”, “Waqf” 
(entails) or “Fiducia”, so as to discharge successors from tax liabilities.218 The fiduciary 
institutions will be detailed in a separate section.219While, the estate freeze is a fiscal 
mechanism that aims to reduce estate or inheritance taxes while transferring the family 
business and protecting its longevity. This tax regulation allows business owners to transfer 
their family legacy smoothly to their offspring, while retaining control over the business. 
Besides, they allocate the “future growth” in value of a business, investments, or other assets 
                                                
216 Supra note 214, § 6166 - Extension of time for payment of estate tax where estate consists largely of interest 
in closely held business. See online:  Cornell University Law School- Legal Information Institute < 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6166> 
217 John A Davis et al, “A comparison of four countries’ estate laws and their influence on family companies” 
(1996) 9:3 Family Business Review 285 at 288. 
218 Supra note 207. 
219 See below “Fiduciary Institutions” (section 1.5.5) 
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to their successors. 220 This mechanism is applied through the procedure of exchanging the 
common shares in a company into two types of shares: 
New fixed-value preferred shares: These shares will belong to the original business 
owner, namely the parent(s), and retain the current fair market value of the assets at the 
date of the exchange and freeze.221  
New common shares: These shares are known by the future growth, as they increase in 
value by time.222 They are issued directly to the successors, at a nominal value, reflected 
by the business value of the frozen shares.223  
The value of this mechanism resides in the following aspects:  
• It highlights the necessity to differentiate between the ownership of the older 
generation and successors.  
• It emphasizes the owners’ right to keep control over the business that was built over 
the years, by owning voting-preferred shares issued in an appropriate number, which 
allows the freezer to outvote the beneficiaries.224 
• It recognizes the necessity to protect the continuity of a successful and valuable 
business across generations.  
                                                
220 Dunseith, Robert C. “Estate Freezes: What, Why, When, and How” (Paper delivered at Legal Education 
Society of Alberta, Edmonton, 27 November 2012) online:  Duncan & Craig 
<http://dcllp.com/publications/LESA_paper_on_Estate_Freezes.pdf>. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Lisa Collings & Aileen Collings, “The ticking time bomb: an estate-freeze strategy can be useful, but should 
be done as part of an overall plan reflecting the family’s objectives”, CA Magazine 145.5 (June-July 2012) 32.  
224 Supra note 220 at 9. 
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• It accentuates the impact of the ownership change upon transferring it to the new 
generation, which may put the business at risk of dissipation upon the hand-on to 
successors; particularly, when they are incompetent to handle it. Seeing, parents, as 
founders, deal differently with their business than successive generations. It is worth 
noting, it is suggested, most of the time, to create the common shares under a “Family 
Trust” or the umbrella of a “holding company- HoldCo”225 where the offspring are the 
beneficiaries.  
• It protects the transition during the parents’ life as testators. As the significant income 
taxes liability may be produced in the year of the owner’s death, which could erode the 
whole business in transition, 226 and render successors incapable to pay the liabilities; 
so they may be urged to sell or liquidate the family legacy for financial resources 
deficiency. It also allows business owners to have a source of income from the freeze 
shares dividends.  
The estate-freeze is considered one of the legal and financial techniques that recognize the 
main challenges faced by a multigenerational family business. Therefore, its characteristics 
can be easily integrated into the family enterprise system, so the latter can stay in the market 
and operate over generations in harmony with its nature and identity.  
1.5.4 Business legal institutions  
The difference between the common law and the civil law systems is more distinct at the level 
of business and corporate law. It echoes mostly in terms of corporate ownership structures, 
                                                
225 Ibid at 10. 
226 Tax Planning Guide 2015-2016, “Estate Freeze”, online: Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton 
<http://en.planiguide.ca/tax-planning-guide/section-11-estate-planning/estate-freeze/> 
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and minority shareholders viz. investors’ protection; as corporate structure is more dispersed 
in the common law system; it therefore offers better shareholders’ protection. The civil law 
system, however, fluctuates between concentrated ownership, controlling stockholder, and the 
institutional shareholder, explicitly the banks in Germany.227 Likewise, the respective roles of 
the corporation's constituents and legal powers shape the corporate atmosphere.228 In the civil 
law system, shareholders control the company, and the allocation of powers is statutory and 
mandatory; seeing no constituent can deviate from fixed provisions. The board seeks 
shareholders’ approval for a range of decisions, while some other decisions cannot be 
allocated, even upon the shareholders’ consent. By contrast, since the contractual aspect 
prevails within the common law system, the board can assume several of the shareholders’ 
power. In fact, it can even act independently from the latter; as the legal power is mainly in the 
hands of the board of directors and management.229Moreover, governance structures and 
primacies vary between countries, although the divergence is less linked to law traditions.   
Also, the principles of corporate law are the same in both systems but the main difference 
resides in the implementation and the legal treatment of these principles.230  
However, despite the aforementioned dissimilarities, family businesses share the same 
problems, issues, and interests231 in all jurisdictions. They operate under different legal forms, 
                                                
227 Sofie Cools, “The real difference in corporate la between the United States and continental Europe: 
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based on the business and corporate law that governs their operations. They vary between Sole 
proprietorship, Partnerships, Limited Liability Partnerships, Limited Liability Company and 
Corporation. In addition, legal forms vary in terms of fiduciary institutions; namely Trust 
(common law system), fiducia and foundation (civil law system), and Waqf or entails (Islamic 
tradition). Generally, jurisdictions recognize some of these legal forms in addition to many 
others, but each country determines their characteristics differently. 232 Scholars agree upon 
five common legal characteristics that typify all legal business forms; namely, the legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares’ ownership, delegated management under a 
board structure, and investor ownership. 233 Usually, all of them lead the path in large 
corporations, but some other legal forms possess one or more of them depending on their 
specific requirements. Yet, notwithstanding the variation of business legal forms, it is 
convenient to emphasize the dissimilarities between jurisdictions, rather than the likenesses. 
Therefore, I will accentuate the contemporary legal innovations introduced as new institutions 
applicable within the business context, namely the “patrimony with legal personality” and the 
“patrimony by appropriation”. Besides, it remains crucial to underline “fiduciary institutions” 
in light of these legal bodies, along with their legal repercussions on the business world. 
 
 
 
                                                
232 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman “What is corporate law?” in Reinier Kraakman et al, 
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1.5.4.1 Patrimony with legal personality 
According to the classical theory, there is no legal person without law.234 The legal person is 
the “artificial entity” to which are conferred rights and duties. It is endowed with the capacity 
to enter into legal relationships autonomously, and a unique patrimony, undivided into distinct 
universalities of rights. This patrimony embraces all assets and reveals responsible for its own 
debts and liabilities. These assets answer the latter, as they are the creditors’ guarantee. In 
business, the juristic personality is allocated to some legal forms, combined with the limited or 
unlimited liability,235 along with a patrimony distinct from all owners (partners or 
shareholders) patrimonies.236 In this respect, scholars differ between the strong form and the 
weak form of the legal personality. The former encloses the corporation and limited liability 
companies. It is encircled by two rules: the rule of priority, and the rule of “liquidation 
protection”. 237 The rule of priority protects the creditors of the company by prioritizing and 
prevailing their interests on the enterprise assets over the personal creditors’ interests. The 
liquidation protection shields the capital of the company, by prohibiting the owners to 
withdraw the assets provided to the company as its property. In addition, personal creditors of 
the owners cannot foreclose on these assets. This rule guarantees the going concern of the 
company against individual owners or creditor damages. 238 Scholars consider that the 
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combination between the legal personality and the limited liability strengthens the stability and 
creditworthiness of the company as they separate the personal financial affairs from the 
companies’ shares.239 In contrast, the weak form of legal personality encompasses partnerships 
endowed with legal personality, which applies only the priority rule.240 However, the legal 
personality of companies varies between jurisdictions. For instance, in Canada and in England, 
partnerships are not juristic persons; only the corporation has a legal entity distinct from its 
shareholders. In the United States, a partnership like other companies is a legal entity, separate 
from its partners, unless all parts are under the ownership of one person, so the legal entity is 
disregarded. 241 In other countries, such as in France and Luxembourg, the legal personality is 
granted to some commercial partnerships. In Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, a 
partnership is not endowed with legal personality, except for limited partnerships. Yet, a 
partnership has the right to sue and be sued, own assets, and to adjourn creditors’ claims 
against the partners, until they have exhausted all remedies against the partnership assets.242 
Still, despite these differences, family businesses have a unique method of operation 
regardless the legal form of the business, the legal personality, or the country they operate in. 
Since family along with all related characteristics, enrobe the business.  
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1.5.4.2 Patrimony by appropriation 
Away from the traditional perspective, and until the end of the last century, business 
developments have urged the creation of new legal mechanisms seeking the freedom of the 
enterprise. Thus, the patrimony by appropriation arises and the classic ownership system fades 
in respect of this institution.243 Consequently, the division between the legal personality and 
the patrimony was acknowledged by accepting that the assets of an enterprise go to a specific 
patrimony, appropriated to a specific purpose, and owned by nobody. The common purpose of 
the assets determines the patrimony. This purpose-patrimony is governed by a predestined 
protective legal and management systems that allow its limited liability,244and guarantee the 
purpose fulfillment. Germany, France, and Quebec (Canada) inclined to this development, and 
recognized the “patrimony by appropriation”. For instance, in Germany, the patrimony by 
appropriation is bestowed to individual entrepreneurs only.245 In France, the French legislator 
recognized in 2010 the “special purpose business patrimony”246 by introducing a new business 
legal form endowed with the patrimony by appropriation, namely the “Limited Liability 
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<http://www.henricapitantlawreview.fr/article.php?lg=en&id=310>  
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Individual Enterprise”.247 As such, the legislator took into consideration the protection of the 
personal and family patrimony by separating them from the business sphere.248 However, in 
Quebec, since 1994, the lawmakers have deviated from the classical theory of the patrimony 
and its indivisibility from the legal personality, and integrated the modern-day concept, termed 
the “patrimony by appropriation”. This rule shifts the patrimony from being a subject through 
the legal personality, to an object distinct from its parties.249 The legislator, initially, 
acknowledged that “each person is the holder of a patrimony”, 250 but still may be “subject of a 
division or of an appropriation to a purpose, but only to the extent provided by law”.251 Such a 
rule recognizes the non-singularity of the patrimony, and each person can enjoy multiple 
patrimonies admitted by law. Correspondingly, the patrimony by appropriation reiterates in 
terms of partnerships, whereas general, limited, and undeclared partnerships are not endowed 
with the legal personality anymore, except the joint-stock company.252 However, partnerships 
have a separate patrimony and they benefit from the relevant legal attributes such as the 
capacity to sue and be sued.253 The partnership can redeem the shares of a partner,254 it is 
autonomous and independent from its partners,255 and the liquidation of the partnership is 
                                                
247 Loi n° 2010-658 du 15 juin 2010, L’entrepreneur individuel à responsabilité limitée (EIRL), J.O., 16 juin 
2010, 10984. 
248 Supra note 246.  
249 Nabil N Antaki & Charlaine Bouchard, Droit et pratique de l’entreprise, Tome 1, 2nd ed, (Cowansville, Qc: 
Yvons Blais, 2007) at 471.  
250 Art 2 CCQ.  
251 Ibid. 
252 Art 2188 CCQ.  
253 Art 2225 CCQ. 
254 Art 2210 CCQ. 
255 Art 2226-2229 CCQ. 
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subject to the rules applicable to legal persons. 256 However, it is worth noting, several judicial 
decisions recognize the patrimony by appropriation to partnerships. For instance, we can cite 
the decision of “Corporation des maîtres électriciens du Québec c. Jodoin électrique inc.”:  
La société en commandite possède un patrimoine d’affectation: les biens de la 
société en commandite ne lui appartiennent pas vraiment, mais appartiennent à ses 
commanditaires ou ses commandités. Toutefois, ces biens, particulièrement, 
identifiés comme constituant le patrimoine d’affectation de la société en 
commandite, demeurent le gage prioritaire des créanciers de la société en 
commandite.  257 
In addition, the court of appeal affirmed that:  
Une société en commandite, comme toute autre société, a un patrimoine propre 
qui, tant qu'il est suffisant, est distinct de celui des personnes dont elle est 
constituée; elle jouit alors d'une entité propre, sans pour autant être une personne 
morale au sens de la Loi. 258 
Nevertheless, the advantage of a patrimony by appropriation is revealed in the identification of 
partnership assets. It is considered a relief that resorts to the concept of the collective 
ownership shared between all partners without being individual owners of the assets provided 
in full or in part to the partnership. As the “collective assets”, inclusively combined and 
                                                
256 Art 2235 CCQ. 
257 Corporation des maitres électriciens du Québec c. Jodoin électrique inc., REJB 2000-18092 (C.S.).  See also 
supra note 249 at 455. “The limited partnership has the patrimony by appropriation: Actually, the assets of the 
limited partnership do not belong to it, rather they belong to the special or general partners. However, these 
assets, are chiefly acknowledged as the constituent of the patrimony by appropriation of the limited partnership, 
and remain its priority pledge”[Translated by author]. 
258 Laval (Ville de) c. Polyclinique médicale Fabreville, s.e.c., 2007 QCCA 426 (CanLII), online: CanLII 
<http://canlii.ca/t/1qzt0>.  The limited partnership alike any other company, it has an autonomous patrimony, as 
much as it is appropriate, is distinct from the individuals who established it. It is bestowed with the separate 
entity without being a legal person within the meaning of the law. [Translated by author]. 
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united, seeking a specific purpose, owned by the group rather than individuals. However, it is 
worth mentioning that the collective ownership is different from the joint ownership. The 
latter endows the owner with the right to control a part of ownership he/she owns individually 
despite the jointure.259 The share in the joint-ownership converts the right of enjoyment into a 
personal right, and receives in counterpart the stake that reflects his/her interests in the 
company. Conversely, the collective ownership is a particular co-ownership due to the 
allocation of assets aiming at accomplishing the collective objective of the group. However, 
the collective ownership does not consist of shares owned by individuals and endowed with a 
legal personality, it is rather "a common pool” that goes beyond individuals, predestined and 
allocated for a purely collective purpose. It belongs to the group as a whole, and no one as a 
member of the group can affirm any personal ownership.260 Throughout the operative 
partnership, partners have no individual rights until the dissolution and the division of the 
company according to the consensus of all partners. Accordingly, for instance, the creditor of 
individuals as members of the group could not enforce their rights against the collective 
assets,261contrary to the joint ownership. However, the collective ownership usually reflects 
the “intuitu personae” between all partners through which they relate to each other, in contrast 
to the “intuitu pecunae” that seeks the financial benefits and profits. Therefore, they cannot 
transmit their rights and their shares to a third party without the full consent of other partners.  
                                                
259 “La propriété́ collective n’engendre pas un état d’indivision entre les associés: « l’indivision laisse persister 
l’autonomie des parts individuelles; chacune des parts [indivises] [...] a son propriétaire particulier et ce 
propriétaire est indépendant des autres; lui seul peut agir sur sa part.” See also supra note 243 at 761. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Martin Boodman, “Who owns a Quebec Partnership” (November 29, 2010), online: McMcarthy Tetrault, 
<http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5201> 
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Accordingly, family businesses around the world can benefit from the patrimony by 
appropriation as a legal institution to the level that highlights the uniqueness of this enterprise. 
However, depending on the jurisdiction where it operates, what matters the most within this 
context, refers to the legislator’s acknowledgment of the necessity to create new legal means 
that answer the needs of businesses more than being restricted to the classical approach that do 
not meet the new avenues of business and the challenges faced nowadays.  
1.5.5 Fiduciary institutions  
Fiduciary legal forms around the world converge and possess many intrinsic similarities in 
terms of their tripartite relationships (Settlor, Trustee(s), and Beneficiary (ies)). The concept of 
these institutions resides in the release of some patrimonial assets from the self-ownership to 
put them under the fiduciary control and administration, for the benefits of a third party. The 
major concerns for creating any type of fiduciary relationship are most often identical, 
particularly within the family context. Indeed, the settlor is always driven by altruism, seeking 
to preserve the longevity of the family legacy by keeping the assets within the family. As such, 
a fiduciary institution is considered one of the convenient legal vehicles that protect the family 
business from any fragmentation or demise, under the control of future generations. In 
addition, the fiduciary institution allows the settlor to deviate from the rules of inheritance or 
succession laws, and alleviate inheritance and estate taxes, so as to plan the estate in a 
subjective manner. Also, It could help family owners to act efficiently in order to protect the 
interest of incompetent beneficiaries, who are unable to manage their wealth knowingly. 
However, these institutions diverge depending on jurisdictions, and/or in their legal traditions, 
as well as in their legal nature, form, and rules. In order to emphasize the latter, it is 
convenient to cite them and highlight the main characteristics that differentiate each institution 
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from the other. We can refer to four main fiduciary institutions that lead the way:  Trust, 
Fiducia, Foundation, and Waqf (Entails).  
1.5.5.1 The common law trust 
Trust is an institution applicable under the common law system (such as The United Kingdom, 
The United States, Canada except Quebec). It is usually established by a settlor, an individual 
or any other legal entity, through which the legal title of some assets ownership is transferred 
to a trustee (s), to manage it and act for the benefit of the beneficiary (ies), (third person(s)), 
who can be individuals or otherwise.  
The common law trust divides ownership into two splits: 1) Legal owner(s)” or “nominal 
owner(s)” as the trustee who holds the legal title of the property and 2) The “cestui que trust” 
or “equitable owner(s)” or “true owner(s)”, as the beneficiary (ies) who holds a "beneficial 
interest" (beneficial title) to it. 262 So, “the trust beneficiaries hold rights in the rights that the 
trustee holds as trust property”.263 In other words, the trustee is the legal owner who has 
powers over the trust without having the rights to enjoy the benefits of his/her ownership; by 
contrast, the beneficiary is not the legal owner but enjoys the relevant ownership benefits.264 
                                                
262 Albert Bohémier, “Application of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to the Trust of the Civil Code of 
Quebec” (2003) 37 R.J.T. n.s. 113 at 122, online: Les éditions Thémis 
<https://ssl.editionsthemis.com/uploaded/revue/article/rjtvol37num1_2/english/06_bohemier.pdf> 
263 Lionel Smith, “ Trust and patrimony” (2008) 38 Revue générale de droit 332 at 333, online: Ontario Bar 
Association 
<https://www.oba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/cba_on/pdf/OBA%20Foundation/Widdifield%20Papers/2010-Smith-
Lionel-Widdifield-Award.pdf> 
264 Supra note 137 at 828. 
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Subsequently, trust assets that belong to the trustee are not available to personal creditors of 
the trustee, and are not considered as part of his/her estate.265 
However, trust is not a contract, but a unilateral declaration delivered and revealed by the 
settlor. As such, there are seven major categories of trust:266  
1) The express trust: The settlor expresses his intention to create a trust through a 
"declaration of trust" through which the Trust is created.  
2) The implied trust: When the implicit intention of the settlor is deduced from the words 
used or the acts. 
3) The constructive trust: In this case, trust is an equitable remedy ordered by the court 
against an  “unjust enrichment”,267 regardless of the settlor's intention. This legal institution is 
extensively applicable in the common law system.  
4) The resulting trust: It arises from an unjustified transfer in two situations:  “The transfer 
of property from one partner to the other without consideration, and the joint contribution by 
two partners to the acquisition of property, the title of which is in the name of only one of 
them.”268 Further explanation about the constructive and resulting trust will take place while 
clarifying the role of “trust-confidence” as a main component of the family business system.  
                                                
265 Supra note 263 at 337. 
266 Supra note 262 at 125. 
267 Unjust enrichment occurs when there has been (1) an enrichment to the defendant; (2) a correlative 
impoverishment to the plaintiff; and (3) the lack of any juristic reason for the enrichment.  See art 1493-1496 
CCQ. 
268Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, 2011 SCC 10 [Kerr], online: CanLII 
<http://canlii.ca/t/2fs3h>  
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5) The statutory trust: It is a temporary trust created by a law provision for the benefit of 
certain vulnerable individuals that shall be protected by law. 
6) Discretionary or sprinkling trust: In this type of trust, the trustee is given the full 
discretion to decide on the class of beneficiaries and when and how they can receive the 
income or the capital of the trust. 269 
7) Protective trust: It seeks to protect the beneficiaries for a limited period until the 
occurrence of a specific event.  
In the United States, Trust is a legal person, whereas the property is vested to the trust, and 
trustees have limited liability for the debts of the trust.270 By contrast, the common law trust in 
Canada is not considered a legal person apart from its parties.271 It is based on an equitable 
                                                
269Donovan W M Waters, Mark Gillen & Lionel Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012) 1145. 
270Thomas E Rutledge & Christopher E Schaefer, “The trust as an entity and diversity jurisdiction: Is Navarro 
applicable to the modern business trust?” (2013) 48:2 Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 83 at 92, 
online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255163> 
271According to Mr. Justice Cullity…”The Krystal Group Trust was named as a plaintiff, and the Family Trusts 
were named as defendants, in this action. Trusts, of course, are not legal persons and cannot sue or be sued. 
Actions involving trusts must be brought, or defended, by their trustees just as actions against estates must be 
brought against the estate trustees subject to the relieving provisions of Rule 9. There are no similar provisions 
applicable to inter vivos trusts. An action against a trust - named as such - is a nullity unless, perhaps, by analogy 
to Rule 9, it can be saved by treating the reference to the trust as a shorthand reference to the trustees. However, 
obviously, the trustees must be served and a failure to do this is not a mere technicality that can be cured simply 
by inserting the names of the trustees in the style of cause during the trial without their consent. …. Trustees, 
prima facie, incur personal liability when, as such, they are parties to litigation and, generally, with respect to 
obligations and liabilities they incur on behalf of their trusts. Depending upon the circumstances, they may, or 
may not, be entitled to be indemnified out of their trusts' assets. …., presumably as a matter of convenience - 
trusts are quite commonly named by corporate and commercial lawyers as parties to agreements and as the 
owners of shares and of other property in share certificates and other legal documents. Moreover, this is certainly 
not the only case in which trusts have been named as parties to legal proceedings: Darrigo et al v 245042 
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relationship between the trustee(s) and the beneficiary (ies) regarding the property and, in 
principle, the trustee is personally liable for the debts incurred when the action is taken in the 
context of the trust, and litigations must proceed through the trustee.272 As the Supreme Court 
of Canada declared:  
…First, the trust is not a person like a corporation, so the central management and 
control test is inapplicable to trusts. Sharlow J.A. disposed of St. Michaelís first 
argument summarily, as do we. While a trust is not a person at common law, it is 
deemed to be an individual under the Act. section 104(2) [Income tax Act] 
provides:  
A trust shall, for the purposes of this Act, and without affecting the liability of the 
trustee or legal representative for that person’s own income tax, be deemed to be 
in respect of the trust property an individual… 
We agree with the Minister that the fact that at common law a trust does not have 
an independent legal existence is irrelevant for the purposes of the Act.273 
1.5.5.2 The foundation  
The private foundation is a philanthropic institution endowed with huge flexibility for 
charitable giving by a person, a family or companies as the main funders of this entity. Within 
                                                
Investments Ltd., [2001] O.J. No. 4650 (C.A.) is a recent example. However objectionable in principle, the 
practice of treating trusts as if they had legal personality - or at least as if references to them by names such as 
those used in this case refer to the trustees - appears to be endemic and it has rarely received judicial criticism. 
The decision of the Federal of Appeal in Kingsdale Securities Co. Ltd. v Minister of National Revenue, [1975] 
C.T.C. 10 (F.C.A.), to which I referred during the trial, appears to be a rare exception. For this reason I have 
declined Mr. Altman's invitation to base my decision on the ground that, as the transfer of the BGI shares was 
made to the Krystal Group Trust, and not to its trustee, it was ineffective…” See Foo v Yakimetz, 2002 CanLII 
2662 (ON SC), online: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/t/1hktk> 
272Jonathan J Ossip, “Diversity Jurisdiction and Trusts” (2014) 89:6 New York University Law Review 2301 at 
2311, online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434961> 
273Fundy Settlement v Canada, [2012] 1 SCR 520, 2012 SCC 14, online: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/t/fqx4c> 
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the family context, families often shape the foundations to promote family philanthropy. Being 
driven by altruism and recognizing the support given by their community and/or their society 
while creating and earning wealth, families undertake the responsibility to give back to their 
communities, and to involve their families in the act of giving.  
In Europe and the United States, a foundation is an institution that combines the characteristics 
of both corporate and trust. It is considered a vehicle for estate planning and building wealth 
with purpose. In these jurisdictions, the foundation is a legal person that has a separate 
personality along with all relevant features.274 However, in Quebec, according to the civil 
code, the foundation is an institution that has a social function, seeking benefit for the broad 
public, rather than individuals or a closely related group such as a family. A foundation shall 
be established based on an irrevocable act of property appropriation, wholly or partly offered 
by the owner, for the benefit of the society, and seeking sustainability. Its property has a 
separate and autonomous patrimony distinct from that of the settlor or any other person, or 
even the patrimony of the legal person that created it. In the former case, the foundation is 
governed by the rule of law as a “social trust”, while in the latter; laws applicable to legal 
persons of the same kind govern the foundation.275 Indeed, a foundation shall not 
                                                
274 “Business and private organizations”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Instalment 13, vol 
XIII by Detlev Vagts (Netherlands: Springer 1981) at 42. 
275 Art 1257 CCQ: “The property of the foundation constitutes either an autonomous patrimony distinct from that 
of the settlor or any other person, or the patrimony of a legal person. 
In the first case, the foundation is governed by the provisions of this Title relating to a social trust, subject to the 
provisions of law; in the second case, the foundation is governed by the laws applicable to legal persons of the 
same kind.” 
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predominantly seek profits or run a business or an enterprise.276 However, the latter could be a 
secondary purpose providing that it does not deviate from the main purpose for establishing 
the foundation. Besides, a foundation shall not make a gift to an unqualified donee, as the 
income of a foundation shall not be used for any personal benefit of any of its members, 
shareholders, or governing officials.277 In addition, it cannot incur debts unless when the 
foundation’s objective and purposes call for it. It is worth noting, a private foundation such as 
a family foundation is usually controlled by a single donor or member represented by a family 
board, whereas 50 per cent or more of the directors shall not act at non-arm’s length with each 
other.278  
The family foundation is considered a great vehicle for legacy. It guarantees the perpetuity of 
the family values, principles, and wealth as well as its stand within the society as a responsible 
servant. Accordingly, the legislator recognizes, indirectly, the right for each family to protect 
and preserve their wealth across generations, provided they help and support their 
communities; which is, as mentioned previously, one of the main responsibilities of families in 
business.  
1.5.5.3 The fiducia 
According to the civil code of Quebec, fiducia is an analogous tripartite enterprise similar to 
the express common law trust, but retaining its specific nature, characteristics, and rules that 
                                                
276 Art 1256 CCQ: “A foundation results from an act whereby a person irrevocably appropriates the whole or part 
of his property to the durable fulfillment of a socially beneficial purpose. 
It may not have the making of profit or the operation of an enterprise as its main object.” 
277 Canada Revenue Agency,“ Charities and giving glossary”, online: Canada Revenue Agency  < 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/glssry-eng.html > 
278 Ibid. 
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diverge in its path. As such, fiducia is based on contractual obligations and rights. It does not 
admit the separation between the legal and equitable ownership,279 rather it acknowledges the 
autonomous patrimony devoid of the legal personality, to be functional.280 It is a patrimony by 
appropriation, distinct from the parties’ patrimony (settlor, trustee and beneficiary). According 
to the section 1275 “The settlor or the beneficiary may be a trustee but he shall act jointly with 
a trustee who is neither the settlor nor a beneficiary”.281 It could be established verbally or in 
writing, depending on the settlor’s willpower. So, it does not entail the formalism of the 
common law trust. The fiduciary (trustee) is entitled with the property ownership without the 
legal title. It generates a personal right on the property, not any right in rem.282 Accordingly, it 
is an institution that allows the fiduciary to act as the administrator of the property (Trustee) 
for a certain period while assuming no personal responsibility; whereas the fiducia itself is 
                                                
279 “Additionally, the enactment of arts. 981a et seq. did not have the effect of introducing in Quebec the English 
distinction between legal title and beneficial ownership, a sort of dual ownership, and a concept foreign to 
Quebec law under which ownership is indivisible and vested in a single individual: Laliberté v Larue, 1930 
CanLII 84 (SCC), [1931] S.C.R. 7 at p. 16. See also Laverdure v Du Tremblay, [1937] A.C. 666 at p. 682, 
Greenshields et al v The Queen, 1958 CanLII 36 (SCC), [1958] S.C.R. 216 at p. 217, and Crown Trust Co. v 
Higher et al., 1975 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 418 at pp. 424-26. English law is relevant only in so far 
as it is compatible with arts. 981a et seq. of the Civil Code”, Royal Trust Co. v Tucker, [1982] 1 SCR 250, 1982 
CanLII 162 (SCC), online: CanLII<http:canlii.ca/t/1z1b3> 
280Sylvie Vallée et Louis Bouchard s/n Fiducie Sylvie Vallée v The Queen, 2004 TCC 320[Vallée], online: CanLII 
< http://canlii.ca/t/1ln5p>  
281 Art 1275 CCQ. 
282 Art 1261 CCQ: “The trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust, constitutes a patrimony by 
appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them 
has any real right.” 
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engaged and its assets guarantee its liabilities, similarly to any other patrimony.283Therefore, it 
was conceived that:  
The title held by the fiduciary holder upon the property placed under his 
administration is not as ample as the title held by a trustee in common law: the fact 
that the holder of the fiducia holds a "title" or a right to administer "in trust" the 
goods placed under his administration only makes him the administrator, not the 
owner. This title includes all the necessary powers, which allow him to administer 
the fiduciary goods as effectively as possible.284 
 
Thus, during its operation, the fiduciary is considered the debtor of service towards the 
beneficiary. Yet, it is worth mentioning, the legislator differentiates between several types of 
purpose for a fiducia. It may be constituted for:  
1- Personal purposes:  For the benefit of a specific or determinable person,285or for the 
benefit of several persons successively, that may not include more than two ranks of 
beneficiaries of the fruits and revenues, in addition to that of the beneficiary of the 
capital; 286 
2- Private or social utility purposes: Whereas, a private trust has for its object the creation, 
maintenance or preservation of a thing or the use of property appropriated to a specific 
use, whether for the indirect benefit of a person, or in his memory, or for some other 
                                                
283 Supra note 262 at 126.  
284 Vallée, supra note 280. 
285 Art 1267 CCQ. 
286 Art 1271 CCQ. 
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private purpose.287 A social fiducia is the one seeking the general interest, such as a 
cultural, educational, philanthropic, religious or scientific purpose.288 
Consequently, it is necessary to emphasize that the main object of a fiducia is not to seek 
profit or operate an enterprise. Since, it exists for the benefit of its beneficiaries, and is not 
owned by one person. This legal institution is of great value for the family enterprise in view 
of its characteristics such as the patrimony by affectation, the type of property, and the 
interrelationships between parties. In addition, the absence of capital and inherited taxes 
proves ideal for protecting the multigenerational aspect of the family business.  
1.5.5.4 Islamic Waqf  
Unlike trust and fiducia, the Islamic teachings have never expressively acknowledged the 
juristic person for any Islamic institution, since the legal personality for non-human persons is 
a secular positivist concept. They recognize the patrimony concept, as it is granted to various 
Islamic institutions. However, Muslim scholars approve the legal personality of the latter 
based on the patrimony notion. As such, they consider that the separate patrimony 
automatically generates the legal personality. Accordingly, the concept of the patrimony by 
appropriation does not exist in their analysis. 
The institution of Islamic waqf is one of four charity institutions applicable in Islam, namely 
1) Alms (Sadaka, an optional act offered as a gift to deprived people), 2) Zakat (one of the five 
pillars of Islam), is the Islamic Tax to be paid once per year to needy Muslims by every 
productive adult person. 3) Gift or donation as a unilateral act offered voluntarily to anybody, 
                                                
287 Art 1268 CCQ. 
288 Art 1270 CCQ. 
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Muslim or non-Muslim. 4) Waqf is a goal oriented charity institution, 289 established for the 
benefits of Muslims or non-Muslims, inheritors’ viz. family members or non-family members.  
According to Muslim scholars, waqf is a long-lasting endowment offered by a Muslim owner. 
So, the appropriation right is concluded, for charity or religious purposes (waqf for charity). In 
addition, it can be founded for the settlor’s account during his/her lifetime, as a beneficiary; 
and after death, it will be settled for the benefit of the descendants (waqf for progeny).290 
Additionally, waqf could combine two of the previously mentioned purposes, to be qualified 
as a “combined waqf”. In our context, waqf for progeny is considered a great institutional 
mechanism that allows the settlor to deviate subjectively from mandatory Islamic inheritance 
rules. It grants him the ability to bestow some benefits to specific members of the family, or 
even non-family inheritors providing that the settlor seeks justice and acts in good faith with 
God. 
However, it is convenient to accentuate that Islamic schools of thoughts have different 
interpretations for waqf. These schools are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali (Four sunnite 
schools) and Jaafari (Shiite School). By principle, waqf is irrevocable and limitless for all 
scholars, except for the Maliki School, which permits establishing it for a limited period.291 
Also, all schools, except the Hanafi School, recognize the legal personality of waqf as a legal 
                                                
289 Charity for progeny as a purpose is one of the main characteristics that differ between the common law Trust 
and Islamic Waqf. The former excludes family from the charity concept, providing that charity Trust maintain the 
public character, contrary to Islamic Theology that gives priority to supporting the family. See Paul Stibbard, 
David Russel & Blake Brombley, “Understanding the Waqf in the world of Trust” (2012) 18:8 Trusts and 
trustees 785 at 787, Benefic (blog) online: <http://beneficgroup.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Understanding-the-Waqf-in-the-World-of-the-Trust.pdf> 
290 Jamal J Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, 2nd ed (London: Graham & Trotman, 1990) at 274. 
291 Supra note 289 at 789. 
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entity having independent patrimony, separate from the administrator’s patrimony, as the waqf 
representative. In addition, it is worthy to note that laws in Arab and Muslim countries 
recognize the legal personality of waqf. Yet, in terms of ownership, unlike the common law 
trust, waqf does not transfer assets’ ownership to the trustee. However, there is a divergence 
between Islamic scholars upon this point. For instance, according to Maliki School, the settlor 
remains the owner of waqf but he/she is deprived of any right to use it. By contrast, Hanafi 
and Shafii schools consider that all properties on earth belong to God, as well as waqf 
ownership, it belongs only to His Majesty. The administrator (trustee) is the vicegerent who 
should act as a steward;292 particularly, ownership endows the owner with the right of 
disposal. However, this right cannot be allocated to any person, neither the founder nor the 
administrator (except with explicit permission from the court). 293  
Therefore, despite the recognition of the legal personality to waqf, it is convenient to consider 
the patrimony by appropriation to this fiduciary institution, since no one owns its assets, 
appropriated for a specific purpose, particularly when it is waqf for progeny.  
1.5.6 Governance perspective 
Even within the same legal tradition, governance structures vary between monistic, dualistic, 
and pluralistic, and primacies differ between monistic (shareholders) and pluralistic 
(stakeholders). However, companies in both common law (i.e. the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada) and civil law countries (i.e France, Arab countries) operate under a 
single board system, viz. admit the monistic structure. The board of directors is endowed with 
                                                
292 Mohammed Obaidullah, Awqaf Development and Management, 1st ed (Jeddah, KSA: Islamic Research and 
Training Institute, 2012) at 37, 38.  
293 Ibid at 65. 
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dual authorities, namely the executive and control. The roles of the chairperson and chief 
executive officer (CEO) are combined. As such, decisions are concentrated and self-supervision 
develops.  
However, the German dualistic model aims at binding all parties with various conflicts of 
interests together. It is based on the co-determination and the two-tier board structure. As 
such, there are two boards: the “Executive Board” and the “Supervisory Board”.294 In the 
former, shareholders nominate the directors and the chairperson for four years. The latter is 
endowed with a casting vote. Its members are chosen for five years, by one-third (in small 
companies) to one-half (in companies that exceed 2,000 employees) of the members are 
elected by employees; and the others are elected by shareholders.295 Notably, no member is 
allowed to join the two boards and be a member of both at the same time. Although, the 
executive board is endowed with a high margin of decision-making autonomy, still the 
supervisory board and/or the general meeting of shareholders have the authority to approve 
some important decisions.  
Generally, the pluralistic structure emerges in the Japanese structure. Its board is considered 
the largest, as it comprises around fifty directors. Considering, the board membership is a 
motivating and marketing instrument; in other words, a reward “for long and faithful service 
or major contributions to the company”.296 Consequently, the board often embraces senior 
managers or former company employees. The pluralistic structure is translated through the 
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board chair, as an honorary and advisory position, usually assigned to presidents who have 
served the company for a lapse of time. The president and the board of directors represent the 
formal authority in the company. Still, meetings with the board are rare, and the decisions are 
rubber-stamped.297 The president and the management committee usually handle the chief 
powers of the company. Moreover, the selection of board members and election of officers is 
usually done by the latter, and then approved by shareholder votes by clapping their hands at 
the shareholders' meeting. 298 
Nevertheless, the fundamental legal difference between countries that adopt the same 
governance model resides in the distribution of powers and the decision-making process 
within a company. For instance, in the United Sates, the center of power lies within the board 
that acts autonomously from the shareholders; while in Europe, powers are divided between 
shareholders and directors, and each body shall respect others’ authorities.299 Still, 
shareholders control the company, and the board needs their permission for a range of 
decisions; which sometimes can be replaced if a simple majority of shareholders demands to 
do so.  
Moreover, the World stands between two primacies: the Anglo-American model of 
“Shareholders’ primacy” and the German and Japanese model of “Stakeholders’ primacy”. 
The former highlights the interest of shareholders who advance the financial capital to the 
company; so managers maximize shareholders’ value, taking into consideration that other 
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stakeholders are protected through their contracts. This approach assumes the agency theory, 
whereas decision-makers expose as agents of the enterprise; they seek and ensure that all 
business activities align with owners’ interests. The second model considers that nobody owns 
the corporation but the corporate itself; therefore, manager’s decisions balance the interest of 
all stakeholders who can affect or be affected, and seek the long-term ability of the corporation 
to remain a progressing enterprise.300So, this prescribes the theory of stewardship that 
accentuates: “(a) values of service over self-interest; (b) responsibility by prioritizing long-
term gains and values over short-term, myopic greed; (c) and develops good governance, clear 
working processes, open communications, and encompassing empowerment”. 301 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the board of directors can be of two types: insiders, and 
outsiders. The former embraces those who run the business, while the latter is of two 
categories: Grey and Independent directors. 302 Grey directors have significant business 
relationships or relational ties with the company. They can be customers, suppliers, advisors, 
and others. The independent directors consist of neutral directors who have no single existing, 
previous tie, or contractual arrangement with the business.303 Thus, as stated earlier, the notion 
of introducing outsiders, particularly independent directors, is widely accepted and affirms a 
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legal requirement in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada. While in France and 
Lebanon, for instance, the notion is not legally recognized, since any director to be elected and 
appointed shall firstly be a shareholder.304 So, this observation may enlist within the category 
of Grey directors.  Although, it is worth mentioning, the independent director notion is present 
in the soft law of AFEP-MEDEF corporate governance code of listed corporations in 
France,305 and the Lebanese Corporate Governance Code for Small and Medium enterprises 
(SME’s),306 issued in June 2006. 
Despite the legal dissimilarities between countries and governance legal cultures, family 
companies face the same problems all over the world; due to the fact that the decision-making 
process, primacies, and structures within a family business are far detached from what is 
actually stipulated in hard or even soft laws. This is to say that the legal principles and rules 
are quite inconsistent with the typology of the family business governance. Particularly, 
informality and trust due to close relationships are considered governance’ substitute 
mechanisms in the family business. In addition, the rubber-stamping decisions made by silent 
family members as owners or directors, in order to legitimize the decisions of executives, 
besides other aspects, play a major role in the functionality of this enterprise. Therefore, 
family decision-makers always struggle between two challenges:  
                                                
304 Jacques Delga, “Administrateur indépendant et Corporate Governance: Comparaison France-Etats Unis” 
(2009) 2:3 Revue Libanaise de Gestion et d’ Économie 1 at 4, online: ScienceDirect 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S199976200970014X>  
305 OECD, Corporate Governance Committee, Corporate Governance Board Practices Incentives and governing 
risks: incentives and governing risks (Paris: OECD, 2 August 2011) at 30 online: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf > 
306 The Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance, LCCG (Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA))  (2006) at 
39, online: Hawkamah <https://hawkamah.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/lebanon_cg_2006.pdf> 
  91 
1) What does the law say, and  
2) What does the family dictate, the individual want, or the business require? 
Besides, same family members, mostly, combine between the three levels of control, such as 
ownership, governance, and management. Additionally, family business governance has no 
one model that fits all;307 as governance could be informal and formal. Moreover, the notion of 
independent directors, in many cases, is not always required. Particularly when the enterprise 
is small or is in its developmental stage. However, even when the family business becomes 
more complicated in terms of ownership and structure, the notion of independent directors is 
not easily receptive, considered as a serious breach of family privacy. Therefore, only the legal 
recognition of the distinctiveness of the family business from its non-family counterparts 
could allow the establishment of an appropriate governance system that fits the enterprise 
taxonomy.  
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2. The attributes of the family business  
Family businesses are endowed with particular attributes that reflect the uniqueness of the 
enterprise. However, these same attributes could be considered as competitive advantages or 
disadvantages, depending on how family members, as decision makers, deal with them. 
Accordingly, it is convenient to underline these traits, as well as the main strengths and pitfalls 
that differentiate this enterprise.  
2.1 The strengths of the family business 
The utmost strength of the family business resides in the genuine intersection between family 
and business. Since family patterns, interpersonal relationships, and the acquainted family 
setting and identity stretch instinctively to business; this serves to generate specific potencies. 
The latter are usually translated into business outperformance, longevity, swiftness, and 
flexibility. More clarification as follows:  
2.1.1 The outperformance of the family business 
Referring to the bivalent systems, comparative studies between family and non-family 
enterprises prove that the former not only behave differently than non-family counterparts, but 
they also outperform them.308 The outperformance is generally pertaining to the role of the 
family in developing future leadership, and the intention to keep the business in the family, 
perceiving its longevity. However, the outperformance is apparent at the financial level as 
well; particularly in terms of liquidity, solvency, and affluence.309 In addition, it is underlined 
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internally at governance and management levels; for instance, it was established that being 
driven by intangible duties towards the family more than any other financial interest, family 
members serve better as CEOs rather than outsider CEOs.310 Yet, it is worth mentioning, the 
outperformance varies between listed family companies and private family companies. As it 
was concluded, only businesses with a “lone founder” outperform,311 while listed family 
businesses do not outperform their non-family counterparts in the market valuation, even 
during the first generation.312 
2.1.2 The informal decision–making process  
The informal decision-making process is usually translated by quick, intuitive, resilient, 
flexible and less bureaucratic decisions. Such informality is usually directed by trust, good 
faith, and great expectations between family members. It is considered as an advantage from 
which family decision-makers benefit on both the internal and external levels, specifically in 
terms of communication and negotiation.  
As for communication, informality is usually the essence of the family culture and 
atmosphere between family members. However, such a quality could turn into weakness 
whenever personal interpretations, unspoken assumptions, and implicit expectations lead to 
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blurred areas between family members; which may result in a cut-off from both the family and 
the business.  
Additionally, in terms of negotiation, informality can provide a considerable and strategic 
benefit for the family business, seeing the genuine ingrained patterns developed over years 
between family members.313 Although, despite their complexity, seeing family members most 
often negotiate multiple issues concurrently, informal negotiations can generate competitive 
outcomes, particularly during the course of hunting local and foreign opportunities,314 or 
challenging crisis.   
2.1.3 The long-term perspective of the family business 
The determination for business durability stems initially from the reflective subconscious 
belief of family members that family and business interlink, hence the subsistence of the 
family outspreads business. So, the latter endures and stays in the market and in the family 
across generations. Accordingly, family businesses are not built on fly-by-night operation.315 
They normally adopt a conservative approach, foresight, and a sharp leadership vision. Their 
stable and long-term leadership often helps to ensure careful stewardship for the company’s 
assets, which protects the family as a group and family members’ interests as individuals, in 
addition to other stakeholders. Therefore, family businesses usually apprehend long-term 
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strategies and investments rather than seeking quarterly returns.316 Consequently, they have a 
better-managed capital structure, and a more efficient allocation of resources.317 Besides, 
considering their ability to act with less (or no) pressure from the stock market and takeover 
risk,318 as well as their aversion to losing control over their business, family members usually 
tend to re-invest in their business through their dividends; 319 so as to support and preserve the 
family wealth for future generations. Moreover, being less driven to take risks, family 
businesses are quite reluctant towards debt, which may affect the long-term survival of their 
business.320 Therefore, family members rely more on family wealth, especially in difficult 
times, instead of resorting to financial institutions (e.g. banks).  
Typically, if the abovementioned strengths were perceived in a constructive and judicious 
way, they would guarantee success within family enterprises. As such, the paradox of the 
family business is unveiled when the same characteristics that energize the business’ success 
hinder its survival, development and growth; particularly during leadership transitions.  
2.2 The pitfalls of the family business  
It is evident that the family business is burdened with negative factors that affect its longevity 
and efficiency, and consequently reduce its value. Some researchers emphasize that the duality 
of family and business systems is the main source of weakness and dysfunctionality within 
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this enterprise.321 Particularly, when family issues take precedence over administrative needs, 
family and business finances are milked and mixed,322 and decisions are led by "sentiments 
rather than ... logic". 323 So, the family business exposes as a ‘non-professional’, 
‘unsystematic’, old-fashioned, irrational, 324 obscure, problematic and ephemeral model,325or a 
confusing organization with messy management and governance structure.326 Researchers 
consider that paternalistic and authoritarian decisions, in addition to family rivalries, financial 
burdens, and weak risk bearing, impede the enterprise against developing and investing in 
people.327 Some other scholars highlight the ownership system and conclude that personal or 
family capitalism is defective,328 and these enterprises can barely maintain or compete with 
modern corporations.329 As such, they show slower growth and less participation in the global 
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market.330 Still, the concentration of family ownership extracts control premiums at the 
expense of minority shareholders.331 Also, the strong culturally pre-determined family values 
restrain the development of capitalist economic activities, which require an individualistic 
form of entrepreneurship and an absence of nepotism.332 Nevertheless, many scholars 
highlight succession and leadership transition as a serious problem;333 they suggest that 
nepotism is the sole reason behind it, which limits the family enterprise’s growth.334 Indeed, 
nepotism spoils unskillful family members, and imposes discriminatory family reward systems 
(promotion, compensation).335 It doles out equal rewards to family members, regardless of 
their commitment or performance, which occurs at the expense of others.336 Such a vice can 
threaten the enterprise’s survival, and cause its demise.337 It may affect the business 
performance, reputation, and even its financial capacities.338 Besides, it creates a glass ceiling 
for non-family employees to promote, and restrain them from any career development and 
advancement.339  
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However, it is worth noting, nepotism has different connotations between family businesses 
and across countries and cultures. For instance, it could be considered as a trademark of and a 
marketing tool for the company.340 As such, it really depends on how family enterprises deal 
with it, as this could easily cause an overlap in family and business dynamics. Therefore, 
family businesses must enforce clear policies that reflect fairness and impartiality, based on 
competence and performance rather than blood and family ties. Nevertheless, from a cultural 
perspective, what could be considered as a negative concept in the United States, for instance, 
carries a positive connotation in the Arab culture. As in the latter, it is conceived that hiring 
any relative or friend ensures loyalty and trust within the surrounding and family circle. 
Particularly, family ties within the Arab community may exceed the nuclear family to include 
the extended one; namely cousinship back to many generations, affinity or in-laws. Therefore, 
it was stated "Arabians do not see society as a vast, impersonal mass of people containing a 
few individuals whom they will meet at various times in their lives and with whom they will 
form business or personal relationships. Rather, their world is made up of a web of 
communities, tribes and families—some they know personally, but all they know of." 341 
Certainly, nothing is perfect, including family businesses. Dealing with the weaknesses in any 
type of business can always be approached either constructively or destructively, depending 
on the case. Despite the complexity of family enterprises, they are equipped with the necessary 
mechanisms, which can turn any fragility into an advantage. All depends on the balance 
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between adeptness and responsibility to act according to the exclusiveness of this enterprise 
and its taxonomy.  
2.3 The challenges of the family business 
Family businesses face their challenges in a different way, since they are family based more 
than business-based.342 Their risks result from their approach towards business practices and 
policies, more than from their competitors, consumers, regulatory legislation, or any other 
outside forces. Since, the rapports required for business dealings are linked to additional 
evolving bonds that relate decision-makers far beyond, namely family ties. 343 These bonds 
develop over generations, and make family businesses dynamic enterprises; they grow, 
change, and transform naturally.344 Accordingly, this development is determined in three 
stages: Founding Owner(s), Sibling(s) Partnership, and Confederation of Cousins.345 Each 
stage encloses its own internal and external challenges, encounters, and dilemmas. For 
instance, in comparison to advanced generations, founding families retain their sense of 
tradition and goal orientation. They also display a “market mentality” that enables them to 
take an “active” ownership role.346 Several estimates indicate that approximately 70 per cent 
of all family businesses are either sold or liquidated after the death or retirement of their 
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founders.347 Therefore, scholars admit the universal fact that not all family businesses survive 
successfully beyond the first generation, regardless of the cultural context or economic viz. 
business environment.348 The failure of family enterprises to endure “beyond the tenure of 
their founders has serious social and economic consequences”;349 specifically, the business 
survival between generations has a great impact on economic development, job creation and 
wellbeing more than “laborious attempts to create new businesses”.350As such, the demise of a 
family business constitutes a loss not only for the family, which often has most of its assets 
tied up in the firm, but also, it extends to conquer employees, the surrounding community, and 
“the lives and fates of countless people”.351 Since, as it was earlier said, the economic and 
social wellbeing depends largely on the survival of these businesses.352 Correspondingly, 
family businesses face a multitude of internal challenges, which may threaten its longevity. 
The major challenges can be outlined in three categories: Conflicts, lack of governance 
structure, and succession planning deficiency. 
2.3.1 Conflicts between family members 
Conflicts in family enterprises are unique, persistent, complex, and different from those 
present in non-family counterparts. They are part of the normal life cycle of any family 
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business, which cannot be avoided. 353 The problem resides in the “built-in Achilles’heel” of 
the enterprise. 354 Seeing, two contradictory systems interact, which makes “destructive family 
feuds” easy to locate. They precisely unveil when the enterprise is at stake. As the boundaries 
between both systems are blurred, so it becomes difficult to dissociate quarrels in private life 
from business rapports and involvement.355 Usually, when business interests and primacies 
infringe on those of the family, they result in frictions that make the family enterprise a “fertile 
field for conflict”.356 They often end up with damages, losses, bankruptcy, or litigations that 
destroy both families and businesses.357 However, the nature of conflicts is not fixed over 
time. They shift and change, as the role of the individual within the family and/or the business 
evolves, and the change of social and business norms takes place.358 Principally, upon the 
entry of the new generation into the business; a transformation from an autocratic/paternalistic 
control system to a participative or democratic leadership and/or the change in the ownership 
system and in dynamics may occur. Consequently, conflicts in family or business spread out 
reciprocally to family and business. They affect family members’ behavior and relationships 
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in both settings. Mostly, upon the death of the patriarch,359 they can be deciphered into taking 
control of the business,360 expropriation, retaining leadership, and succession.  
We can cite numerous reasons for conflicts, such as the lack of communication and 
transparency, information asymmetry.361 However, confusion and ambiguity are the main 
source of rivalries; specifically at the level of imprecise mission, vision, objectives, or roles. 
Ambiguity also arises when the mix of rationalities,362 namely family rationality, individual 
rationality, and market rationality, emerge, and the boundaries between these systems are not 
adequately separated.363 In consequence, family members struggle while making decisions to 
realize different objectives,364 particularly when management and ownership are shrouded and 
jumbled.365As stated, “when there are many masters, all will end up being short-changed”.366 
In addition, confusion ensues when the company’s assets are milked with the family’s assets, 
which are tailored to family needs, sometimes at the expense of the business entity or the 
company. Nevertheless, scholars distinguish between various levels of conflicts based on 
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interests’ aspects: namely family issues, business, and ownership issues; whereas, “a dispute 
in one area can quickly cascade into the other areas”.367  
a) Family conflicts are categorized into two types: 368 
* Generational disputes: Conflicts between parents and offspring. The continuous 
source of friction between both generations resides in seeking independence from the 
older generation, so as to differentiate themselves from their parents, and retaining 
control from the oldest generation.  
* Siblings’ jealousies, tensions, and competition: This may be the main source of 
rivalries that trace their roots to childhood, and could be exacerbated in business by 
keeping control in light of ownership dispersion.  
However, the “psychodynamic effects”369 of these conflicts that may cause the disunion of the 
family, and business failure,370 are non-existent in non-family businesses.  
b) Business and ownership conflicts are sorted, “in varying degrees of frequency and 
intensity”, into three categories. 371 These conflicts are “task conflict”,372 “process 
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conflict”,373 and “relationship conflict”.374 Each type has its own benefits and shortcomings. 
Thus, there is an interrelation between task and process conflicts, as well as relationship 
conflicts. Seeing, family members play various roles within the enterprise; we suggest 
combining the three types of conflicts in one category, namely “role conflicts”, as it reflects 
all responsibilities and rights endowed to a family member, whether in the context of the 
family or the business. Dissensions arise between different family stakeholders due to 
contradictory claims.375 These claims result from their overlapping membership of any of the 
systems; “family”, “business”, ownership, or individual systems. For instance, it echoes the 
intersection between the birth order and hierarchical role in the family, and the role in business 
whether in management/employment, and governance or ownership, and the underestimation 
of the significant role-played as individuals. As such, tensions in one role may spread to the 
second role. Therefore, “role conflicts” usually stem from the blurry definition of each 
person’s role, his/her responsibilities, rights, and authorities. Consequently, this leads most 
often to the courts. In addition, “role conflicts” occur when minority shareholders feel 
oppressed and vulnerable to the conduct of majority shareholders.376 They expect having an 
echoed voice, while the majority is endowed with the monopoly of control, or “monopsony 
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power”,377 particularly upon the absence of the patriarch. Fundamentally, the “role conflicts” 
are harmful at all levels. They may “escalate to destroy sound family relationships and lead to 
vindictiveness”,378 thus increasing the risk of dilapidating the company assets, and razing the 
economic and social value of the family and the business.379 A question may therefore arise at 
this level; what are the mechanisms that alleviate these conflicts in order to avoid any potential 
losses (e.g. litigations) for both systems (family and business)?  
It was concluded, “All types of organizations . . . benefit from having a healthy identity, a 
motivating direction and strong discipline”.380 So, to thrive and survive, family businesses 
must shift to various strategies and policies that enable them to self-sustain and compete more 
successfully. 
It is worth mentioning, two main standards shall prevail in the family business to alleviate 
conflicts; namely, fairness and recognition. Thus, the perceptions of these aspirations differ 
between family, individuals, ownership, and business. Fairness and recognition in decisions 
and managerial processes,381rule the business based on meritocracy for management. They 
also expose in ownership throughout fair equilibrium amongst owners by receiving their 
relevant rights legitimately. 382 Meanwhile, the case is different within the family context, 
which varies sometimes in terms of gender, birth order, emotions, and aptitudes. As for 
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individuals, they seek validation of their work, respect, acknowledgement, and appreciation. 
They have personal expectations as their hierarchy in the family is not to be overlooked, and 
implicit prospects of what the business will provide them with apropos their roles and rapport 
to business.383 Therefore, it was argued that fairness in family business is “messy and 
complicated”.384  
Nevertheless, whatever the source and/or the type of conflicts are, it is crucial to acknowledge 
the uniqueness of the family business and the conflicts that may result from it. Since, most of 
them are personal conflicts; they do not arise neither from the vagueness of laws, nor from the 
implementation of a contract. In fact, even well defined rules cannot reduce or avoid them. 
Yet, courts tend to deal with them objectively, and overlook the exclusivity of family 
dynamics within the business. As such, they do not end up with efficient resolutions, nor do 
they meet the specific standards for these enterprises. It, therefore, becomes fundamental for 
courts to treat family business conflicts practically, and in case-specific ways by implementing 
singular standards for these company settings.385 Such a procedure shall guarantee a better 
understanding of these conflicts, specifically regarding the interests, roles, and identities 
overlap between stakeholders viz. shareholders, employees, management, and among top 
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managers.386 In addition, it will help to establish trust, commitment, and harmony in the family 
as the turnkeys that reduce or avoid disagreements. Such objectives cannot be reached without 
definite roles, rights and obligations of each family member, involved or not involved in the 
business, and without formalizing the relevant rules and mechanisms to cope with conflicts 
adequately, effectively and equitably. As such, one of these mechanisms can be identified by 
the implementation of the most convenient governance arrangement that balances the interests 
of the overlapping systems in view of the generational development evidence in both family 
and business.   
2.3.2 Lack of governance structure definition 
Combining governance and family business is labeled as an oxymoron that poses distinct 
challenges. It is “the speech in which antithetical incongruous terms are combined”. 387 
Particularly, the two notions are loaded with a wide range of complexities across the globe. 
Thus, it was conceived, “If you are in a family enterprise, you need to learn the basics of 
governance and apply the best practices that exist in family business governance”. 388 Yet, the 
central role of the family overlapping with business, ownership, and individual systems, 
requires a multi-dimensional approach of governance that extends to all subsystems. However, 
it is worth noting, family enterprises’ governance structures and policies vary and depend on 
business size, its legal form, and the generational development of the family. Therefore, it is 
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admitted, as specified earlier, there is not a unique model of governance structure and policy 
that fits all family businesses. Since, family businesses choose any of the classic legal forms 
for operating their businesses. The legal veil is usually adopted based on various concerns, 
such as registration fees, liabilities, control, and taxation. Although, whatever the legal setting 
of the family business, still governance structure breaks down. Seeing that family members 
work collaboratively and rely less on formal written policies;389 as it was previously stated, 
most of their decisions are made informally, and decision-makers are no more than paper or 
rubber-stamp signatories.390 Therefore, despite the legal form espoused for the business, 
oftentimes, the decision-making strategy is interlinked with the governance system applied in 
the family that, anecdotally, may take the form of tossing a coin to make a decision. 
Nevertheless, the evolution and the increasing involvedness of family members over 
generations shall dictate the improvement of the internal governance practices in order to 
manage the “emerging realities”, so the family business survives.391 Accordingly, the typical 
challenge that may intimidate the longevity of this multigenerational enterprise resides in the 
lack of formal governance structures and policies.  
Notwithstanding, corporate governance has received more attention, in all countries, due to its 
positive effects at various levels. It is becoming more central to economic development and 
society’s well being. This is because governance structures and policies give greater access to 
financing opportunities, lower the cost of capital, guarantee better business performance, and 
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provide more dealings that are advantageous to all stakeholders.392 Besides, governance within 
a family enterprise is an efficient mechanism for transferring wealth between generations; 
seeing that its practices influence the capabilities of businesses.393 It reveals a great tool to 
limit and rectify the power abuse committed by corporate insiders, particularly when it 
combines both family and business objectives in a conscientious approach. As such, this may 
reflect a sequence of well-communicated procedures and guidelines, in addition to generating 
stronger, healthier, and interdependent family and business relationships.  
However, governance is considered an ambiguous concept; instead alien for many. Some 
family owners are unaware of the necessity to develop the firm’s governance structure, others 
are resistant to embrace it; they believe that these structures and formal policies threaten their 
ability to control their businesses. They fear the necessity to dissociate the professional from 
the personal and institutionalize business conduct; presuming that the formal governance 
enforces them to share their family or individual businesses’ evidence, prosperity and success 
with “strangers”.394 Indeed, they have to exchange information with others, such as minority 
shareholders, or those locked out of management, whether they are family members or not. So, 
getting out of informality towards professionalism complicates things. Principally, officers, 
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directors, shareholders/owners, and managers who tend to have a longstanding presence in 
their business, are often the same individuals.395 They master their business and trade secrets, 
and are able to disclose them only to close family members. They believe that their 
enterprise’s performance is better than the one based on governance principles, which have led 
to numerous financial crises. They dominate the strategic decision making, and, more 
importantly, they possess the exclusive control of financial resources, particularly when family 
finance and business finance are mixed. Therefore, the separation between management and 
ownership will put their power, control, and privacy at risk, thus harming their business and 
family identity. Concurrently, the long-term perspective of family owners urges them to 
protect their business and transfer it successfully to future generations; yet they do not trust 
“formal governance” as the key that guarantees their business longevity and legacy.  
Still, family business owners cannot be blamed for their resistance as the social choice often 
depends upon collective values.396 Primarily, they discount the greatest strength and 
significance of their family enterprises at the macro level.397 They ignore the difference 
between family enterprises and non-family counterparts, and the main criteria and objectives 
that distinguish governance policies and structures within their companies. This illiteracy finds 
its roots in the ecosystem in which these businesses operate. Predominantly, in legal systems, 
whereas policymakers are unconscious about the specificities of these enterprises, their 
distinctiveness, as well as their economic and social significance. Thus, they are unable to 
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encourage family owners through specific legal mechanisms and incentives towards 
implementing the convenient governance structures and policies that guarantee a healthy 
longevity of their enterprises, particularly in developing countries. 
Consequently, the family business’ governance phenomenon is not an orphan or an 
independent instrument; rather it is a system to be complemented by other requirements, 
which favor its successful implementation. It is a process that requires a pre-requisite set of 
values based on “Good Parenting”, which, by analogy to the political and cultural systems 
within a country, it was suggested:   
“Imagine trying to transplant [...] democratic social political system to a country 
with no history of respect for human rights or individual expression, no 
experience with any form of stable government except chaotic, despotic rule, and 
no history of working together to postpone immediate self-gratification for longer 
term mutual gain to society. Without long preparatory effort, our democratic 
model would never get off the ground in such a country because the cultural-
political background required to sustain it is missing.”398 
Hence, espousing governance within a family enterprise is not a checklist of “dos” and 
“don’ts”, rather it is a culture that shall be disseminated. As it was concluded, corporate 
governance “is the product of the interaction between a multifaceted set of the mercantile, 
legal, and peri-legal mechanisms. The latter are affected by the political, social, cultural and 
national context in which the enterprises operate.”399 
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Consequently, family business governance requires a multi-faceted ecosystem evolution that 
shall begin with the legal recognition of the distinctiveness of this enterprise, in terms of the 
implicit and explicit constructs, as well as the mechanisms through which the overlapping sub-
systems operate.  
2.3.3 Succession planning deficiency  
Family business and succession are described as “a pair of Siamese twins”. 400 There is a 
common belief that “the first generation builds the company, the second preserves it, and the 
third squanders it”.401 Only 30 per cent of family businesses survive the transition to the 
second generation, and barely 10 per cent make it to the third generation.402 Fewer than 15 per 
cent of family-owned businesses survive under the family control beyond the third 
generation.403The American proverb summarizes this journey “from shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves in three generations”.404 However, the demise of any family business is considered 
as a major loss, as its repercussions attain all levels, as it was previously stated. Hitherto, it is 
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admitted that non-family businesses have a clear demarcation between management and 
ownership, and meritocracy is the main criterion that governs the business successor 
selection.405 By contrast, leadership transition in the family business is an exceptional and 
considerable challenge; it is immersed in many emotional, cultural, legal, and religious factors 
that reflect the complexity of the process. As such, it may put the family legacy at risk. During 
the presence of the senior generation, they reveal as reluctant to step down and pass the torch 
to the next generation. For some, predestination is a conviction; they refuse to plan for 
succession. Others fear that succession-planning act may expose their business to internal and 
external uncertainties, which could paralyze it, totally or partially. Particularly, generational 
changeover usually interweaves with various concerns such as personal, family, ownership, 
and business.406 At the personal level, the resistance of the senior generation, dreading to lose 
their social standing and prestige, reveals as a serious concern, and the major stumbling 
block407 against succession planning; although it leads many times to the 
“corporeuthanasia"408 of the family business. It is defined by the owner's act of “willfully 
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killing off the business he loves by failing to provide in his lifetime for a viable organization 
with clear continuity".409 
 As for the family, trust between family members fades very often over time; and the reason 
behind their partnership as a multigenerational family business, as well as the variation of 
intentions or perspectives are usually blurred;410 which could make succession a perplexing 
phase for any family business. Besides the emotional aspects at play, particularly when the 
senior generation parachute incompetent family members to fill key positions as decision–
makers, such as a chairman or a chief executive officer. Moreover, sometimes the cultural 
aspect prevails, and the principle of primogeniture and gender concerns is very much 
evident;411 whereby some family members consider the eldest son as the primary and eligible 
inheritor of the family legacy. In this respect, it was reasoned, "as long as there is a son as 
successor, nobody really expects a daughter to do anything except inherit a portion of the 
stock.... She will always be in a stepped-down position in relation to her brother and his 
wife.... Dad usually sees to that."412 Such an emotional and cultural position may create 
rivalries between family members; correspondingly, it may put women’s positions at stake.  
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In terms of business, being immersed in the “informality”, the senior generation is usually 
hesitant to articulate their values, 413the vision, or their long-term business plans and purposes 
that have helped shaping the business with the successors.414 As such, the peculiar qualities of 
the business remain fuzzy 415 for successive generations.  
In terms of ownership succession, there is a specific feature found in most family businesses. 
Wherein even during the senior generation’s presence, and despite the fact that sometimes, the 
majority of shares are completely owned by the successors, predecessors control the 
business.416 However, upon their absence, the majority owners’ intent, as inheritors, becomes 
entitled to implement their own power to control the business, as if it is their personal 
property. In addition, as stated hitherto, inheritance rules play major roles in family business 
succession; mainly when religious edicts take effect, and affect assets’ transition and wealth 
distribution among inheritors. Accordingly, succession planning discloses the controlling 
senior generation’s responsibility.417 Its significance emerges more when the latter passes from 
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the scene unexpectedly. This sudden event may “leave a lot of unresolved tensions and 
unfinished business”.418  
Correspondingly, there is a major gap between what laws stipulate for the family in terms of 
inheritance and succession, and what is required for the family business, which challenges its 
longevity. This is due to the lack of legal recognition of the distinctiveness of this type of 
enterprise. The multi-dimensional process of the family business succession necessitates well-
defined legal preventive measures that meet the family business’ specific requirements to stay 
in the market and survive prosperously over generations. Therefore, law and family business 
should not march anymore to the beat of a different drum. As such, it is essential to understand 
the entire developing system, and underline the main tangible and intangible internal dynamics 
of this enterprise, in addition to the external institutional systems that enclave it. In such 
manner, the transition from one generation to another will be thoroughly examined as an 
authentic process to be adopted within this enterprise, rather than managing it as an overnight 
decision or sudden event.  
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3. Family Business Theories 
Scholars have attempted to conceptualize the family business by adopting two types of 
theories: narrow theories and systemic theories.419  
3.1 The narrow theories 
These theories encompass the rational approach, founder-focused approach, and the stages 
approach. 
3.1.1 The rational approach 
The rational or “excising-family-from-the business approach” 420 is a prescriptive approach. It 
states that the family business does not operate in a very 'business-like' way. The interaction 
between family authority, namely “emotionalism, nepotism, father-son conflicts, or poor 
management skills”,421 and rationalism such as logic and profit making,422 hinders business 
success and functioning. The supporters of this theory treat family and business as polar 
opposites, in conflict and competing with one another. 423 Therefore, they advocate the excise 
of the family from business, and encourage these businesses to convert into non-family 
businesses.424 This approach was perceived as superficial; having a narrow view that does not 
identify this enterprise thoroughly. 425 
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Figure 1: The rational approach 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 The founder-focused approach 
It is a one-dimensional approach. It subordinates the family business system to one individual, 
namely the founder, as “the prime influencer of the business destiny”.426 This theory reveals a 
self-centered and unproductive notion. It reduces the system to one person, and neglects the 
developing aspects of the individual, as an element of a complex and dynamic living 
system.427 It also disregards all external and internal dynamics that affect the family business’ 
performance and operation.  
3.1.3 The stages approach 
This theory assumes that the development of businesses, families, and individuals occur 
analogously.428 All of them go through a life cycle; they are born, they grow, mature, and pass 
on.429 Scholars conclude different phases through which the family business passes over years. 
Some concluded three management phases such as the “paternal dominance”, “collaborative 
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fraternal management”, and then the “collective family network management”.430 These 
phases are based on the generational involvement in the family business and their attitudes 
towards the business. Others divide the life cycle of the family business into five stages based 
on the consequences that result from the founder control and the circumstances’ repercussions 
on business. These stages are as follows: namely the wonder, blunder, thunder, plunder or 
sunder stages. 431 
The wonder stage is a period filled with excitement and energy,432 wherein the founder “deals 
with uncertainties and unknowns, committed to his idea, forges ahead”.433  
The blunder stage is the “period of rapid growth”, 434 risk taking; the founder sees “the light 
at the end of the tunnel”.435 Although missteps are inevitable,436 therefore, many businesses 
stumble and fall at this stage.437  
The thunder stage, or “harmonic convergence”, when all the stars are aligned438 and business 
matures. The founder becomes intolerant and overwhelmed with personal success and 
business growth, which was built on a strong management basis.439 
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In the plunder stage, cash is strong.440 It is the time to harvest what has been sown throughout 
the years.441 
Finally, the asunder stage requires business innovation and the introduction of new strategies 
and structures; otherwise, business will decay.442  
The stages approach cannot be underestimated. Although, it is limited in terms of time and 
orientation, yet it is situational, as it varies between families and businesses based on the 
generational development. 443 Particularly, the evolutionary change in a family business is not 
definitely harmonious, nor steady, neither gradually versatile.444 Also, the lifecycle of the 
generational development should not neglect the right forces that influence its business 
structure, formalizing systems, and determining the primacies.445 Proceeding from that, and 
founded on the life-cycles approach, the systemic theories began to emerge, tackling the 
family business from a different perspective.  
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3.2 The systemic theories 
Many scholars resort to systemic theories, in order to decipher the complexities of both 
systems, namely family and business.446 These theories have evolved concurrently, and varied 
between the dual-systems theory, the three-circle approach, the open-system systems 
approach, and the fourth circle theory.  
3.2.1 The dual-system theory 
Despite the criticism of the “rational approach”, and excising family from business, this theory 
has led to the establishment of the dual-system overlapping system.  
Figure 2: The Dual-System Theory 
 
Source: Mary Barrett, “Theories to define and understand family firms” (2013) Theori Research group 168 at 
169, online: Research online < http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=buspapers > 
 
The dualistic-system seeks to analyze the developing operational scheme that differentiates 
family dynamics from business dynamics. It accentuates the nexus points between both 
systems, and the nature of the differential variables and processes.447 As such, each system has 
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its specific integrated norms, membership rules, values, orientation, behaviorism, 
organizational structures,448 and resistance.449 On the one hand, the membership of the family 
is involuntary or fated, governed by family norms and values. The orientation of this 
emotional system is private. It seeks nurturance, development, and protection of family 
members. Therefore, family members actively resist change, aiming at stability and 
reassurance. On the other hand, any business reveals as predominantly rational, and a profit-
oriented system. It pursues adaptation within the market place, and recognizes change as a 
strategy towards “growth and advancement”.450 Its membership is voluntary, assessed in view 
of the ability to contribute to business’ performance and production.  
Consequently, both family and business always stimulate and reinforce each other, jointly and 
constructively,451 by adopting a proper planning synchronization452 in order to create a 
combined emotional task-oriented joint-system.453 The latter has the potential to maintain its 
viability depending on the orientation of both systems in a degree of proficiency, and the 
degree of intentionality (high or low commitment to achievement).454 
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Notwithstanding, the “dual systems approach” accentuates the inter-relationship between 
family and business systems; still, it shows them as two competing systems with rigid 
boundaries and structures. The latter shall be clearly defined; 455otherwise, conflicts reveal 
unavoidable.456 Particularly, it ignores other subsystems that affect various aspects in the 
family business, such as individuals, ownership, and management subsystems,457in addition to 
the environmental component.458 Therefore, it is difficult to describe a holistic system without 
emphasizing all relevant components. As, for instance, family members play various roles in 
business under a set of boundaries that rule them.459  
However, researchers and scholars use the dualistic approach as a basis for analyzing the 
complexities within the family business, while adopting a further all-inclusive system; which 
clarifies the main sources of individuals’ behaviors and decisions.460  
3.2.2 The three-circle theory 
In 1982, Taguiri and Davis clarified the blurred areas of the dual-system theory by drawing a 
more accurate portrayal; the three-circle system.461 So, they added the “ownership” circle to 
depict the interaction and interdependence between the two sub-systems; namely, family and 
business  
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Figure 3: The Three-Circle Theory 
 
Source: Three-circle model developed by: Renato Tagiuri & John A. Davis,  “Bivalent Attributes of the Family 
Firm” (1982)  9:2 Family Business Review 199 at 201462 
 
This theory is the mainstream that has received an emerging consensus and a widespread 
acceptance in the field. It has been recognized as theoretically elegant, simple to understand, 
effective to work with.463 Since it elucidates the motivations, perspectives, strengths, and 
challenges faced by each subsystem, observing the overlapping roles of individuals at various 
locations in the overall system.464 In addition, considering the separation between ownership 
and management, this theory puts forward the issue of agency theory, and pointing out the 
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conflicts of interest between owners and managers,465 besides identifying the role of family 
membership in business. Although, it was criticized that it disregards the environment in 
which the family business operates and interacts.466 Besides, even if this three-circle theory 
allows scholars to identify the role of individuals within the family business through their 
nested memberships, and interaction between family, business (management), and ownership, 
it is still considered a closed-system theory. It sees the individual not as a distinct system,467 
but as embraced by each group of the sub-systems, assuming each person’s behavior as 
homogeneous and monolithic.468 Such a conclusion opened the door to new approaches and 
theories.  
3.2.3 The open-system approach  
Based on the above-said closed-systems, scholars proposed a more flexible holistic approach 
to the family business system, namely the open-system theory.  This theory emphasizes the 
interaction between all sub-systems that operate regularly, but change in a non-linear and 
unpredictable way. Seeing, the dynamics are unconventional and unsystematic, since the input 
is sometimes not related to output. In addition, it underlines that a family business is not an 
isolated entity; rather it “…is a system composed of numerous sub-systems, but [this] 
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organization is also a subsystem within a much broader, complex economic and cultural 
system.”469 Therefore, it developed an analysis that portrays this enterprise within the 
environmental system, by emphasizing four organizational sub-systems; namely the family, 
ownership, management and business subsystems, based on the role of individuals. 
Figure 4: The Bulleye: Two-Dimensional Onlook Onto the Three-Dimensional Open-
System Approach 
 
 
Source: Source: Torsten M Pieper & Sabine B Klein, “The Bulleye: A Systems Approach to Modeling Family 
Firms”, (2007) 20:4 Family Business Review 301 at 309.  
 
According to this theory, the family business is constituted of two types of subsystems:  the 
constituting subsystems and the connecting subsystems. The former are defined by “family” 
and “business”; while the latter consist of “ownership” and “management”.  
This theory addresses the two-dimensional reciprocity between all subsystems; for instance, 
the family provides the business with funds through the ownership and labor force through the 
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management. Reciprocally, the business provides the family with jobs, financial profits, and 
non-financial returns. Besides, this theory accentuates the human aspect, by highlighting the 
heterogeneous roles of individuals as the focal level of analysis. Seeing, the different roles 
played by individuals within the whole system, and the crucial interactions between each of 
them within the subsystems. Moreover, this theory accentuates the environmental level, by 
analyzing the interaction between the family business and individuals on one hand, and the 
cultural and economic setting on the other. It emphasizes “how these interactions shape the 
organizational structure, and how they affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors.”470  
All scholars approve the central and influencing role of the family sub-system that makes this 
organization different and unique. This theory discusses the different organizational levels of 
the family business and the impact of the environment on the behavior and decisions of each 
person and each sub-system. Still, when it comes to the legal identity of the family business, 
this model reveals as incomplete; it does not serve jurists to clarify the rights and obligations 
of all family stakeholders. It also omits one of the main mechanisms of the family business, 
such as governance.  
3.2.4 The four-circle theory 
It was considered that the family business is neither a homogeneous nor a monolithic 
organization with converged interests, wherein family members act in cohesion throughout the 
time. 471 Seeing, individuals’ behaviors, preferences, roles and perceptions vary, change and 
develop through the life cycle of the family business; which may diverge from, or be 
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detrimental to the family and/or business interests. Therefore, a fourth circle was suggested 
adding to the three – circle theory that represents “The individual circle.” Particularly, the 
controversial immersion of family members in two rationales, namely the individual and 
collective, in presence of the emotional bonds, and sometimes trust decrease may raise agency 
costs and increase the risk of the family business demise.472 
Figure 5: The Four-Circle Theory 
 
 
 
Source: Gérard Hirigoyen, “Biais comportementaux dans l’entreprise familiale: antécédents et impacts.” (2007) 19 
Revue Économie et Sociétés, Série économie de l’entreprise 10, 1901 at 1904.   
 
This theory aims at creating the balance between the role of individuals in business on one 
hand, by recognizing their personal objectives, aspirations, expectations, and their membership 
of the family as a spouse, parent, offspring, sibling, cousin, in-law, or a kin on the other hand. 
The individual system approach within the family business reflects the value brought into 
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business by each person distinctly; which constitutes the human capital that guarantees the 
success or the failure of both the family and the business.473  
This theory shall help to depict the complete family business system, wherein several actors 
are involved, many factors matter, several boundaries interact, tangible and intangible, implicit 
and invisible constructs apply; which affect its effectiveness and functionality. In addition, it 
allows circumscribing the rights, obligations, and liabilities generated from the membership of 
all ownership, business, individual, and family subsystems. Moreover, inserting the individual 
system shall shed light on the discrimination that may occur in terms of genderism or family 
membership rank or role, and the consequences that this may engender within the family and 
business contexts. However, the generational development of the family and business requires 
a comprehensive approach that illustrates the entire picture of this enterprise, and apprehends 
the way it functions based on the interaction between its unique building constructs, dynamics, 
and the institutional environment in which it operates.  
3.2.5 The ecosystem approach 
 Family business is a constellation of living interdependent subsystems that reciprocally 
interact in order to generate a unique identity. The latter is not parentless or volatile. It has an 
origin. It is sowed, cultivated, and flourished in a fertile soil, governed by a set of rules, 
influenced by countless circumstances and dynamic inputs and outputs, which, overall, affect 
its functionality. Such a perspective raises the ecosystem theory defined by researchers as a 
dynamic entity of various characteristics and sizes. It reveals as a community of diverse biotic 
(living) and (nonliving) self-regulating organisms that interconnect through nutrient cycles 
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and energy flows. They interact as a single integrated system; so as to create a network of 
internal relations between the organisms, and the external interactions of these organisms in 
equilibrium with their environment. Besides, these dynamics control the processes and all 
activities of the ecosystem and are often subject to feedback loops.474 It is worth noting, in 
order to manage the ecosystem effectively; it is crucial to agree upon a standardized and 
harmonized entity that reflects its classification.  
By projecting the ecosystem definition into the family business loop, we can emphasize that 
the living organisms are also independent ecosystems by themselves. Each one has its own 
interactive resources, mechanisms, and dynamics. The interaction of the sub-ecosystems 
creates a supra-ecosystem. The latter is affected whenever change occurs in one of these sub-
ecosystems; thus, the need for a mutual adaptation to the entire system emerges.475 In addition, 
each sub-ecosystem has its peculiar legal perspective, so a specific set of rights and 
obligations generates, once the constellation is interlinked. 
Most theorists outline the human ecosystem as being composed of three organizing concepts: 
Humans, their Environment (social, economic, legal and political systems), and their 
Interactions476within the boundaries of these systems. Consequently, the interrelationships 
between different processes, factors, and the relevant contextual variation take place.477 
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Additionally, it is worth noting, the developing role of the person that “shapes environments, 
evokes responses from them, and reacts to them”478variably; as depending on the affordance of 
the environment’s distinct processes and outcomes are usually observed.479 Nevertheless, in 
order to understand any type of development, one must consider the entire ecosystem system 
in which change occurs.  
Therefore, it reveals crucial to highlight the five social sub-systems as well as the integral 
parts that constitute the ecosystem,480and apply them by analogy on the vigorous family 
business system by espousing it with the abovementioned four-circle theory.  
These sub-systems are: the microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, macrosystem, and 
chronosystem. 
• The microsystem represents “the pattern of activities, social roles and interpersonal 
relations experienced by a developing person in a given face to face setting with 
particular physical, social and symbolic features that invite, permit, or inhibit 
engagement in sustained, progressively more complex interaction with, and activity in, 
the immediate environment…. [in which] development...depends on the content and 
structure of the microsystem”.481 Applying this definition on the family business 
exposes the main features of every single subsystem and its relevant development 
challenges. For instance, individuals play their roles within the family and business 
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settings as family members, owners, directors, managers/employees, or successor, 
family or business representatives, or social workers. 
Figure 6.1: The Microsystems 
 
         Business 
 
 
Individual 
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• The meso-system is defined by “the interrelationships between two or more 
microsystems”.482 In other words, it is the interaction created between the 
microsystems,483 translated by the immediate and reciprocal influence, and the direct 
impact of each microsystem on the other.  
                                                
482 Laura E Berk, Child Development, 5th ed (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000) at 27.  
483 Supra note 480 at 40. 
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Figure 6.2: The Mesosysem 
 
 
• The exo-system encompasses the environment, settings, or events that profoundly 
influence each microsystem, devoid of any direct participation in it. It exposes within 
the family setting, rank and role, governance structure, strategic family or business 
decisions, family social network, values, or the market. 
Figure 6.3: The Exosystem 
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• The macro-system is the milieu in which all microsystems, meso-systems, and exo-
systems interact and operate jointly. It includes the developing society and sub-culture, 
broadest ideologies, belief systems, shared assumptions, and institutional patterns of 
the external environment.484As family members themselves shape their business 
culture,485 the latter is affected and changes due to social, political, legal policies and 
structures; however, “unrestricted of where changes come, social structure and work 
settings may put up with settlement”.486 
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Figure 6.4: The Macrosystem 
 
 
 
• The chronosystem reflects the passage of time as a synonym of the chronological age. 
It embraces change or consistency over time; namely, family structure, generational 
development of business management and governance, business expansion and 
growth, ownership arrangements adaptations, socio-economic status, employment 
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policies;487so, all changes that occur over the life course of a family business. 
Therefore, it was highlighted that “a family business evolution may be understood 
based on the external influence on internal changes, and which way maturity factors 
influence company’s internal pressures”.488 
 
Figure 6.5: The Chronosystem 
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Taking into consideration the whole ecosystem, and dealing with the relevant dynamics, 
interactions shall absolutely produce a healthy and sustainable family business. It emphasizes 
its operation and pathway within its natural niche. Additionally, it allows accentuating the 
legal mechanisms and constructs that influence the functionality of this enterprise, by 
distinguishing between the internal ecosystem, (the micro-, meso-, exo-, and chrono-systems), 
and the external ecosystem viz. the macro-system.   
3.3 The added value of the ecosystem approach  
The major developments in the modern science of law often occur when the analytical 
perspective changes to a functional one.489 Thus, in order to cope with challenging situations, 
researchers shall seek innovative approaches and suggest new avenues and concepts to solve 
them intelligibly. This perception synchronizes with the citation “there is nothing more 
practical than a good theory”.490 As such, ascribing “good” to a theory transpires when it is 
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possible to justify it practically, and concretize its functionality so as to change and guide the 
practice of experts, particularly jurists. Accordingly, a good theory shall provoke assertive 
actions that solve complex, ambiguous and confusing situations. The latter prove to be a 
source of insecurity, volatility, and risk aversion. Therefore, people usually prefer formal 
rules, and applied processes that allow them to understand the past, deal with the present, and 
foresee the future in a well-defined map.  
Correspondingly, espousing the ecosystem and combining it with the four-circle theories 
reveal as a prerequisite for the family business institution. Although, I do not pretend novelty; 
rather it is just an attempt to link and incorporate the applicable theories, in the best way that 
justifies a comparative, comprehensive, integrative, and a multidisciplinary approach, so as to 
elucidate the complexity of this enterprise. However, embracing a continuum of social and 
human behavior, in addition to the psychological, economic, and legal disciplines, without 
slopping any of their boundaries, helps in desiccating the entire system thoroughly.  Doing so 
will disclose the answers of the when, where, who, what, why, and how the family, family 
resources and the overlapping interrelationships mark the uniqueness of this enterprise. 
3.3.1 The legal repercussions of this approach 
It is usually expected that law has an evolving nature, which mirrors the society’s needs and 
identifies with its aspirations. Therefore, “a little sociology leads away from the law but much 
sociology leads back to it”.491 Besides, law usually encloses comprehensive orders, which 
regulate various human interactions and conducts within a particular cultural and social 
setting. It is supposed to govern both individual and group behaviors, and to set the boundaries 
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that guarantee each group’s interests. Therefore, law usually operates in an expectable way, 
while resolving disputes arising from such interactions. Still, seeing the social change and 
evolution, as well as various challenging and complex problems confronted by humankind, 
render a human’s behavior unpredictable. Therefore, law sometimes becomes inept at 
conveying the complexities of human conduct and development. Such ineffectiveness requires 
creating equilibrium between the legal rules and the social context in order to prevent the 
conflicts that may occur or even resolve them when they arise.  
As such, the family business litigations and disputes cannot be perceived through the 
conventional legal channels anymore, without a thorough understanding of its distinctiveness. 
Particularly, the ignorance, unawareness, and/or the lack of recognition of its unique legal 
identity reveal most often the source of injustice in all societies. Consequently, judicial 
decisions are mostly grounded in the implementation of business and corporate laws, devoid 
of any single concern for the family system that governs this enterprise. Such neutral 
perception often generates massive social and economic consequences, in addition to negative 
repercussions on family relationships. They result in tragic sagas, bitter and rancorous feuds, 
hidden agonies, animosity, distress, and lesion amongst family members. They also promote 
various disappointing expectations, disintegration amongst generations, assets dissipation, and 
consequently, in many cases, the businesses’ demise.492 
 Accordingly, it reveals appropriate to put in practice the adopted theory, since it facilitates the 
recognition of the legal “taxonomy” of the family business, as a singular entity. It 
acknowledges the impact of the macro-system, serves the purposes of each of its intersected 
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micro-systems, and then the interdependence between each sub-system493 creates the meta-
system that allows its safe mode operation. The synergy between the subsystems only occurs 
when “the parts can do something together that they cannot do alone”.494  Thus, the whole -the 
family business meta-system-  “cannot be divided into independent parts…  [Which each] has 
one or more defining functions . . .  [It] cannot be carried out by any one part of the system 
taken separately  . . . When an essential part of a system is separated from [it] of which it is a 
part, that part loses its ability to carry out its defining function.”495  
This theory shall help jurists (researchers, scholars, advisors, lawyers, judges, mediators or 
arbitrators), to visualize and deal with this enterprise in a singular way as a family business, 
and not just as a business anymore. Hence, their perspectives, the decision-making processes, 
adjudications, and the outcomes vis-à-vis it will extremely change. Since, they will be 
equipped with the necessary means to desiccate its complexity and dispose of the ambiguity 
that encounters its concept. Moreover, legislators shall not overlook it as a distinctive legal 
institution anymore, considering its primordial impact on all economic, social, and political 
arenas.  
3.3.2 Individuals versus family  
The main origination of the four-circle ecosystem’ theory resides in the separation between the 
family as an independent stakeholder detached from individuals as family members. This fine 
line between the family as a group and the individual shall generate unavoidable legal 
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consequences. Particularly, it was conceived, “There are no individuals in the world, only 
fragments of families."496 Individuals start with the family, float around; try to live life497 until 
they end up within it again. However, individuals act, interact, and react differently within the 
family setting as family members, than as independently.498 They usually struggle within the 
family enterprise between two opposing forces: the personal and the family. Each paradox 
pulls them to its side. Therefore, the character of any individual shall be naturally viewed 
under two different aspects: “first, as it may affect his own happiness; and secondly, as it may 
affect that of other people”.499 As such, families (as groups) and individuals have their own 
unconscious dynamics expressed in terms of role (member role and group role) and behaviors; 
whereby each of them has three forces: “energy organizing, goal-oriented, and self–
correcting”.500 It “survives, develops, and transforms from simpler to more complex through 
an ongoing process of recognizing differences and integrating them”.501  
The family is considered “a living organism”, different from individuals who compose it. It 
has a definite atmosphere, distinct reactions, spirit, and ambiance. 502 Therefore, it was 
concluded, “the family is not simply a group of individuals” having “dyadic relationships with 
each other”, [instead] …”these individuals create a unique system or group attributes through 
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family interactions and transactions”.503 Consequently, the discrete taxonomy of the family 
vis-à-vis the individuals, reveals two distinct developing systems, but discloses a reciprocal 
rapport between each other. Since each identifies its own role, competencies, effectiveness, 
values, interests, concerns, and aspirations. However, they are inseparable throughout the 
multigenerational patterns and processes.504 Accordingly, the family can never transpire 
without its members; it shapes their personalities, and lives through their activities. It 
surpasses them, and endures as long as family members survive.505 Its authority influences its 
members in terms of strict unspoken values, legacy, allegiances, or reputation. Therefore, 
family members shall interact within its forces; abide by its rules, needs, and objectives at a 
specific place and time, which assures the stability and survival of the family.506 However, the 
endurance of this permanent social institution depends on the adaptation of its rules and norms 
to life changing conditions.507 Particularly, the family always expects specific behaviors from 
its members who, as previously said, mostly modify their actions while interacting within its 
context.508 Their utterances, observations, reflections, and conducts shall be continuously 
directed towards the family as a whole,509 and located within its relationships structure. These 
concerns affect, very often, family members within the enterprise. They adjust, perceive, 
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conclude, and decide in a different manner, and adpat in order to deal with others, who may 
not share common personal values or goals with them.510 Moreover, it is very often expected 
that their choices be accommodated to the collective interests of the family. Consequently, 
they reduce their personal autonomy and privacy.511 Still, the same persons have their self-
perception based on “their successions of different overlapping selves” over time.512 Their 
identity develops over years; their needs and apprehensions change from being dependent 
family offspring, to independent persons who achieve, own, and lead. Personal forces drive 
them towards seeking their self-esteem, self-concerns, and interests. They aim at being 
autonomous, enhancing their personal, professional, and social status, isolating themselves 
from their emotional root relationships and issues.  
Subsequently, both family and individuals, as two “opposing forces”513 in the family business, 
intertwine into reciprocal roles and authorities, which shall be accommodated while 
conducting the enterprise.514 Particularly, individuals encounter the dilemma when both 
dynamisms seem mêlée. They incline to be trapped; powerless to understand their roles, and 
incapable to define their rights, obligations, authorities and the prevailing primacies within the 
family business. Chiefly, nothing but ignorance of where the limits end and begin, and/or 
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invading both systems boundaries, echoes the main source of ascending manipulation, agency 
cost and conflicts, which threaten family connectedness and business longevity. Therefore, it 
is crucial to depict a clear definition of the “family” and “individuals”, delineate their 
boundaries, and validate their reciprocal interconnection into determining their legal rights, 
obligations, liabilities, and rewards systems. This shall create equilibrium between both 
subsystems, as “they limit one another, […] they balance one another, and by thus creating 
order, they justify one another.”515 Yet, it is worth noting, “the individual is not the sole source 
of his own rights, …[nor] the absolute source of all rights; … … [admitting this logic leads] to 
deny social rights, or at least to lose the way of recognizing them and to risk the most 
hazardous constructions to provide a basis for them”.516 Particularly, “a right is never born of a 
unilateral principle; it is realized only in a social group and in practical balance.” 517 So, it is an 
error “to believe that individual rights can be justified solely by the value of the human 
individual.” 518 Consequently, we can draw the hypothesis that individuals’ rights within the 
family business are not born unilaterally and voluntarily. They stem firstly from their family 
membership, and the family decision to connect them to the family business and grant them 
the opportunity to benefit from family resources and capitals.  
Correspondingly, the four-circle ecosystem approach exposes as pertinent to:  
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1) Observe the instrumental role of family members as individuals; and the family, not 
only as individuals’ embracer, but also as an independent stakeholder granted with 
rights and obligations. 
2) Underline the impact of the family as an independent stakeholder and its inputs within 
the business, in addition to the relevant mechanisms that assure the enterprise’ survival 
as a family business. 
 3) Customize the rule of law that guarantees the distributive fairness between all 
stakeholders, aimed at developing justice.  
 
 
 
  
Part II:  The Distinctive Identity of the Family Business 
The complexity of the family business resides in the interaction between contradictory and 
interconnected social systems.519 It creates an entire amalgam of incongruent values, 
intentions, and expectations. It operates in an emotional mode, directed by personal 
aspirations, and influenced by the market constraints, principles, and incentives.520 
Considering, the family transmits the core of nurturance, care, attention, and continuousness, 
into the business, and articulates them into productive assets.521 However, the generational 
development of the family has its particular impact on business; it affects the interrelationships 
and usually exposes through ownership, governance, and management. Consequently, a 
fundamental change in terms of business legal structures, roles, responsibilities, rights, and 
culture occur.522 This usually disturbs the equilibrium within business, and activates regulating 
mechanisms.523 Therefore, it is crucial to emphasize the implicit and explicit constructs and 
mechanisms of the whole system, by “using wide and narrow lenses respectively”, 524 
embracing all dissimilarities, and underlining the unique characteristics of healthy or 
dysfunctional actions within the family business. 525 
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1. Family business stakeholders 
There is no specific definition for stakeholders within a family business. However, family 
business stakeholders reflect a broad and multidimensional construct that incites scholars to 
divide them into different categories. Their perceptions vary. Some accentuate their status, 
function, and interest, or restrict them to family members by measuring their role, based on the 
degree of ownership. Others underline the fraction of family members involved in the 
enterprise,526 or focus on their perceived expectations.527 Another group of researchers 
highlight the shared-interest and the purpose of the authorities sought by stakeholders. They 
divide them into two groups: The general-purpose group, seeking the same authorities, and the 
special-purpose group, which pursues small and selected authorities of particular interest.528 
Moreover, the criterion of those whom, without their support, the enterprise would have never 
existed529was also underlined. This position encounters, somehow, the supporters of the 
“group entrepreneurial” approach, which concludes that the solo traditional entrepreneurial 
hero becomes a myth; and “entrepreneurship is seldom a solitary activity”.530  Since 
businesspeople are well defined by the group of people who support them, and are fully 
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committed to seeking the business’ success.531 
Moreover, in the same line, there was a distinction between two categories of stakeholders, 
primary-internal and secondary-external. The former consists of those known by voluntary 
risk bearers; who without their direct and enduring support, involvement, and investment, the 
organization could not operate and survive; they are embraced in business, ownership, and 
family membership circles.532 Thus, this category of stakeholders includes seven sub-
categories: 
1) Family members not involved in business; 2) Non-family employees; 3) Non-family owners 
(not involved in operations of the business); 4) A family member owner and employee; 5) A 
family member owner (not involved in operations of the business); 6) An employee owner 
(not a member of the family); 7) A family member employee (not an owner).  
Figure 7: Stakeholders categories 
 
Source: Adapted: John A Davis et al, From Generation to Generation: life cycles of the family business, 1st ed 
(USA: Harvard Business School, 1997) at 34. 
 
However, the second category consists of a wider group of stakeholders; those who affect the 
long-term survival and prosperity of the enterprise without being related to it directly; namely 
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Gabler, 2013) at 12. 
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governments, communities, or special interest groups. 533 
Based on the above-mentioned analysis, all scholars focus on the individual aspect of 
stakeholders, and highlight the larger range of influential social identities that overlap and 
compete within the enterprise.534 However, another category of scholars differentiates between 
two groups of stakeholders, who substantially affect or is/are affected by the achievement of 
the enterprise’s objectives;535 namely the group-such as the family- and individual(s).  
Consequently, all of the previous approaches accentuate the main concerns of stakeholders 
within the family business; however, it is convenient to consider all of them but under the 
distinction between the internal and external categories of stakeholders, and featuring the 
difference between individuals and the family as a group. However, I will analyze only the 
internal category, and more specifically family member’s stakeholders, by drawing the 
boundaries between the two types of stakeholders, seeing that they differentiate the family 
enterprise from non-family counterparts. Particularly, nothing can guarantee the survival of 
the enterprise more than orchestrating the interrelationships, determining their nature,536 
circumscribing their functions, and then depicting their legal consequences. 
1.1 Stakeholders as individuals 
Referring to the four-circle ecosystem theory, “individuals” as family members, intermingles 
within the three circles of “family”, “business”, and “ownership”; they are absolutely 
positioned within the family circle in addition to one or more of the overlapping 
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subsystems.537 Such a setting reflects the great complexity that resides in the confluence of 
various roles played by individuals whether at the personal level or the business level.  
Firstly, a person in a family business is primarily the family member who acts within the 
framework of the family, and also an individual who is self-regulated; having his/her own 
personality, perspective, needs, scope of understanding, knowledge, experience, attitudes, 
beliefs, aspirations, expectations, and interests.  
Secondly, individuals wear multiple functioning hats in the decision making process, whether 
at the level of governance, management/employment, or ownership.538 Consequently, they 
turn towards juggling all concerns together such as the personal, family, ownership and 
business interests and primacies.539 This status appears very costly for the family business. Its 
dysfunction may generate, most often, family and business collapses,540 and then personal, 
moral and financial damages.  
Therefore, the individual perspective is primordial for the family business, since its marginal 
acknowledgment is the main source of disagreements between family members.  
Thus, it is also fundamental to emphasize the dissimilarities between all family members, 
throughout the four distinct sub-systems, and the relevant avenues of influence.541 It is worthy 
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to mention that not all families or businesses are alike542 vis-à-vis their business; since families 
deal with their members differently. Their dissimilarities reveal by determining the category of 
individuals as family members, involved in or concerned about the business.  
1.1.1 Individuals as family members 
A family business is a property arranged in multilevel structures,543 and the various statuses of 
individuals, as family members, pass through multigenerational phases and roles. Their 
responsibilities, claims, and expectations vary over time.  
Family membership is usually categorical, as it does not require any personal effort to become 
or remain a member of the family.544 Family members are usually struggled between two main 
forces, the internal forces, and the external forces. The external force reflects their 
responsibility to preserve the goodwill of their family by respecting the cultural rules applied 
in their community. While the internal forces are of twofold and two underlying rules: 
primarily family members are subject, to family rules so they do not challenge family 
cohesiveness. Secondly, they shall respect the type of relationship they have with other family 
members and regard its boundaries. Thus, it was noted, “every relationship has a life of its 
own”.545  It has its specific rules, needs, and expectations. Particularly, the family system 
intermingles between the nuclear and the extended family. An individual is simultaneously a 
member of both extents. For instance, a family member is in the same time a kid, and a sibling 
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(sister and brother), a kin (nephew, niece, cousin). In addition, across generations, he/she is a 
spouse, an in-law, a parent, an aunt, or an uncle, and a grandparent. Each role has its own 
characteristics, obligations, and rights. In this respect, researchers highlight that congruency 
shall be present in every relationship through its two elements, namely attitude and aptitude. 
The former consists of three main components, such as feelings, intentions, and aspirations;546 
which should be consistent with the main goal viz. a long-term relationship. While, the latter 
consists of the relationship skills and abilities that should harmonize with the tasks, functions, 
and responsibilities that take place in the relationship.547 Whereas, any misbalance and deficit 
between the two shores creates in-congruency and then conflicts. However, it is worth noting, 
family members relationships are interlinked with their shared history and the emotional bonds 
and lifelong experience. Therefore, the biological, psychological, emotional, social, and 
economic factors combine inextricably. Moreover, in the middle of the abovementioned 
struggles, individuals encounter their need to emerge their personal identity that defines their 
needs, behaviors, desires, and ambitions. Dealing with individuals as incapable or dependent 
family members, restraining their roles and avoid recognizing their evolving personality, in 
addition to preventing them to echo their voices, incite family members to revolt and ask for 
recognition and justice. Particularly they hold in high regard on their accomplishments and 
achievements in the family business. The complexity of these factors plays a major role as a 
source of conflicts, whenever the overlapping roles are not dissected, and the appropriate 
obligations and rights are not lucidly defined. 
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Nevertheless, the primordial role of family membership for individuals exposes 
straightforwardly in terms of gender discrimination, inheritance, and succession. Gender 
discrimination reveals uncompromisingly by keeping the role of women invisible in the family 
business, despite their major impact on the business development over years. Also, it takes 
place by reducing business information to males involved in the business only. So patriarchs 
seek to separate business from family, assuming that harmony between family members is 
guaranteed by excluding women, which diminishes conflicts. Although, gender issues could 
take another dimension, where women, as well as the young generation, are sometimes silent 
stakeholders. They only obey the patriarchal culture and rules. In addition, headmen may 
create a glass ceiling for women to promote in business or as a decision maker by limiting 
access to some positions and responsibilities to male family members only, regardless their 
competence and capabilities. So, primogeniture sometimes, as a cultural value reigns, and sons 
reveal as an indisputable successor, while daughters may be expelled, or excluded from being 
an option. However, despite the underestimation of the role of women in the family business it 
is agreed that they are the major decision makers in family businesses seemingly owned and 
run by men.548 Nevertheless, any of the above-stated family approaches towards approaches 
have weighty negative impacts on both family and business; seeing, a family business is not an 
individual or a fractionized business. Instead, it concerns all family members, young and old, 
males and females, active or silent, involved or not involved within the business. Moreover, 
the inheritance law, as previously analyzed, has a great impact on the individual leadership 
succession within the family business. Therefore, it is primordial for family members to learn 
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how to live within the family and business, comprehend their codes, and dichotomize their 
functions.  This measure allows them to take personal feuds away from the business, if not 
totally alleviating them. They have to organize all forces adequately, particularly in view of 
the generational development and the living change of all subsystems. Since, nothing but 
demarcating the clear lines between individuals, family, ownership and business can remove 
blurred areas that distresses their family and business relationships. 
1.1.2 The genealogical development in the family business 
Scholars differentiate between the several evolving phases of maturity549 that family 
businesses pass through. Some distinguish between four stages, namely the survival, stable, 
professional and institutional stage; 550 while others underline the difference between the 
Controlling Owner (CO) and owner–manager (first-generation), Sibling Partnership (SP) (the 
second generation), Cousin Consortium (CC) (third generation), and Family Syndicate (later 
generations).551 However, as family enterprises are not alike, not all of them follow the same 
path. For instance, some move into three generations from the “survival” to “institutional” 
stage, whereas others never get past the “stable” phase.552 Also, some family businesses keep 
the same controlling–owner status.  However, from the legal perspective, each stage requires a 
set of interests and criteria that necessitates a specific legal form. As it was previously stated, 
the legal forms adopted by family businesses do not always reflect their de facto status. For 
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instance, they may take the form of a limited liability partnership or corporation, but actually 
operate as a sole-proprietorship. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate between three stages 
for the family enterprise: The founder Stage, Partnership Stage and Shareholding stage. 
1.1.2.1 Controlling-owner – The founder’s stage  
Empowered by family resources, founders (the father viz. the patriarch) sow the viable seeds 
of the business.553 They are the owner-managers or controlling owners (CO). At this stage, the 
business is considered, essentially, an extension of them.554 It reflects their personality 
epithet,555 reputation and the achievement left behind.556 Founders usually invest all accessible 
resources into the business, and know all its facets. They are the major source of knowledge 
and expertise, and the creators of the business’ operational style.557 They usually display the 
“market mentality”,558 and build the family and business social networks as the significant 
intangible assets of the enterprise.559 Besides, family shared-values are ingrained in their 
vision, and from them a strong identity is stemmed. Moreover, during the founders’ period, 
family perspectives towards the business are often established,560 and the responsibilities of 
ownership and management are imbued with love. At this stage, founders are considered 
stewards, seeing their full sense of responsibility, watchfulness, honesty, loyalty, 
trustworthiness, and transparency. They act vigilantly and carefully by respecting their family 
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values, reputation, and legacy. They observe all stakeholders’ rights, business concerns, and 
serve the community adequately. Also, they understand their challenges as family members, 
and do not spare any opportunity to add value to their business, considering that it will be 
reciprocally rewarding to the family. Founders are usually intolerant and more unwavering 
towards any facetious, casual, and indifferent acts that may affect the business or the family. 
The strong alignment of interests between ownership and monitoring agents’, viz. 
management, reduces opportunism, increases incentive for self-discipline, and promotes 
altruism by seeking other-regarding interests.561 It allows the founders to control all behaviors 
and conducts firmly and quickly. This results in the absence of formal governance structures, 
as most, if not all, authorities are in their hands.  
Moreover, throughout the years, once the business prospers, with all energies spent, the 
intention to keep the business in the family crosses the founders’ mind. Nevertheless, the 
business does not develop a family business mindset until the intent of the founder meets 
family members’ plan to join the business. Yet, once the latter enter the enterprise, their legal 
status often reveals ambiguous. Since, their involvement may take the form of employees or 
even managers, although they act as owners. Correspondingly, sometimes, sons and daughters 
may be legal shareholders or partners, or even directors; but in fact, they are just apparent, 
silent, or passive role-players. Their responsibility is limited to be rubber-stamping 
signatories- nothing else, and the founder remains the patriarch and the lone decision-maker. 
Accordingly, at this founders’ stage, the informal, secretive, and intuitive governance model, 
along with the lack of delegation, may expose the legal form of the business as a veil that may 
                                                
561 Supra note 328.   
 158 
not necessarily reflect its factual status. Generally speaking, under the founders ‘control, the 
family business seems at the safe harbor. Yet, the major challenge is usually disclosed upon 
their absenteeism, and when conflicts and litigations lead the path between inheritors and 
successors.  
1.1.2.2 The second generation- Sibling partnership 
At this stage, siblings, brothers and sisters control the business. Sometimes, they co-own it 
with the founders. Joining the family business at this stage is usually based on several factors: 
business entitlements, family memberships and trust between family members; seeing they 
are, very often, closer to each other. In addition, taking part in their family legacy and sharing 
the family common values with each other are the presumed reliance on reciprocal 
dependence. At this stage, siblings usually build on the secure foundation562 to invest in their 
business seeking its prosperity and longevity. They nurture a strong sense of duty towards it, 
as it represents the extension of the family; where everyone has the right to enjoy its reputation 
and benefit from it, as it belongs to each of them. Which become the main motives that incite 
family members to act beyond their self-interest for their best interest as a group.  
These emotional and social aspects are usually translated straightforwardly into creating their 
partnership based on the legal constructs, such as the “intuitu personae”, and the intention to 
share the family business profits and losses and legacy.  
However, very often, this phase witnesses family members’ struggle; as besides their family 
belonging, the second generation needs to be recognized individually, independently from 
their family membership. Therefore, defining their roles, rights, and duties as individuals, and 
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not only as family members, reveals primordial. Particularly, the demarcation of these 
boundaries paves the road towards the endurance the family legacy, and values, as well as the 
economic survival of the enterprise across generations. Particularly, they encounter a shift 
from the autocratic - individualistic ownership and control- culture, to a culture of 
interdependence and collectivism, by sharing control and ownership.563 Thus, the 
“collectivistic rationality” necessitates the “cooperative behavior”,564and conduct with regard 
to creating the balance between all dynamics. Although, their mission reveals challenging 
since they still align governance, management, and ownership. Moreover, they keep acting as 
stewards towards the family and business, but less differently than the phase of the founder. 
Seeing, the individual interest takes place moderately. Furthermore, throughout the years, the 
sibling partnerships, wherein collaboration and tolerance have predominated, face a new 
burden, by probing how to protect the interests of the new generation? So, the individual 
interest discloses increasingly, and the conflicts of interest appear gradually between siblings 
perceiving the interests of their own children.565 Particularly, they usually put too much weight 
on keeping the business in the family. Therefore, it is decidedly required, at this stage, to 
introduce the formal governance system that meets the family and business needs; providing 
that governance be in harmony with the legal form that responds to the enterprise ‘challenges 
in order to function efficiently. Thus, in all cases, governance shall be translated by separating 
the family, individuals, ownership and business, defining the different roles played by family 
members within the business, particularly when siblings own, manage, and govern business, 
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and learning how to manage, govern, deliberate and discuss transparently, in order to avoid the 
information asymmetry in all decisions to be made, in preparation for the cousin shareholding 
stage.566 This separation between the subsystems and roles in a crystal-clear demarcated 
statute would alleviate the risk of the business’ demise, and family collapse. For instance, 
from the financial perspective, business liquidity shall stop intermingling with the family 
needs and desires. 
1.1.2.3 Cousin shareholding stage 
At this stage, the family is much larger and business ownership is much more dispersed. 
Family members are sometimes not very connected to each other, and some owners are not 
involved in and distant from the business. The embeddedness and connectedness in the 
extended family and business is less stretched and selective. Therefore, their decision to join 
the business as well as their commitment to it are generally voluntary and freely chosen.567 
Consequently, the “intuitu pecunae” prevails for some family members, who may act as 
investors, more than family business owners. However, some others may still be connected to 
the family and business and abide by the family and business norms and rules. In addition, at 
this stage, nothing can create a balance more than the family board and family governance. 
Particularly, the behavior of some family members towards business could be qualified as 
irresponsible; so the family board shall be endowed with rectifying every single decision, 
behavior and conduct that may affect the family and/or business.  
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1.1.3 Individuals in business 
Individuals in business, whether they mix different roles or play only a single role, should 
firstly recognize the necessity to separate the family from business in terms of performance, 
accountability, and remunerations. Seeing, each role incurs different rights and duties.  
1.1.3.1 Business ownership 
Legally speaking, by definition, an owner is the legal, natural person or undivided group, who 
owns at least one share in the enterprise. The main objective of ownership reveals in acquiring 
profits and legal enrichment.568 Otherwise, it turns out to be a non-lucrative business, such as 
an association or non-for-profit organization. Accordingly, ownership entitles owners with the 
basic common rights in any business such as:  1) The right to vote (except owners of 
preference shares), 2) the right to receive dividends; 3) the right to examine corporate books 
and records and acquire adequate and transparent information; 4) the right of disposal,5695) the 
right to claim a share of the proceeds from the sale, or liquidation, to blaming unfair acts; and 
6) the right to hold the management and the board of directors accountable, and maybe suing 
illegal actions.  
Besides, scholars differentiate between three general categories of companies ‘ owners:570 
1) Majority versus minority owners: Majority owners are those who own 
more than half of the company shares (a single owner or group of owners). 
They can control the company and outvote minority owners, who own less than 
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half of the company shares. 
2) Voting versus non-voting owners: In general, all shares have a voting right, 
except some types of shares such as the preference shares; whereby their 
holders are entitled to fixed dividends paid in preference of the common shares 
holders, but without carrying any voting rights. Some parents resort to this 
technique with their offspring in order to control their business. 
3) General partners versus limited partners and/or shareholders: General 
partners incur the unlimited personal liability against their right to control and 
run the company under their names. This is in contrast to limited partners and 
shareholders, whose liability is limited to their shares in the company. 
However, it is worth mentioning that limited partners are not allowed to take 
part in management in the limited liability partnership.571 
However, family business ownership has a distinctive dimension. Firstly, it is not limited to 
financial profits as it was previously stated. Secondly, many of ownerships’ rights are very 
often overwhelmed with the lack of formalism. They typically disclose when conflicts arise 
between family members. In addition, they juggle with other roles such as management and/or 
governance. Therefore, the ownership subsystem, and the way it affects the decision-making 
process within the family business necessitates a crystal-clear definition. Particularly, it is 
extremely affected by the strong ‘personal’ and emotional aspects, which amalgamates with 
others’, interests, rights, and responsibilities. Besides, scholars differentiate between owners 
and investors; whereas, every owner is an investor but the inverse is not the case. Investors 
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seek financial profits by risking their money,572 and hold management liable for business 
performance. However, the feeling of possessiveness for family owners is psychologically 
entwined with their physical property.573They are attached, and identify with their 
business;574being endowed with the ultimate power that makes them visible, personally and 
emotionally, and accountable for their decisions towards themselves, the family, and their 
enterprise. Therefore, it is considered easy to be the owner of any business but it is hard and 
challenging to act as a responsible family business owner, whereby their “at-risk assets tied up 
in business”. 575 Such “Emotional Ownership”576 (EO) is considered a vital ingredient that 
reflects a vigilant ownership. Therefore, it was concluded, ownership is not sufficiently 
described as a legal agreement but has to be understood as a culturally embedded construct, 
namely a part of the family culture and tradition, which guarantees the family business’ 
success and longevity.577 Yet, the multigenerational change of the business structure 
engenders the exposure of various categories of ownership. As, it turns out to be 
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“depersonalized”578 across the years; the life cycle forces shape the individual’s conduct, as 
well as the family, business, society, and the market behaviors.579 Therefore, seeing that 
ownership is not static, family owners shall manage the development of their legal business 
relationships and structures correctly in order to increase the chances of longevity.580In this 
respect, scholars identify six additional categories of ownership that are specific to the family 
enterprise: 581   
 1) Operating-owners: They are the owner-managers and the decision-makers 
who run and control the business on a daily basis, and in every single detail.   
2) Governing owners: They may be managers in business but their additional 
role prevails in governance, controlling, supervising and shaping the culture of 
the business through their continuous presence.  
 3) Active owners: They are not involved in the business as executives, but 
they are attached to the enterprise, conscious about the operating system and its 
strategies. They support the business when the need arises, or when the latter is 
at risk, if any event affects the viability of the enterprise,582 or threatens the 
family reputation. 
 4) Proud owners: They ignore the business specifics, although they are proud 
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to be owners. They have a strong sense of belonging to the family business, and 
an emotional bond with it. Therefore, they receive and welcome all information 
provided to them, and do not hesitate to attend any meeting when it is required 
to do so. 
5) Passive owners: They only care about the dividends they receive from the 
family business without acting efficiently towards it. Although, they may have 
major ownership interests in business, but care less about it. 
 6) Investor owners: Similar to passive owners, but they discuss the profits and 
losses incurred, in addition to the feasibility of keeping their rights as owners or 
to sell their shares in the business.  
Consequently, the emotional dimension of the family business ownership makes any transfer 
of ownership very problematic to any of the said categories. Their entrenchment to business is 
presumed. Generally, they expect not to relinquish or leave the business for any reason. Since, 
it engenders a feeling of disloyalty for cutting themselves off and being exiled from both 
business and family.583Besides, it deprives them from the social and family standing so as to 
benefit from their enduring legacy.   
Moreover, the particularity of the family business ownership discloses a different range of 
prospects and expectations for family owners.  
Predominantly, considering the overlapping roles that overload the ownership dimension, 
family members expectations of each other as individuals and of the family vary. In general, 
they implicitly expect that each person is a steward, and acts for the legacy in good faith, 
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honesty, altruism, loyalty, transparency, with fairness and respect towards others. Besides, 
they expect from family members to avoid any losses or damages that may incur at the 
expense of the family, business, or each other. However, sometimes, excessive expectations 
are due to the blurry perception of family members towards the enterprise itself. In addition, 
confusion transpires through their intermingling roles, and the lack of demarcation between all 
overlapping subsystems. However, family owners very often struggle between coping with 
other owners and stakeholders based on the objective rights conferred to them by law, devoid 
of any recognition of the enterprise’s distinctiveness, and the influence of the family on them 
while using ownership rights and making decisions. In addition, a tug of indefinite war usually 
arises between family members active or governing owners, and non- or passive owners, for 
instance, tackling their sense of belonging and bond to the family legacy. Moreover, these 
confrontations escalate over time considering the generational development, when the 
individual interest conquers both family and business interests. Therefore, it becomes crucial 
to perceive family business ownership differently. In this respect, I do suggest a new category 
of ownership, identified by the “family” as a group, and an independent owner. Since, family 
ownership guarantees the equilibrium within the family business over generations, particularly 
upon the senior generation’s absenteeism. In addition, it alleviates the expectations between 
family members by separating the family, as a group, from individuals. Consequently, it 
depicts the uniqueness of the enterprise, and then censors and moderates any abusive act or 
decision; particularly when it reveals critical and hard-hitting for both the family and business. 
However, it is worth noting, family ownership shall be defined and granted with specific 
ownership rights inimitable to any of the above-mentioned owners, as it will be elucidated at 
length subsequently.   
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 Accordingly, family business owners shall be equipped with the necessary legal definition of 
family business ownership by highlighting two main categories - family and individuals’ 
ownership. So, individuals, and family, and their category of owners, can echo their voice for 
the best interest of both the family and business. However, a sharp demarcation between 
ownership, governance, and management / employment simplifies the assignment.  
1.1.3.2 Business directorship - Governance  
Governance in family business shall always synchronize with the generational development.584 
Since, each stage requires a distinct legal form, and a coherent structure of governance that fits 
the need of the family and business.585 However, each governance structure shall necessarily 
provide the family, as a group, and family members with the opportunity to echo their voice, 
and subsequently increase communication, trust, and transparency amongst them. 586 Such a 
measure necessitates a crystal-clear distinction between the different roles, rights, and duties 
of family-business-owners, managers-employees, and governors (Directors). It is worth 
noting, the separation between each role does not necessarily stand for introducing outsiders 
(non-family members) into business.  Many scholars highlight the threat of family removal 
whenever the separation between ownership and management occurs, and introducing 
outsiders into the business. 587 Instead, seeing that the same person wears multiple hats within 
the business, the separation shall be understood in terms of the definition of roles, rights and 
obligations depending on the context requirements. In other words, by differentiating between: 
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owners who exercise the rights and duties of ownership (i.e. by attending owners’ meetings, 
receiving dividends, electing directors); managers who operate on a daily basis whose duties 
are to provide information when the need arises, discuss salaries and benefits, supervise other 
employees; or directors monitor business affairs, or receive remunerations. Accordingly, it is 
convenient to accentuate the rights and duties of each role played within the family business. 
However, in this section, I will accentuate the specific challenges faced by the family business 
governance, in terms of directors’ role; whether it is played formally or informally. As such, 
four main points will be discussed:  the duties of the directors, their rights in terms of 
compensations, and the relationship between the family and the board of directors in the 
family business.  
a) The duties of directors:  
Through their shares, owners have the right to supervise the management of their company via 
the board of directors, by exercising their right to vote at shareholders’ meetings. In this 
respect, it was ruled: 
A share “is not an isolated piece of property . . . [but] a ‘bundle’ of 
interrelated rights and liabilities”: Sparling v. Quebec (Caisse de dépôt et 
placement du Québec), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1015, at p. 1025, per La Forest J.  
These rights include the right to a proportionate part of the assets of the 
corporation upon winding-up and the right to oversee the management of 
the corporation by its board of directors by way of votes at shareholder 
meetings.588 
 
Family directors shall act rationally in the best interests of both the family and business, 
seeking the multigenerational sustainability of the company as a “going concern”. They shall 
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create and maximize its value,589 by depicting the business strategy at various levels, and the 
ethical culture of the enterprise. Therefore, the role of directors is perceived based on the 
principles of good faith, loyalty, stewardship, and accountability. These principles apply while 
exercising their duties. However, each principle is revealed independently in civil law,590 while 
in the common law system they are enclosed in two principal duties: fiduciary duty and duty 
of care.591 The fiduciary duty discharges directors if they act honestly, with loyalty and good 
faith. In addition, if they apply the “fair treatment” in conformity with the reasonable 
expectations of the stakeholders, and in the best interest of the company. The duty of care 
requires that directors exercise their duties with attention, diligence, and competence, similarly 
to a reasonably prudent person in comparable circumstances.  In other words, they shall act 
like any ordinary person who might be in the same circumstances, having the same 
capabilities and skills. Besides, the duty of diligence is to be concerned, as it dictates that 
directors shall attend all board meetings, and be fully informed about the company.  
Moreover, directors in the family enterprise shall perceive the family and business primacies. 
Therefore, they shall prevent decaying, wasting or deteriorating any of its tangible or 
intangible assets. Moreover, any act that may occur in the best interest of individuals in one 
generation at the expense of future generations shall be considered as a generational 
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embezzlement. Thus, an additional duty shall be imposed on family members’ directors, 
namely, the duty of vigilance. It encloses the terms of safeguarding the tangible and intangible 
assets of the family business, superintending, and staying watchful, observing its 
multigenerational development. In this respect, I quote Adam Smith - “The directors of such 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than their own, it 
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own […] Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less in the management of the affairs of 
such a company”.592 However, despite the fact that as family members owners are most often 
the directors, they still sometimes act neglectfully towards the family and business. Contrarily, 
they prove assiduous regarding their self-interest, or when they are driven by nepotism for 
instance; particularly when the conflict of interests and competition emerge between family 
factions. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge the collective family co-ownership of the 
family business, rather than the individual ownership, in order for the family directors to act 
vigilantly in the interest of the whole system.  
b) The remuneration of directors 
Remunerations are considered one of the main features of corporate governance. They are the 
main incentives that encourage directors to perform effectively based on their knowledge, 
expertise, and skills for the best interest of the company.593 However, the question of 
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remunerations has a particular perception in family business. Families prefer keeping control 
by assigning key positions to family members without any consideration to their competence, 
capabilities and their added-value to the business.594 Their appointment occurs based on 
family membership, birth order, or gender. Therefore, they treat them differently while 
designing their remuneration packages, which lack transparency and exceed, most of the time, 
the market price. Particularly, the authority to determine these packages is usually entitled to 
family members decision-makers themselves. So, they usually seek maximizing the individual 
wealth profit, rising financial benefits, at the expense of the business, and the minority 
owners’ (shareholders, partners) interests. 595 This could disclose the agency cost incurred at 
the level of directors, which in turn provokes losses to the family business. In addition, such 
decisions may produce conflicts between family members, specifically the non-executive 
ones. Seeing, the atmosphere of trust and transparency that must transpire between family 
members, directors’ remunerations shall reflect fairness and accountability; sensing the 
interest of the company as a pressing concern and seeking long-term financial 
results.596Therefore, determining directors’ remunerations shall be market-based, fairly 
justified, and reviewed annually based only on business concerns.597 
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c) The relationship between the family and the board of directors 
Whenever a business is categorized as a family business, the family subsystems shall be 
mirrored in its structure. Therefore, its intersection with other subsystems shall be interpreted 
at the level of governance through both the family council and the board of directors. The 
family council reveals as the vehicle that governs family issues pertaining to business; further 
explanation will take place later on. As for the board of directors, seeing that the family is the 
foundation of the business, its recognition as an independent group shall be represented in the 
board of directors. By analogy to the co-determination practice adopted in German corporate 
governance, previously stated, the family, as a group, shall be represented in the board of 
directors differently than the individual owners’ representation. So, the family will be 
endowed with an active role in the decision making process, instead of playing a simple 
advisory role. Its representation becomes mandatory and legally recognized in every enterprise 
qualified as a family business. On one hand, throughout this measure, family directors echo 
the voice of the family in the decision making process separately from the individuals’ stance. 
On the other hand, individuals will have their own voice that reflects their personal 
perspective freely from their family membership.  Such a mechanism can enhance the family 
value within the enterprise and create a particular equilibrium that guarantees the best interest 
of the family in business.  
1.1.3.3 Business management/employment 
The employment contract is usually a written or unwritten contract by which a person, an 
employee, undertakes to do work for remuneration, under the supervision, and according to 
the employer’s instructions. This contract could be for a fixed or undetermined term. 
However, the contract of employment in a family business is very often an unwritten contract, 
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with verbal and implied terms based on trust and family relationship expectations, for an 
unlimited period. However, the verbal agreement very often creates many grey areas between 
family members towards the company; particularly when the clauses are open-ended in terms 
of job description, work hours, vacation, or benefits. Such a situation can confuse family 
members by mixing between family belonging and membership, ownership and employment. 
It engenders a mixed feeling and paradoxical behavior towards the family and business, to 
then become a source of serious conflict. On the one hand, as family members, the family 
business is the "mother" whose function is to provide nurturance,598 a sense of connectedness 
among family, and their identity and heritage. On the other hand, business is a vehicle for 
professional development and economic achievement. It reveals a source of financial security, 
as their salary and benefits are the principal revenue source to satisfy their life-style 
expectations. Therefore, the primary goals of employees, in general, reside in generating 
incomes and ensuring a continuing career growth. However, family members cannot 
categorically disregard family needs while serving the firm as employees. Thus, scholars 
emphasize the difference in management process between family and non-family businesses, 
and its effect in view of stewardship and agency theories over generations. Seeing, family 
members in business management act as stewards, being influenced by the family and 
business values, less driven by financial factors, seeking the good will, and prevailing the 
collective and family-serving objectives over their self-serving objectives. 599 Therefore, their 
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involvement alleviates agency costs, considering the long-term prominence, and avoidance of 
any short-termism and managerial myopia.600 While, over time, and across generations, things 
may change, and the asymmetric information issue may take the lead, even between family 
members. As such, some family executives seek to captivate some information from family 
owners or executives, particularly the non-controlling family members being influenced by the 
economic rationality, and self-dealing seeking their expropriation, and maximizing their 
individual utility. Therefore, the opportunistic behavior that reflects the agency cost emerges; 
whereas a family manager avoids securing the interests of the principal601 (family member’s 
stakeholders and the family as a group). Specifically, principals (owners) and managers 
(agents) “have different goals; they are utility maximizers, each for his/her own interest, and 
their attitudes towards risks vary.602 However, the manager or the employee may be at the 
same time owner of the family business. So, a question arises in this respect, who is the 
“principal” and the “agent” in this case? It is crucial in this circumstance to focus on the role 
rather than the person and the context of the act. In addition, a written contract that includes 
well-defined clauses is able to accentuate the relationship of the family member as an 
employee within the family business. So, it removes all ambiguous role definitions in the 
company. Moreover, nothing can create the balance within the family business at this level 
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more than the acknowledgement that this enterprise is not an individual ownership earned by 
succession; rather it is a collective co-ownership that belongs firstly to the family, as a group, 
then to individuals as successors. Such a differentiation can dot the I’s, and reduce the 
controversy between the family’s interest and the self-interest. Moreover, it alleviates the 
conflicts between family members involved and not involved in the business, and relieves 
them from living the dilemma to recognize their efforts spent for the best interest of the family 
and business. Consequently, they act as employees who seek their individual interest eligibly, 
but also motivated by their family membership, legacy, and pride. Then, the family recognizes 
their achievements as employees straightforwardly, and rewards them accordingly in terms of 
salary and benefits. Although, it is worth noting, salaries and benefits of family members 
involved in business as employees shall not be different from those involved in the same 
positions as non-family members; otherwise nepotism arises and the sentiment of unfairness 
simmers amongst other employees. However, family members shall be awarded through the 
supplementary benefits mechanisms, whenever they show extra diligence about their business 
as an extension of their family. Therefore, family members as employees shall respect their 
duty as any non-family executive to be transparent, provide the necessary information when 
the need arises, and work for the best interest of both the family and business. Otherwise, they 
can be held accountable, primarily before the family, then the business.  
1.2 The family as a stakeholder  
Families are the “transparent incubators for the germination of business ideas and endeavors 
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both in and out of the home, at the storefront or the factory”.603 Therefore, this backing urges 
an inquiry about the main category of stakeholders that support the business. In addition, it 
discloses the embedded mechanisms that may affect the business fundamentally; namely, the 
mutigenerational resources and capitals, which can endow stakeholders with imperceptible 
legal rights and obligations.  
1.2.1 The legal nature of the family  
When we talk “family”, an implicit inquiry about the meaning of this term takes place; what is 
a “family”? It is recognized that the definition of a “family” varies between cultures and 
contexts. It always depends on the researcher’s perspective and the purpose of the analysis. 
We will therefore skip any sociological and cultural definition, since it has subjective 
perception, and jump to the legal angle in order to highlight the role of the family within the 
family business, then the legal consequences that may arise upon delimiting its function. 
Afterwards, we will address the following question: does the family have a legal personality 
distinct from the one of its members? Subsequently, Can the family be endowed with legal 
rights and duties within the family enterprise? 
It is recognized that the legal personality reflects the legal capacity, endowed with legal rights 
and duties, which allows a juristic person to deal with others and litigate (to sue and be sued). 
The legal personality is usually granted to individuals as natural persons at birth, and to the 
groups of people as juristic persons by law. Since the family is a living group of individuals 
who share the same legacy and pride, the question that may arise: can we grant the family the 
legal personality and consider it a juristic person?  
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According to René Savatier, the family has the necessary attributes to be classified as a juristic 
person by nature. 604This theory was founded on the factual existence of a juristic person. 
Savatier has a comprehensive vision for the family as an entity despite its plurality. According 
to him, the family is a collective group that has its proper settings, run by its members, 
whereas the patrimonial entitlements belong to the group. However, Jean Dabin, a supporter of 
individualism, contested Savatier’s position; and argued that family rights and duties shall be 
interpreted exclusively from an individual perspective.605 Since, all extra-patrimonial rights 
such as “family name, legacy, or authority” belong to individuals as members of the family. 
Correspondingly, the family estates are considered a shared property, as a collective right 
organized by appropriation, whereas the family public representation is not more than the 
family chiefs’ representation.606 In turn, Jean Carbonnier ponders that the parties who create 
the juristic person shall demonstrate the common interest through its proper vehicle, and show 
a consciousness as the “affectio societatis”. 607He argues that the family is not an eventual 
association of persons but a property partnership that is based unconsciously on the will of the 
parties (spouses), and their union within the matrimonial framework. In other words, it is a 
domestic company that holds all fundamental constituents of the juristic person, such as the 
family name, domicile (the matrimonial domicile) and the legal and judiciary capacity with its 
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representative as well as its patrimony (family estate). So, the legal personality reveals as a 
question of fact. Thus, it was considered that personalizing the family, as a juristic person, is a 
legal mechanism that generates legal consequences. Firstly, the law should primarily 
recognize it. Then, a juristic person necessitates the intervention of public authorities in order 
to establish it as a capable person. Besides, a legal person shall determine a fixed legal seat, a 
legal representative, and has the possibility to be liquidated and dissolute at any time, 
depending on its parties’ will. Hence, such a process could not meet the complexity of the 
family system; since there are myriad of family arrangements among countless family 
members, both legally capable and incapable. Moreover, since a juristic person is a legal entity 
separated from its participants, if we admit the delimitation of the aforesaid, how can we 
define the governance structure, authority, function, rights, and obligations of each family 
member within the settings of the family? Yet, the family is at the highest rank of institutions’ 
scale that surpasses the legal personality.608 We support this position since the family is a real 
natural group, characterized by “the most intimate emotional and volitional unity”609 that 
technically outstrips the legal personality notion. It is the most primitive and enduring 
institution of human history, to which granting it the legal personality confines its function, 
role, connotation, and significance. Its role remains universally legally immeasurable and 
unrecognizable. However, it was cited “When a body of twenty or two thousand or two 
hundred thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common 
purpose, they create a body which by no fiction of law but by the very nature of things, differs 
                                                
608 Georges Renard, La théorie de l’institution - Essai d’ontologie juridique (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1930) at 245.  
609 John Dewey, James Gouinlock & Jo Ann Boydston, ed, The Later Works 1925 - 1953, John Dewey, 1st ed 
(USA: Southern Illinois University, 1984) at 42.  
  179 
from the individuals of whom it is composed.” 610 Departing from this position, though the 
family is not a legal person, still it exits with tremendous impact and dominance that 
overpowers the business at all levels. Moreover, the “family” is the initial motive for family 
members to join the family business. The questions that may arise: would it be legally 
appropriate to consider the family as a group, as one of the stakeholders, rather an owner 
within the family business, even if it is not considered a legal person? Subsequently, can we 
introduce a new concept in the family business, and raise the patrimony by appropriation at the 
“family system” level?  
It is conceivable to enlarge the concept of “family” and “family patrimony” and extend them 
beyond the matrimonial framework in order to encompass the extended family. So, the family 
in business can be endowed with a separate patrimony. However, the patrimony by 
appropriation is a legal institution adopted in the business world, independently from the 
burden of the legal personality. It therefore becomes crucial to recognize this institution within 
the family business, and endow the “family” as an independent stakeholder, with a patrimony 
by appropriation. Moreover, referring to the section 2186 CCQ, for instance, the legislator 
circumscribes that the contract of partnership is a contract concluded by the “parties” devoid 
of any definition for the term “parties”. It does not restrict it to legal or natural persons,611 
which could give rise to the “family” to be one of the “parties” in a family business. 
Moreover, it will be vested with legal rights, through its autonomous patrimony distinct from 
all family members’ patrimonies. Whereas, only the family, as a group, retains the 
appropriated rights but none of family members has any real or individual rights separate from 
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the family as a group. However, its ownership can be held in “Trust” as long as the enterprise 
is qualified as a family business. Consequently, this perspective detaches the family business 
from the “individual ownership” to become a “collective co-ownership”, whereas the family 
exposes as a Royalty-Owner, an independent stakeholder, and considering its supremacy in the 
family business. 
1.2.2 The family authority on the family business  
The “soul of the family” was raised as a notion that “drives all what happens in family 
businesses, as well as the indefinable essence of the family’s spirit and being”.612 In addition, 
it was stated, “the soul cannot be measured or qualified but it is easy to recognize its presence 
or even its absence.613 Besides, the singularity that the family brings to a family business was 
stated in a more concrete resource-based insight, outlined as “Familiness”.614 It is the central 
concept that encompasses an idiosyncratic bundle of complex, intangible, and dynamic 
resources and capabilities. The latter are considered as unique, inseparable, and synergistic,615 
and emerge from the family involvement, as well as interactions between family, business, 
and individual family members, and their desire to maintain a strong personal attachment, 
commitment, and identification with their business.616 Thus, it is the umbrella of the “Family 
capital”, indeed, it is the main construct which differentiates the family business from its 
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counterpart.617 However, “familiness” could be “ distinctive, as a source of competence”, 618 
and influence the family business positively in terms of trust improvement, altruism, 
stewardship, communication, transparency and long-termism, a source of “competitive 
advantage”, and a wealth creation over generations. 619 Also, it might be  “constrictive, as an 
encumbrance by family firms”,620 in view of nepotism, opportunistic decisions viz. and 
unfavorable decisions, lawlessness, power abuse, conflicts, “apathy, inflexibility, and 
inertia”.621 Nevertheless, “familiness” is a paradigm that helps to understand the mechanisms 
behind family members’ involvement in business, in addition to its core or engendered 
consequences.622 However, the question that may arise, how can “familiness” be demarcated 
legally? Such a question necessitates a delimitation of the  “family capital” and the resources 
that make a family business exist.  
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2. Family Business Capitals  
It is legally recognized that the “capital” reflects the basic assets of the company. It consists of 
the assets deriving from the resources originally owned or bestowed by a natural or juristic 
person. They are usually transferred and incorporated in the business, so as to operate 
productively. However, the informal approach often depicts family businesses, the resources 
and capitals are most often conveyed tacitly within the enterprise, devoid of any formalism. 
Particularly, requesting to document some dealings between family members mirrors mistrust. 
Therefore, it is crucial to detect the implicit intention of family members behind their assets’ 
submission to the enterprise. As, it plays an immense role in accentuating their appropriate 
rights and obligations in business; chiefly, in presence of the emotional and endowment 
mechanisms that usually enfold the family capital and most of its resources. According to 
Ernest & Young, the value of family enterprises entails around 70 per cent of economic value 
and 30 per cent of emotional value.623 The emotional attachment and the sense of obligation 
towards their business and legacy surpass mere dividends’ distribution and financial 
revenues.624 Also, sometimes emotions overrule the logic of the rational thoughts and can lead 
to some behaviors and actions that the latter would seldom support”.625 However, family 
assets may be, tangible or intangible, having a definite economic value, and encircled with 
expectations, which provide the entitled persons with future benefits. The tangible assets may 
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be current, movable, and immovable; they create the financial business capital. The latter takes 
the form of debts that necessitate a future refund, or the equities that bestow their conferrer 
with an ownership position, as well as the relevant property rights within the enterprise. The 
intangible assets reflect the non-physical resources and rights, which add and create value to 
the enterprise in the market place. They enclose the non-monetary, non-marketable, 
indivisible, and illiquid value. Based on various judicial decisions, the main characteristics 
that define the intangible asset are enumerated as follows:626 It shall: ”1) be identifiable, both 
within the specific company or context, as well as identifiable in a general sense; 2) be legally 
owned; 3) be able to trace its birth and development; 4) be legally protected; 5) have some 
proof of its existence in the form of a contract, registration, or a database; 6) have a 
determinable lifespan, and/or a specific renewable lifespan; 7) have similar or comparable 
assets to be found elsewhere in the marketplace, or in other companies; and 8) be quantifiable 
in terms of its value. 627 Along the same lines, it was declared that the intangible assets could 
be founded on a right owned and/or alienated, and can generate or increase the owners’ profits 
.628Particularly, transmitting these assets into the business embraces a considerable quota of 
the enterprise’s “gross revenue and perceived success”. 629 The latter result from major 
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interactions between various assets, 630 mainly, when the family enterprise accesses, uses, and 
relies on them over time; so they interact back and forth, between and within the sub-systems 
boundaries, throughout the interpersonal relationships, generational developments, and 
resource flows’ processes.631 Thus, a reciprocal and balanced movement of parallel family 
capital resources632 depicts the uniqueness of this enterprise.  
Consequently, tangible assets, and more specifically the financial capital is the apparatus that 
often safeguards the interests of the creditors,633 but still it is not the unique capital perceived 
in the family business, alike other non-family counterparts. There are other forms of capital, 
through which family members may contribute and add value to their business.634As such, in 
addition to financial resources through outside sources of earned income,635 and the flow of 
revenues generated from the business activity, family businesses always benefit from the 
family “power, prestige, reputation, sense of belonging, as well as the legacy value from 
continuing a family tradition, the emotional bonds between family members and nostalgia”.636 
Also, family members may be more likely to provide emotional support in the form of 
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encouragement, and instrumental support in the form of knowledge, and physical assistance in 
helping the family business to survive.637 Yet, it is rarely that families measure these 
resources; in fact, they do not even know they own them,638 or they implicitly recognize them 
but do not expressly realize their benefit to their business. Despite the non-apprehension of 
these resources’ ownership, still the family capital is the fundamental source of information, 
influence, control, and social solidarity, which leads to improve the productivity of family 
members within the family business.639 However, it is conceived that the main source of the 
family enterprise’s longstanding resides in three hubs: family unity, the human capital, and the 
social capital. While the unique resources that differentiate and strengthen this enterprise are 
the patient family capital, reputation, influential knowledge, and networks.640Correspondingly, 
some scholars consider the family capital is the supply reservoir composed of observable 
constructs, namely human, financial and social capital.641 Others identify five resources as 
components of ‘familiness’: human capital, social capital, patient capital, and survivability 
capital, along with the governance structure attribute. 642 Overall, they contribute to creating 
the “Family wealth” ,643 or even more the “True Wealth”644 of the family.  
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Nevertheless, based on the aforesaid, each of these dimensions has its characteristics and value 
that affect the operation of business, and differentiate it from non-family counterparts. 
Particularly, the mix of family resources occurs to be the main construct on which each family 
member (founder, partner or a shareholder) relies, whatever the stage of the family business 
development.645 As such, the family supports the founder, financially, emotionally, and 
professionally in the early stages of new venture creation, devoid of any condition or 
restriction. However, upon the latter’s success, a substantial disagreement may reveal 
considering the resources’ allocation as the capital assets of the business.646 Such cases explain 
the necessity to articulate every single resource invested by family members, in order to reveal 
the implicit and intangible capital assets. Subsequently, this shall generate a set of rights for 
each stakeholder and the relevant obligations and liabilities, fairly and equitably. Accordingly, 
we do suggest highlighting the main components of the “Family capital” as a bundle of 
resources and assets within the family that “outweigh liabilities”,647 influence the family 
business legally, and affect its healthy operation and longevity. Accordingly, I will distinguish 
between the following types of capitals:  
1) The Financial-capital; 2) The Family Human-capital; 3) The Social/ Relational-capital 
(Internal and external relational capital); 4) The Moral-Capital (Shared value system); 
and 5) The Intellectual-capital (know-how, reputation – good will); 
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2.1 The financial capital 
The financial capital often defines the legal form of a company in terms of its distinction 
between sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. Since, the minimum capital 
prescribed by law, indicated in the balance sheet, and business memorandum, reveals the 
extent of creditors’ rights protection and usually demarcates the owners’ limited liabilities 
within the enterprise. Also, in addition to liabilities concerns, the burden of taxation, and their 
desired treatment, the financial capital usually plays a major role for business people in 
choosing the most suitable legal form of the business and its territory. Particularly, 
entrepreneurs or family business owners usually seek to reduce their business incorporation 
cost by maintaining the legal form of their business, or changing it to the most permissive 
conditions. So, based on the aforementioned, a question may arise: does the choice of the 
business’ legal form mirror the real intention of family owners towards their businesses, or 
their partners/shareholders, or even towards business creditors, particularly within the context 
of the family business? This directly raises the corporate veil issue, if it is legally and 
judicially acceptable to disregard it in order to outweigh fairness and justice in this enterprise. 
In order to answer these questions, it is suitable to circumscribe the different components of 
the financial capital within the family business and its legal consequences. Particularly, it has a 
distinctive connotation that identifies the financial resources of the family introduced into 
business.  
2.1.1 The family financial resources 
Family and business financial resources usually intermingle for the benefits of the family 
business. They are the most preferred and the first external source of finance for family 
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members.648 As it was above-stated, they may be composed of both monetary and physical 
assets, movable and immovable properties, tangible or intangible, owned by family members, 
individually or jointly.649 They are the means that guarantee the security for the business 
ventures,650 and support the growth of the human and intellectual capital.651 From the very 
early period, the founder(s), then family members as successors, rely primarily on them in 
order to start, subsist, grow, and invest in their business; specifically in difficult times ahead of 
debt aversion and resorting to financial institutions i.e. Banks. This might explain the low 
debt/equity level observed in family businesses. Particularly, resorting sometimes to external 
sources may incur high personal, business, and social costs, which could affect the family 
reputation.652  For instance, when family owners approach financial institutions, they may fail 
to raise money from them,653 as the latter consider their personal ownership, reputation, and 
wealth, instead of analyzing the business repayment capability and its future cash flows. 
Therefore, they fund their businesses through their own personal savings, complemented by 
family money and group resources,654 or they may resort to family assets to secure their loans, 
once occurred.655 They also incline more to reinvest dividends in their business, and lower 
their transaction costs. Particularly, as mentioned-above, they steer away from seeking 
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external investors and sharing equity with non-family members, due to the fear of losing their 
autonomy and control over the business, to breach their privacy, plus the desire to retain 
profits within the family. Therefore, they are able to make great financial sacrifices,656 at all 
costs, only for ensuring the survival of their business legacy under their control.  
However, resorting to the family financial capital usually depends on the family business’ 
development stage. Seeing that family and business resources mostly intertwine in small 
businesses, or at the controlling owner stage. Nonetheless, family members are usually lenient 
and willing to support their business informally, without any documentation. Remarkably, the 
family financial support, in happy or challenging moments, usually expresses trust and 
benevolence, but later on, it may lead to skepticism and dissensions. They usually make loans 
or gifts to other family members on a personal basis, for numerous reasons. Still, the 
problematic arises when the same assets are used for both household and business needs,657 
and the implicit causes and motives, seeking the family business development, and 
survivability. In this respect, considering the invisible intention and motives that enfold the 
business and personal support; it is crucial to probe if these assets are offered in terms of a 
loan, donation or their provider seeks partnership or shares within the family business? Such 
questions usually take place when conflicts transpire, particularly, in light of the absence of 
any written or official document. Answering them engenders distinctive legal consequences. 
Since, a loan is a bilateral onerous contract that bears the burden of reimbursement, while a 
gift is a unilateral gratuitous contract in which the donor does not expect a repayment. 
Besides, as for partnership or shareholding expectations, they reside in returns and profits. 
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However, the financial advancements between family members entail, first and foremost, to 
determine the type of relationship between family members. For instance, the Supreme Court 
of Canada distinguishes between the advancements given by a parent to his dependent child or 
to his adult child. The presumption of advancement as a gift only applies to money advanced 
to minor children. If parents transfer assets to adult children, the act is a rebuttable 
presumption that the property or the advancement is not a gift, but rather it may be offered as a 
loan, or held in trust for the parent. However, it is worth noting, the onus or burden of 
rebutting this presumption is placed on the person who takes the position that the advancement 
was a gift. 658  
The long-standing common law presumptions of advancement and resulting 
trust continue to play a role in disputes over gratuitous transfers. These 
presumptions provide a guide for courts where evidence as to the transferor’s 
intent in making the transfer is unavailable or unpersuasive. They also provide a 
measure of certainty and predictability for individuals who put property in joint 
accounts or make other gratuitous transfers. The presumption of resulting trust 
is the general rule for gratuitous transfers and the onus is placed on the 
transferee to demonstrate that a gift was intended. However, depending on the 
nature of the relationship between the transferor and transferee, the presumption 
of advancement may apply and it will fall on the party challenging the transfer 
to rebut the presumption of a gift. The civil standard of proof is applicable to 
rebut the presumptions. The applicable presumption will only determine the 
result where there is insufficient evidence to rebut it on a balance of 
probabilities ….. The presumption of resulting trust is the general rule for 
gratuitous transfers. However, depending on the nature of the relationship 
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between the transferor and transferee, the presumption of a resulting trust will 
not arise and there will be a presumption of advancement instead:[..]. If the 
presumption of advancement applies, it will fall on the party challenging the 
transfer to rebut the presumption of a gift.659 
 
Accordingly, since personal concerns intermingle inextricably with business concerns in 
family business, it is suitable to emphasize the intention behind the financial support, 
particularly in light of the absence of any documentation. Therefore, the financial statement of 
a business does not always announce or reflect the actual financial status of the company. In 
this context, it is convenient to highlight the best legal means that may outweigh fairness and 
justice within the family in particular, and the business subsequently, vis-à-vis the financial 
assets advancements. 
2.1.2 Legal measures to unveil the family business 
A business’ legal veil is the legal form that differentiates the business in terms of liabilities, 
creditors protection, and due taxes. However, as mentioned above, the family business legal 
form does not always reflect the factual situation of the business in terms of ownership, 
governance structure, and real decision–makers in business. However, legally speaking, there 
are legal techniques that help to uncover the truth, although not all of them are easily admitted 
and applicable for various reasons. For instance, piercing the corporate veil is a judicial 
common law doctrine that disregards the company’s legal form, and breaks the limited 
liability rules. This technique aims at protecting the creditors by holding business owners as 
shareholders personally accountable for the business’ actions or debts. It is applicable when 
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the company is used as a shield for “illegal, fraudulent, or improper purposes”, 660 abuse of 
rights, and commingling of funds. Still this practice “seems to happen freakishly. Like 
lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled”.661 However, the three requirements were 
outlined to pierce the corporate veil: 1) The individual exercises complete control of finances, 
policy and business practices of the company; 2) The control must have been used by the 
individual to commit a fraud or wrong that would unjustly deprive a claimant of his or her 
rights. 3) The misconduct must be the reason for the third party’s injury or loss.662 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered a leading judgment by Lord 
Sumption, while addressing “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine by identifying two 
principles: the “concealment” principle and the “evasion” principle:663  
a) The concealment principle does not disregard the “facade” of the company, instead it 
allows the courts looking behind the legal veil to disclose the facts, and identify the 
real actors concealed through the corporate structure.  
b)  The evasion principle allows the court to disregard the corporate veil if there is a 
“legal right against the person in control of it, which exists independently of the 
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company’s involvement; and a company is interposed so that the separate legal 
personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement.664  
 
Although, some cases may fall into both categories, still the misconduct and the fraudulent 
acts do not always take place in the family business context. In addition, the third party barely 
exists in conflicts that arise between family members involved in business. Although, in 
Canada, for instance, it is convenient to mention the question of the “non-party” that emerges 
whenever family law overlays with corporate law and juxtaposes with the family business. It 
intervenes in many case laws seeking to disclose some information and produce some 
documents from the family of the spouse involved in business, in order to honor fairness.665 
This has compelled judges, within the context of meeting the financial obligations by a 
divorced spouse, to reveal more flexible looking behind corporate structures and impose 
obligations against those structures. So, they apply “the concealment principle” tacitly, 
considering “the principle of the separate legal personality of a corporation is an important one 
[but] not an absolute principle”.666  
Besides, according to section 317 CCQ: “The juridical personality of a legal person may not 
be invoked against a person in good faith so as to dissemble fraud, abuse of right or 
contravention of a rule of public order.”667 This article proves to be very crucial with the large 
meaning of the enumerated conditions. However, it inclines more to the “concealment 
principle” than piercing the corporate veil doctrine, which is not very common within the civil 
law system. Therefore, the “concealment principle” reveals as a great legal means for all 
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courts to follow a similar path, and disclose the reality behind the corporate wall in order to 
ensure justice, without attaining the legal form of the family business; particularly in presence 
of the family dynamics that affect the business in all means.  
2.2 The family human capital 
The family human capital is an advantageous capital-talent-pooling-device. It usually exposes 
as the primary intangible resource on which the family relies.668 Particularly, once deprived of 
financial resources, family owners immediately seek support for their venture from other 
family members.669 This capital promotes cooperation and cohesion, it guarantees that 
financial capital assets do not dissipate, and economizes the operational costs within the 
enterprise.670 It denotes the internal market for managerial workforce and governance.671 In 
addition, it enhances the quality of family, as well as business life for family members.672 
Accordingly, this resource is an accessible and flexible stock that flows over the business 
when the need arises. Once the family business integrates the family human stock into 
business, it turns out into an asset that shapes the business capital. Yet, the impact of the 
family human capital depends on the size of the family business and its generational stage. As 
such, the family may cease to be the principal source of human capital673 throughout the 
advanced stages of business growth and expansion, such as at the cousins’ consortium stage. 
In addition, the readiness of family members in terms of “knowledge, experience, ability, and 
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energy” 674 they bring to the business varies over time. Therefore, the family human capital has 
a bidirectional influence – it could be positive as a “stress buffer” 675 and/or negative- as a 
“resource drain” 676 on work conditions and family outcomes and vice versa.677 Particularly, 
when family relationships disregard the meritocracy scale, and unqualified family members 
are preferred and promoted ahead of competent non-family members. Also, if an outsider 
executive is seen as a cost rather than an investment,678 so favoritism will be promoted. 
Consequently, qualified non-family employees face a glass ceiling that prevents them from 
progressing within the enterprise. Still, the family human capital shows specific 
characteristics, particularly in terms of remuneration. Thus, it is convenient to clarify the 
following hypothesis: generally, family members are rewarded differently than non-family 
members. Hence, we can underline two statements:  
1. Family members are engaged in business without any salary, remuneration or 
compensation; or 
2. The rewards for family members are not commensurate with the work performance, 
and exceed or fall behind the normal salary or compensation scale.  
Appropriately, it is worth noting, when family members provide the family business with their 
efforts, it is primarily linked to their sense of belonging and assumed altruism towards both  
family and business. Particularly, these enterprises “enable people to work hard for something 
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more important than either opportunity or ego: family”.679 Hence, their initial motives reside 
in their implicit sense of responsibility towards the family and business legacy, in which they 
share their common heritage and pride. Therefore, they incline, altruistically,680 to provide 
unconditional support, aiming firstly at encouraging other family members, then seeking a 
long-term acknowledgment, endowment, and lastly the personal reward and profit. Therefore, 
their intention to join the business is not volunteering, neither working for a simple salary, 
compensation, or any other benefits, nor even to be subordinated to others’ guidance and 
direction in some cases. Consequently, the implied mixed expectations find their roots within 
the family and marketplace as well.681 Particularly, family members usually support each other 
in the first stages of the venture creation; however, upon success and expansion of the latter, 
family members claim their legal rights. Thus, substantial disagreements could take place vis-
à-vis the resources’ allocation and investment.682 Sometimes, the distinctive involvement of 
family members within the family business encloses the connotation of implicit and intangible 
emotional ownership. Hence, it is obvious that ownership’s fundamental rights in terms of 
possession and control cannot be raised legally unless it was indicated officially in the 
corporate registry. However, a question may arise, whether it is possible to emphasize the 
intention, the reason behind the active involvement and the factual role played in business? In 
other terms, would it be possible to perceive the rights of family members differently? Could 
the court look beyond the legal title, or the Memorandum of Association, to determine the 
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intent and conduct of family members within the enterprise? In other words, could the court 
raise the question of the factual family members’ ownership within the family business if the 
subordination aspect is lacking? Then, is it conceivable to go beyond wording and terminology 
used by the parties in the agreement and corporate documents? 
Though, legally, when there is no an explicit and written contract between the company and 
the employee the court shall verify the role of the person within the enterprise, along with the 
type of relationship between the two parties. For instance, if a family member is involved as a 
family employee, the commitment shall be undertaken for a fixed or undetermined term, and 
work for a salary, as said by business instructions and under the direction or control of the 
employer.683  Accordingly, the three main components shall be fulfilled: work, remuneration, 
and the subordination relationship. The latter is the essential element that distinguishes an 
employment contract from the contract of services. If a family member plays the role of a 
contractor or a provider of services, he/she shall carry out physical or intellectual work and 
provide a self-directed service for a price; whereas no subordinate relationship exists between 
him/her and the family business, in respect of the service’ performance.684 However, whatever 
the role of family members is, their approach, attitude, behavior, and performance towards the 
business, they are most often different from non-family members. Many of them function 
altruistically as implicit owners, for the best interest of the family and business.  
In an appeal brought before the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals tribunal 
(ONWSIAT), it was stated based on the financial aspect: 
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“If the business were to sustain significant losses affecting the business’s capital, 
the impact on the wife would be direct since the business’s capital is very much 
intertwined with the family’s assets; …The legal action against the business 
would have direct consequences on the wife’s personal assets. The definitions of 
partnership and sole proprietorship distinguish between the entities by reference 
to the question of legal responsibility. It appears that the ARO felt that only the 
husband was legally responsible because only his name was on the provincial 
business registry. However, the definition in the Board policy states that one 
should look at the persons who are responsible “for the liabilities” of the 
business. In the present case, the Panel is persuaded that the wife is as 
responsible as the husband because any liabilities the business incurs would 
directly affect the couple’s personal assets. … There was no evidence that the 
husband had any separate assets that could be attached if the business was to be 
unsuccessful. It is clear on the evidence that any future liabilities the business 
incurred would be redressed through the family’s personal assets, in which the 
wife had a clear and equal interest…. The Panel does not consider it significant 
that the nominal distribution of the business’s profits was 60 per cent to the 
husband and 40 per cent to the wife. We note section 24 of the Ontario 
Partnerships Act, which specifies that equal sharing in the capital and profits of 
the business is subject to “agreement express or implied between the partners”…. 
Hence, it is not inconsistent with a partnership arrangement for the partners to 
agree to an unequal split of the profits.  In any event, as the testimony indicates, 
that split was a nominal one arranged for income tax reporting 
purposes. According to the testimony, the actual split in the profit was an equal 
one. … For these reasons, we allow the employer’s appeal. We find that, in the 
years 2006 and 2007 covered by the audit done by the Board in 2008, the wife 
was a partner in the appellant employer’s business and not a worker. 685 
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Such a decision surpasses the formalism of legal rules that govern the business as a business, 
and perceives the family system as a mechanism and a dynamic that reins the business in 
every single detail. In addition, the appeal tribunal founded the decision on the active role of 
the wife within the business. It was stated:  
 …. the wife in this family business was substantially more involved than being a 
passive beneficiary of its economic fate. …, the evidence demonstrates [the] 
facts:  
The wife was very much involved in the day-to-day activities of the business and 
performed activities that reflect a directing mind rather than merely providing 
services; The remuneration the wife has received for her activities is entirely 
related to the profitability of the business…. that the husband and wife carry on 
this business together…. They each have particular tasks to perform. … They 
each contribute to the running of the business as a “directing mind,” with 
separate but equally important responsibilities. …. “With respect to the business 
name, the Panel is persuaded that this is not determinative. We accept the 
testimony that the name was initially registered when the husband was the sole 
proprietor of the business. We accept that the family did not feel it was 
appropriate to change the name after the wife became involved in the business. In 
our view, the name registration does not reflect the realities of the business 
arrangement between the husband and the wife. We are persuaded that there was 
a clear intention on their parts that each was an equal partner in the family 
business. We further note, in this regard, that the family made a determination 
that the son would be involved in the business as a worker. In our view, this 
enhances the intention of the business that the wife’s role would be that of a 
partner rather than that of a worker. For these reasons, we allow the employer’s 
appeal. We find that, in the years 2006 and 2007 covered by the audit done by the 
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Board in 2008, the wife was a partner in the appellant employer’s business and 
not a worker. 686 
 
Consequently, the court recognized the role of owner, based on the evidence that the family 
member is not bound to a specific working time schedule, a task, or even a salary and/or 
remuneration. In addition, to demonstrate the intention of partnership, and the exceptional 
added value brought to the industry, along with the unique activities, talents, technical and 
professional family secret knowledge, and notability.687 Subsequently, in order to establish 
justice and fairness, it is crucial to firstly perceive the exceptional involvement of family 
members in business, and then to inspect the intention behind their involvement and their 
actions in the family businesses; so, to accentuate the specific characteristics of the family 
members’ interest, motives and actions. 
Nevertheless, in France, since 2007, it has been mandatory for a spouse (or civil partner), who 
works regularly and participates directly and perceptibly on a consistent basis in the family 
business, to choose a legal business “status”, otherwise the business is subject to penalties.688 
This measure was taken in order to protect active spouses in the family business, so they do 
not become subject to indeterminate position. Accordingly, they may choose between three 
different 'statuses': collaborating partner, salaried employee, or shareholder. Each category 
provides its specific conditions and benefits, and depends on the legal form of the business. 
However, this rule reflects an oblique legal recognition of the distinctiveness of the family 
                                                
686 Ibid.  
687 Supra note 249 at 418.  
688 Décret n° 2006-966 du 1er août 2006, Conjoint collaborateur, JO, 3 August 2006, 11580, online: Legifrance  
<http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000640539&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id> 
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enterprise; it is obvious that the legislator aims at protecting family members and their efforts 
spent in the enterprise. Despite the fact that family members are limited to the role of a spouse 
in business, but this regulation reveals as the first step towards extending its limits to every 
family member involved in business and attached to it. Consequently, most often, family 
members are not a cost or a liability that burdens the family business; rather they represent the 
source that energizes it and boosts its productivity and performance;689 seeing their 
commitment, competence, pride, dignity and devotion towards their legacy. However, 
resorting to such a capital depends generally on positive relationships,690 translated through 
family members’ ties. 
2.3 The Social/Relational Capital 
“Family-owned businesses are unique because of the people in them and their relationships 
with each other…many of these people are not simply employees or managers or investors. 
They are family. They are related. What anywhere else would be simple business concerns 
become intimately tied up with the unalterable fact of family.”691 Accordingly, the family 
relational capital is considered as “the most enduring and powerful forms of social capital”.692 
It is the advantageous productive relational resource, inside and outside the family and the 
                                                
689 Edward M Marshall, Building Trust At the Speed of Change: The Power of the Relationship-based 
Corporation (New York: American Management Association, 2000) at 11.  
690 Supra note 669. 
691 Leon A Danco, Inside the family business (Cleveland, OH: University Press, 1980) at 125.  
692 Nils Kraiczy, Innovations in small and medium-sized family firms- An analysis of innovation related top 
management team behaviors and family firm-Specific characteristics (Germany: Springer Gabler, 2013) at 11.  
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business, embedded in “cross-cutting personal [and family] ties”.693 Thus, all capitals have 
substitutes outside the family except the relational capital that “cannot be hired or 
imported”.694 It distinguishes the family business from other non-family counterparts. Seeing, 
it is embodied in relationships, amongst people and/or formal social institutions, while the 
human capital is embodied in individuals.695 So, once lost it is not easy to regain it identically. 
The benefits generated from this capital exceed the economic sphere.696 It creates healthy 
relationships, developed and nurtured on a day-to-day basis, thoroughly, and vigilantly. These 
ties are usually based on trust, respect, altruism, and confidence, spread among all internal and 
external stakeholders,697 and transferred smoothly across generations better than the financial 
capital. Correspondingly, this capital has its impact on business performance and functionality, 
by simplifying access to various family resources informally, which shall create value within 
enterprise.698 Therefore, scholars underlined and developed the following three dimensions of 
this capital: structural, relational, and cognitive. The structural dimension embraces personal 
and family social interaction, which helps family members to obtain information, or to access 
specific resources. The relational dimension denotes the assets rooted in these relationships, 
such as trust, beliefs, norms, and obligations. 699 Then, the third dimension mirrors “ a shared 
                                                
693Wenpin Tsai & Sumantra Ghoshal, “Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm Networks” 
(1998) 41:4 The Academy of Management Journal 464. 
694 Supra note 629 at 193.   
695 Supra note 634 at 202.  
696 Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital”, in Lawrence E Harrison & Samuel P Huntington, eds, Culture Matters: 
How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 98 at 99.  
697 Supra note 631 at 234.  
698 Supra note 693 at 473. 
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code or a shared paradigm that facilitates a common understanding of collective goals and 
proper ways of acting in a social system”.700 Investing in these resources and building a strong 
family social capital guarantees success for both family and business.701 Whether through 
family members who keep supporting their business financially, or by spending the necessary 
energies in it; or the external stakeholders who keep using business products or services, 
dealing with it, providing accessibility for helpful contacts, financial resources, and so on.702  
However, the multigenerational family relationships change over time. Therefore, based on the 
aforementioned, it turns out to be faultless that the family social/relational capital is a multi-
facet construct with various resources and repercussions. It obviously echoes a set of implicit, 
tacit, and intangible mechanisms that interact all together informally, so as to create value and 
produce one or more effects on the individual, family, or business. Such an informal resource 
is considered as a channel for information and stock flows, which creates social arrangements, 
so-called "the public good aspect of social capital".703 Hence, scholars introduce the shared 
value system within the family social capital, whereas we suggest analyzing it separately, 
since this system constitutes the moral capital that resides and affects all other capitals. 
Accordingly, the family social capital reveals as bi-dimensional: The internal dimension or the 
                                                
700 Supra note 693 at 466.  
701 Ritch L. Sorenson et al, “The Family Point of View, Family Social Capital, and Firm Performance: An 
Exploratory Test” (2009) 22:3 Family Business Review 239 at 251. 
702 Ibid at 242.  
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bonding704 network that reflects family members’ relationships, and the external bridging705 
social network that echoes the family’s social network with the external non-family 
stakeholders,706 such as the community, customers, suppliers, financial institutions. 
2.3.1 The internal bonding network- Family ties 
When human heart manifests itself at work and “people are given attention and support”,707 
their productivity increases efficiently. The “internal bonding network” is the enduring risk 
engine of a stable economy. It refers to the pre-existing, implicit, social708and root-based 
bonds that create a close-network, enabling its members to share a strong identity that reflects 
their image within society. The intense and long lasting family bonds, past experiences, social 
roles, mutual support, needs, and implied expectations harvest an emotional equilibrium 
within both the family and business. So, these bonds provide family business stakeholders 
with an inherent value aside from any economic return they may expect to achieve.709 Their 
ability to invest in social and financial capitals aims at energizing social and economic 
security. These specific bonds that link family members together make of them a distinctive 
nonmarket mechanism, and the substitute for the formalized explicit contractual relationships 
that unify unrelated stakeholders; so, a substitute for formal governance mechanisms within 
family businesses. Moreover, family ties are deemed the second-best solution in countries 
                                                
704 Lorraine M. Uhlaner et al, “Linking Bonding and Bridging Ownership Social Capital in Private Firms: 
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where weakness portrays its legal structures, institutional environment, and investor protection 
in emerging and immature capital markets.710 Particularly, such an informal mechanism 
reduces “transaction costs”; explicitly, the costs of monitoring, contracting, adjudicating, and 
enforcing formal agreements.711 As such, family members’ closeness and bonds are often 
substitutes for arm’s length bargaining,712 whereas the behaviors between principals and 
agents differ from ‘‘economic rationality’’ and do not depart from “purely economic 
motives”.713 However, the strengths of family ties and durability differ between cultures, 
social obligations, family generational development, and commitment towards the business, 
structural change, and any other external event. Hence, a variation occurrence at any level 
“disturbs the equilibrium and activates regulating mechanisms”,714 as well as generate several 
legal consequences at different levels. Scholars concluded that the impact of family ties on 
family business becomes evident with the superior results generated through more efficient 
operations, better management, and proper alignment of a company’s interests, than unrelated 
managerial ownership.715 Their strength is the vehicle that leads family members to promote 
their loyalty and commitment as “emotional equity”716 towards each other, and vis-à-vis the 
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business itself. They create the required commitment to deal with vulnerabilities efficiently,717 
which engenders great cooperation and trust amongst family members. 718 Although, strong 
family relationships do vary over time and depend on the level of trust between them, and the 
conflict of interests in business. This usually holds implied expectations amongst family 
members. As mentioned above, they expect from each other very often to act as altruistic 
stewards by aligning their interests with those of the family and the enterprise, and place 
others’ interests ahead of or equal to their own.719 Departing from this point, it is convenient to 
emphasize the role of trust within the family business, their relevant components, and their 
consequences.  
2.3.1.1 The role of trust in the family business  
Trust between family members is a crucial construct that guarantees a family business’ 
survival and prosperity. 720 It is a psychological state, linked to individuals’ sentiments, and 
their willingness to be vulnerable to another party, accompanied by an implicit expectation not 
to expect an opportunistic behavior in return.721 However, it was stated “Authority is no longer 
the glue that holds [people] together; trust is.”722 In the family business context, patriarchal 
authority could be somehow the glue that sticks family members to business at its first stage, 
                                                
717 Nick Warr & Mustafa Hussein, Family Business passport, 3rd ed at 8, online: Taylor Wessing  
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but later on, throughout generations, trust more than interest plays a major role in keeping the 
family in business. Despite that, it may be taken for granted. Trust plays a major role in 
attracting family human and financial capitals to business, and promoting cooperation between 
them. It functions as an indigenous, “on-going social [and family] control mechanism and a 
risk reduction device”.723 In addition, it encourages informality and flexibility within business; 
whereas, the embedded contracting relationship724 within the enterprise relies on trust as the 
substitute for missing governance and contractual enforcement.725 Therefore, it reveals, “more 
powerful than contracts or authority, [...] enables partner companies-or groups within a 
company-to achieve results that exceed the sum of the parts."726 It can “[control] opportunism 
[..] reduce governance costs, and facilitate adaptation”.727 Notably, the level of trust is 
dynamic and changes over time.728 It varies between family members depending on their 
generation, the bonds that may fade over time, culture, and attachments to each other. As such, 
relatives become more dispersed and distant, their experiences differ, and interests diverge.729 
Thus, despite its competitive strategic advantage in the early stages of the enterprise between 
family members, it often deteriorates along its growth. Consequently, devastated trust may 
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lead to several problems such as the lack of coordination and control,730 and increased agency 
costs, which may destabilize the enterprise and put it at risk. Therefore, it becomes essential to 
keep nurturing trust, and generate confidence within the enterprise by adopting governance 
mechanisms, policies, and structures that respond to the generational-development, and 
increase transparency and fairness.731 Seeing the impact of trust as a construct within the 
family business, it is convenient to emphasize its nature and its effects, particularly 
considering the natural transitional and multigenerational development.  
2.3.1.2 The nature of trust within the family business 
Trust is usually rational. It reveals the economic driver732that facilitates social interactions, 
increases transparency, reduces transaction costs, and uncertainty.733 It starts by being 
calculative and cognitive-based, founded on evidence of trustworthiness between parties. 
Then, it develops in order to become relational, affect-based, and identity-based where 
emotional bonds emerge in order to promote the belief that both parties care about each 
other.734 Thus, trust commonly has a personal and individual dimension. However, within the 
family enterprise system, trust has a different perception, seeing that family ties are more 
status-based than contractual.735 So, based on long-term interactions between family members, 
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attachments, kinship, familiarity, shared values, and common history,736 trust becomes 
predictable and embedded within family bonds. 737 Such a situation states what the so-called 
“Implied collective trust” is; where family members have an implicit rooted belief in family 
trust within the family system, which extends smoothly to the enterprise. Since, throughout 
generations, pre-existing family relationships allow family members to deal, share ownership, 
and be involved in the same business naturally rather than rationally. The latter do business 
with each other to improve their status within the enterprise. As such, co-ownership does not 
often occur owing to their desire to share their individual wealth and diversify risk, but rather 
it is a result of their founder's desire to distribute wealth. Thus, it is more about leaving the 
tangible and intangible assets for continuing their livelihood and receiving interest, by gift or 
inheritance, from the family business instead of liquidating it. 738 Correspondingly, family 
members do not choose each other based on personal attributes, nor rely on their abilities, 
talents, expertise or invested capital to become partners or shareholders.739Their willpower is 
limited to accept their involvement in business or not, aimed at sharing their common legacy 
and heritage. So, their business rapports are based primarily on their relationship with the 
founder(s), then, on the latter’s expectations and decisions, and the family or business 
advantages and interests. In other words, they deal with what the so-called  “transmission of 
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wealth and legacy”, instead of “risk diversification or acquisition of managerial talent”, 740  as 
it is admitted in non-family counterparts. Nevertheless they remain family members, and the 
personal dimension is not a cornerstone of their collaboration but the family dimension is; 
namely, the “family trust”.741 However, this proposition shall engender different legal 
consequences.  
2.3.1.3 The legal consequences of “family trust” 
The collective goal orientation, shared and intensive interactions, as well as the common 
understanding of the family culture have a great impact on disclosing the implicit legal 
constructs of the family enterprise.  
a) The “Intuitu personae” and “Intuitu pecuniae” 
People are usually bound based on two types of considerations: “intuitu personae”, and 
“intuitu pecunae”. Very often, the “intuitu personae” leads the enterprise at its first stage, 
when family members are too close, have strong bonds, and they trust each other due to their 
personal characteristics and shared values. Consequently, family businesses emerge in the 
form of a partnership or even limited liability company. However, throughout the multi-
generational changes, moving from the founder(c) stage to sibling partnership, then 
confederation of cousins, trust reveals in motion. Subsequently, as previously mentioned, the 
“intuitu personae” diminishes or disappears in many cases, and the “intuitu pecuniae” prevails. 
Then, the legal form of “corporations” typifies. However, comparing the characteristics of 
both notions to many factual cases, it proves noticeable that what gathers family members in 
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their business does not relate absolutely to whichever status. Being a family member, it so 
happens that the “implied family collective trust” is the only factor that most often emerges. 
Business relationships are no longer based on personal drives, but on an implicit status 
embedded in their moral capital viz. the value-system. Therefore, by examining the internal 
functional system of the family business, we can perceive that whatever the legal veil this 
enterprise embraces, shareholding or partnership, the intimate concerns of the family 
dimension transpire. So, their cooperative gathering that may enclose the “intuitu personae” 
and/or the “intuitu pecunae”, most of the time encloses a specific type of trust, what is so-
called “intuitu familiae”.  It exposes an added construct, which plays a major role in keeping 
family members in business. Accordingly, the court can resort to such a factual motive 
through its discretionary authority, and assesses all evidences that rule family owners’ 
relationships, in order to differentiate the family business from non- family counterparts.  
b) The “intuitu familiae” and “affectio societatis” 
The “affectio societatis” is one of the primordial components, and the mental factor that 
motivates partners, and differentiates a partnership agreement from other forms of contracts.742 
For instance, according to section 2186.1 CCQ: “A contract of partnership is a contract by 
which the parties, in a spirit of cooperation, agree to carry on an activity, including the 
operation of an enterprise, to contribute thereto by combining property, knowledge or 
activities and to share among themselves any resulting pecuniary profits.”743 
Also, as it is stated in the Cimon c. Arès before the Court of Appeal:  
                                                
742 Beaudouin-Daigneault v Richard, [1984] 1 SCR 2, 1984 CanLII 15 (SCC) [Richard], online: CanLII 
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L’affectio societatis is often the criterion that distinguishes a partnership 
agreement from other forms of association, apparently similar. Without a written 
contract, the judge shall observe this intention throughout the evident facts and 
circumstances surrounding the professional relationship of the parties. 744 
 
Accordingly, it was decided that the “affectio societatis” encloses three elements, namely the 
parties’ intention to enter into a partnership, corporate contributions, and the will to share 
profits,745 losses and risks while realizing a common project in a spirit of collaboration.746 
Moreover, it was approved by the Supreme Court of Canada that,  “…by their actions the two 
partners must have shown that they were motivated by the affectio societatis, the mental factor 
which Pic and Kréher (Des sociétés commerciales, t. 1, 3rd ed., 1940, Nos. 72 et seq.) 
described as follows, at p. 38: 
 
“…les deux associés, par leur comportement, doivent démontrer qu’ils étaient 
animés de l’affectio societatis, cet élément psychologique que Pic et Kréher (Des 
sociétés commerciales, t. 1, 3° éd., Paris, 1940, n°’ 72 et suiv.) décrivaient 
comme suit:... lorsqu’il ressort de l’attitude des associés entre eux une 
collaboration active et consciente - ce qui distingue la société de l’indivision-
sur un pied d’égalité-ce qui distingue le contrat de société du contrat de travail- 
intéressée, c’est-à-dire en vue de partager des bénéfices.747 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined the means that helped to emphasize the intention 
of the owners to collaborate collectively regarding the “affectio societatis”:  
….the Court held that, to determine whether there was an affectio societatis, it 
had to establish whether from the facts it could be said that there was 
[TRANSLATION] "a collection of presumptions precluding any serious 
objection, even though each one of them taken separately might give rise to some 
doubt….And I agree with respondent that if the contribution of one partner is out 
of proportion to that of the other, the trial judge must take it into account and 
consider that this fact weighs greatly against the existence of the affectio 
societatis.748 
However, as it was abovementioned, family members’ participation in business is not limited 
to sharing profits and bearing losses.749 Their collaboration exceeds the business systems’ 
limits to the multigenerational family development perspective as an additional component. 
Appropriately, throughout generations, the “affectio societatis” turns into what is so-called 
“affectio familiae”. 750 It echoes the cohesion factor and the keystone that assembles family 
members in business. Since family members build their business relationships and sustain 
them within the family over time, based on their interest to keep their stakes in their family 
ownership, legacy, and particularly, the intellectual assets. So, despite the convergence of their 
interests,751 their perceptiveness surpasses the financial aspect, towards a collective intention 
and objective; to which they incline to deal with one another in a shared spirit, seeking the 
proper operation of the business, by keeping it in the family. Although, we do recommend the 
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term “Affectio Societatis Familiaris” that assembles family members and unifies them 
collectively under the family business umbrella. 
Subsequently, the “intuitu familiae” and the “affectio societatis familiaris” emphasize the 
difference between the family enterprise and non-family counterparts. They reveal as the main 
constructs, which could establish a distinctive legal form and highlight the specificities of the 
family gathering in business. Particularly, both constructs approve the role of the family and 
its supremacy over personal relationships between family members. Also, it shows how it is 
translated implicitly, and affects their decision within and towards the enterprise. This incites 
to effectively recognize the family as an independent stakeholder in this enterprise, and 
reconsider the type of ownership that unites family members into business.  
2.3.1.4 Trust and fiduciary relationships  
Fiduciary finds its roots in the notion of Trust.752 It enfolds the trustfulness relationship based 
on sureness, confidence, reliance, and sometimes dependency. Generally, the fiduciary 
relationship concept detects its origins in Roman law.753 The civil law system refers to it, as 
above-noted, in all contracts. For instance, section 1375 CCQ states:  
 The parties shall act in good faith both at the time the obligation arises and at the 
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time it is performed or extinguished.754  
Or section 2088 CCQ, which states that the employee should act prudently, diligently, 
faithfully, and honestly towards the employer:  
The employee is bound not only to perform his work with prudence and 
diligence, but also to act faithfully and honestly and not to use any confidential 
information he obtains in the performance or in the course of his work. 
These obligations continue for a reasonable time after the contract terminates and 
permanently where the information concerns the reputation and private life of 
others.755 
 
Also, the fiduciary relationship was borrowed and developed within the common law 
system.756 In addition, both systems, as mentioned above, translated fiduciary relationship 
through the legal institutions, namely “Trust” or ‘fiducia” or “Waqf”; whereas the trustee 
undertakes the management of the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. In this context, 
fiduciary duties suppose that a trustee does not impose any personal interest over other’s 
interest, and becomes liable for exploiting his/her position for the self-interest at the expense, 
and to the detriment of the beneficiary. 
Besides, in analogy to “fiduciary” institutions, and aiming at avoiding injustice, courts have 
adopted fiduciary duties as a flexible legal remedy, in order to protect vulnerable individuals 
against those who hold a position of confidence and power over them.757 For instance, the 
Supreme Court of Canada supported that the fiduciary obligation reveals when the relative 
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legal position in a fiduciary relationship puts “one party at the mercy of the other's discretion”. 
758 So, “the principal's interests can be affected by, and are therefore dependent on, the manner 
in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been delegated to him. The fiduciary 
obligation is the law's blunt tool for the control of this discretion”. 759  
As such, courts have expanded fiduciary duties to numerous rapports in which parties build 
their relationships on trust, and inequalities of power arise. So, one person (the fiduciary) 
exerts a discretionary power over the practical interests of another (the beneficiary),760 and has 
“to act in a disinterested manner in the best interests of the [latter]”.761 In addition, the 
Supreme Court of Canada declared, “Fiduciary relationships are capable of protecting not only 
narrow legal and economic interests, but can also serve to defend fundamental human and 
personal interests.”762  
Whereas, these duties require“ that one party, the fiduciary, act with absolute loyalty 
toward another party, the beneficiary or cestui que trust, in managing the latter's 
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affairs…” 763 So, mutual self-reliance, understanding and dependence reveal between the 
parties. Besides, It was concluded, “Not all obligations existing between such parties 
will necessarily be fiduciary in nature”.764 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada 
declared, “It is the nature of the relationship, not the specific category of actor involved 
that gives rise to the fiduciary duty.” 765 
Therefore, the categories of fiduciary relationships are not limited to director-corporation, 
trustee-beneficiary, solicitor-client, partners, principal-agent, and the like;766 instead,  they are 
extended to ad hoc fiduciary relationships in which obligations arise by implication.767 Thus, 
the Supreme Court has refined a three-part test for whether an ad hoc fiduciary duty arises on 
certain facts: 
 In summary, for an ad hoc fiduciary duty to arise, the claimant must show, 
in addition to the vulnerability arising from the relationship.. (1) an 
undertaking by the alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the 
alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) a defined person or class of persons 
vulnerable to a fiduciary's control (the beneficiary or beneficiaries); and (3) 
a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries 
that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary's exercise of 
discretion or control.768 
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Accordingly, fiduciary duties reflect a flexible concept that encompasses various duties. 
However, the court of appeals of New York in the United States described the nature of 
fiduciary duties within any enterprise as follows: 
Joint adventurers, like co-partners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length are 
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. 
As to this, there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating 
erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for 
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It 
will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.769 
 
Yet, fiduciary duties are not precisely defined. It was perceived that fiduciary duties cannot be 
explained, nor classified until they are breached.770 So, each case shall be justifiable solely. It 
is primarily a fact-based question to be determined firmly and holistically771 by examining the 
remarkable facts, evidences, and circumstances of the case, based on the relationship’s 
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specific norms.772 Since, it was noted, “vulnerability alone is not sufficient to sustain a claim 
for breach of fiduciary…discretion, and influence, vulnerability and trust are but non-
exhaustive examples of evidential factors to be considered in making the fiduciary duty 
determination”. 773 Based on the above-mentioned characteristics and principles, it is presumed 
that fiduciary relationships, as well as the duties stemmed from them, reveal as evidence 
within the family business. Accordingly, it was pointed out “Individuals with whom one has a 
continuing relation have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage 
future transactions; [..] departing from pure economic motives, continuing economic relations 
often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and 
abstention from opportunism. … It would never occur to us to doubt […] in more intimate 
relations, which make behavior more predictable and thus close off some of the fears that 
create difficulties among strangers.”774 However, as it was previously elucidated, the motives 
behind joining the business for family members surpass the economic concerns to their 
preceding social and family concerns and bonds. Therefore, their expectations exceed the 
normal threshold of any other arm’s length relationship. Correspondingly, fiduciary duties are 
nothing more than those moral principles of the highest order, that bind family members based 
on their intimate ties, inherent trust and concerns; and where there are no acceptable 
justifications for not abiding by them.  
However, these intra-trusting-rapports eventually necessitate a distinctive legal analysis. Thus, 
                                                
772 Supra note 760 at 261.  
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it is suitable to raise the following concerns: 1) to verify if the above-mentioned characteristics 
are applicable on the fiduciary duties within a family enterprise? Subsequently, if the answer 
is positive, 2) who are the fiduciaries and beneficiaries within the family business? And, who 
might be liable for breaching fiduciary duties? 
a) The nature of fiduciary relationships in the family business 
Handling and entrusted with family affairs shall generate typical fiduciary relationships 
between family members. However, these relationships vary in terms of the played-role and 
the parties’ identity.   
Family members are usually immersed in deep personal, diverse, multi-tasking, and 
overlapping relationships, convoluted with implicit emotional family policies, and control. 
Therefore, such an interdependent business decision-making process reveals informality 
operational and structural. As such, it prevents family members from organizing their internal 
bodies and relationships within the enterprise clearly and in harmony with the statutory 
prescriptions. Subsequently, this discloses as a source of struggles and litigations, mainly 
when the factual ecosphere of the family business challenges the established legal 
prescriptions.  
However, considering the multiple hats worn within the family business, fiduciary 
relationships and duties shall have a different analysis within this enterprise. Seeing, in 
presence of various forms of squabbling, milking the earnings, profits and conflicts amid 
corporate and personnel aspects,775 fiduciaries may not act in a disinterested manner within the 
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enterprise. Yet, whatever the role-played and the rapport with business, it is usually founded 
on two main bonds: an explicit bond such as a legal contract or statutes, and an implicit 
collective agreement established between family members. Hence, the core of their 
relationships is based on: confidence, dependency for some or reliance for others, and 
discretional power. However, all actions, decisions, and duties shall be exercised for the best 
interest of beneficiaries, who embrace at the same time the fiduciaries themselves. 
Accordingly, these two agreements regularly presume high expectations from and towards 
family members. They expect each other to act proactively, altruistically, vigilantly and 
prudently in loyal, moral, fair, trustworthy and bona-fide manners seeking the best interest of 
the entire family business system. So, they do not expect to be engaged in any delusory 
dealing, oppressive or unlawful manner. Conversely, these presumed expectations nurture and 
enforce the commitment of power-holders to overlook pursuing their self–interest, and avoid 
any negligent, abusive, or oppressive decisions against the interest of all family stakeholders 
and the business as well. Although, these expectations are not usually directly expressed; 
hence, they engender a set of implied rights and duties from trusted family member or power-
holder towards the beneficiaries. Therefore, it was admitted that whenever a party gains a 
position of overriding power or influence over another party based on trust, whether by statute 
or agreement, or by a unilateral undertaking that may generate a unilateral discretion, this 
relationship would be termed a "power-dependency" relationship.776 So, similar to any 
fiduciary relationship, there will be two parties; namely, the power-holder and the beneficiary. 
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However, a question that may arise in this context, is the power-holder as a fiduciary 
considered an agent or a steward in the fiduciary relationship?  
I. Fiduciaries are agents or stewards? 
Stewardship is a Phoenician term composed of stīġ (house, hall) and weard, (ward, guard, 
guardian, keeper).777 Stewards are usually completely trustworthy. They are the leaders or 
executives who are highly dedicated, and intrinsically motivated by higher determinations at 
their position.778 Accordingly, stewards in the family business are   the founder(s) and family 
members who are more emotionally attached to their family and identify with the enterprise. 
Those, who invest their financial and non-financial assets in their business, which, most often, 
carries their names or the name of their parents, ancestors or their family name. They act 
responsibly towards both business and family, being less driven by economic self-interest and 
are rarely self-serving. They work hard to protect their lifetime reputation, and have the 
willingness to hand down a safe family legacy, and a strong business to future generations.779 
They commit to meet the needs of their backers, act diligently, having a well-defined intention 
to foster distinctive capabilities with altruism. They deal prudently and cautiously with various 
resources and make “far-sighted contributions” for the benefit of the collective good, their 
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enterprise, and the latter’s stakeholders.780 They also produce greater financial returns, even at 
a personal sacrifice, in order to benefit successive generations. 781 However, the entrenchment 
and commitment of family members towards their family of origin and enterprise vary across 
generations. Family members’ attitudes towards the family and business are usually disturbed 
as a result of weak emotional bonds, blurred areas, and undefined motives, and roles.782Also, 
the non-recognition of the individual achievement efforts, nepotism, unfairness, and biased 
succession concerns, costs, and problems that may arise simultaneously hinder rational and 
responsible outcomes. Then, the emotional, reactive, and self-regarding decisions and actions 
emerge. For instance, having diverse incentives, some family members involved in business 
may benefit from information asymmetries. Consequently, they drain, exploit, or expropriate 
family business resources,783 at the detriment of the enterprise and other stakeholders. Thus, 
negative feelings and conflicts escalate in business and put both the family and business at 
risk. In this case, family and business attachments, governance structures, and ownership and 
managerial alignments play a great role in breeding the so-called agency costs within the 
enterprise. 
However, family members, whether they were agents or stewards, shall fulfill the fiduciary 
duties. The ampleness of these duties and the context of the fiduciary relationship vary 
depending on the generational development and the degree of separation between ownership 
and control. It is worth noting, the hallmark of fiduciary relationships usually demarcates 
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beneficiaries’ expectations, and the level of commitment of steward(s)/agent(s) to embrace 
their preferences, interests and virtues. In all cases, once fiduciaries voluntarily accept to be in 
charge and to act on behalf of the beneficiaries, they shall not promote any personal interests 
without the latter’s authorization; particularly when they are unable to monitor or control the 
fiduciary's decision.784 Hence, the beneficiaries shall be the main concern regarding decisions 
made by the power-holder. However, the overlapping roles of family members highlight the 
tri-dimensional approach of fiduciaries within a family business: 
1. Family members usually play a social role due to their membership of the family. This 
role reflects their duty to overview what is so-called the other-regarding interests and 
virtues.785 
2. Each family member has a self-role and a self-identity, personal expectations, as well 
as the so-called self-regarding interests and virtues.786 
3. Family members have multiple functions, and wear several hats within the family 
enterprise in terms of ownership, management, employment, and/or governance. These 
roles shall emphasize the dilemma of fiduciaries and beneficiaries within the family 
enterprise, since the ebb and flow of interests arise in the same persons.  
Accordingly, a struggle reveals between the competitive self-regarding conduct, the 
cooperative other-regarding conduct, and the overlapping interests that take place.787 In order 
to balance these apprehensions, it is suitable to emphasize three main points:  
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- Who are the beneficiaries within the family enterprise? 
- What are the fiduciary relationships within the enterprise? 
- What are the fiduciary duties within the family enterprise? 
II. The beneficiaries  
There are three main categories of beneficiaries in any fiduciary relationship within the family 
business.  
1- The family as an independent stakeholder: There is perpetual evidence that the 
“family” is always one of the beneficiaries in this relationship. Most of the time, all 
those involved in business, whatever their roles are, are family members, who 
abide by the implicit contract and set of family rules; the latter are transferred into 
the business to “be used for the continued support of the family”.788 This implicit 
code embraces the expectations of family members from each other. In addition, 
the “intuitu familiae” and the “affectio societatis familiaris” disclose the real 
intention, motive, and the primordial role of the family behind their attachment to 
the enterprise. Therefore, fulfilling the fiduciary duties or any breach of them has 
usually a preliminary and major impact on the family as a group. Then, any 
deterioration within the family absolutely weakens the business or even destroys 
it,789 and vice versa. Therefore, the family shall be considered the principal 
beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship in the family business. 
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2- Individuals as family members involved in business, who usually found their 
relationships primarily on their family ties and trust, as noted above. They are the 
second beneficiaries, with whom the fiduciary relationship is built and developed 
based on their personal attitudes and stances.  
3- The business: Resorting to the family and corporate assets by family members, 
and handling the business’ affairs reflects the intertwining relationship between the 
family legacy and the business’ standing in the market. As such, any quaking 
action or decision generates its repercussions on business. Therefore, it is 
understood that the business is the third beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.  
b) Different types of fiduciary relationships  
“Not every interaction between parties in business falls within the scope of their respective 
fiduciary obligations”. 790 Due to the separation between ownership and control within a non-
family company, shareholders do not usually owe a fiduciary duty towards each other. 
Accentuating the distinctive relationships within the family business gives rise to specific 
fiduciary duties that do not exist in non-family counterparts. The intimate venture, and the 
overlapping between “ownership” and “business governance and management”, creates 
various types of fiduciary relationships.  
Particularly, family enterprises’ stewards/agents “bear a substantial share of the wealth effects 
of their decisions”.791 However, it was stated that the decision making process in business 
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usually follows four phases: 792 Initiation, implementation, ratification, and monitoring. 793 
These phases allow for controlling agency problems that may occur within an enterprise, 
throughout the generational development. However, in the family enterprise, the first two 
functions are very often allocated to the same persons.  In many other cases, the four phases 
are under the same agents/ stewards’ control. Although, when the latter is the patriarch, 
conflicts may not arise as much as when successor(s) take the lead. Therefore, most conflicts 
that occur between family members as fiduciaries and beneficiaries pertain to struggling over 
power, money,794 family traditions, and reputation. These conflicts are due to several forms of 
power abuse and unfair decisions and conducts. For instance, oppressive conducts and 
decisions, freeze-out, conspiratorial ploys, corporate deadlocks, fraudulent and illegal acts, 
corporate waste and mismanagement, excessive benefits and remunerations, business 
competition, succession planning, cashing-out shares, siblings’ rivalries and competition 
between generations.795 Accordingly, fiduciary duties emerge at two main levels: Ownership 
system and Business system (including Governance, Management and Employment) 
I. Ownership system 
Theorists argue that concentrated ownership can reduce agency costs and increase stewardship 
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within the enterprise. Since, owners in family enterprises are motivated by the rightful reasons, 
having access to the necessary information and the relevant power to control the business and 
reduce free-rider agency costs.796 The above-mentioned is possible when the ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of one or two persons. Considering the generational development of 
the family business, ownership becomes increasingly dispersed between generations and 
family branches. Therefore, two categories of owners are often born: majority and minority. 
Simultaneously, the misconception predominates.  The majority owners presume that they are 
privileged and have exclusive rights over the business, as well as all advantages over the 
minority. They consider that they are unchallenged, and so manage and control the business 
their way. As for the minority, although they usually expect fairness from the majority, and 
have an intrinsic belief that they are unable to make a change; simultaneously, they remain 
silent and passive or in other terms, vulnerable. Such a misconception often leads to 
oppressive conducts and decisions, which may result in “expensive litigation [as well as] 
costly judgments for compensatory and punitive damages”.797However, it is worth noting, the 
consequences of such oppressive conducts are not only limited to business boundaries, instead 
they may extend to the family sphere. Besides, minority owners may face another challenge 
via embracing pyramiding company, namely a “holding”. Since, this structure of ownership 
manipulates the rights of the minority by separating ownership from control, and creates a 
psychological detachment from the enterprise. Also, it can establish a large gap between the 
minority and majority. Moreover, the distribution of ownership between different family 
branches may incite owners to create competing blocs so as to control the business, or what is 
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known as a “conspiratorial ploy”.798 Consequently, through their voting rights, family-holders 
stymie one another’s initiatives, and bewilder effective actions to parochialize and exploit 
some family owners’ interests and roles. Again, they may deprive the minority of any 
prospective opportunity to participate in the enterprise’s management and control, or to 
receive any other benefit from it. Then, their interests diverge;799 particularly when the 
growing demand for dividends or disproportionate distributions occur, or high salaries and 
remunerations are entreated to those involved in business.800 Correspondingly, since they do 
not have access to market their shares, minority owners often seem unable to liquidate and 
cash-out their ownership shares in order to escape oppressive conducts and decisions. 801 As 
such, minority owners in such situations reveal as powerless and vulnerable, as they lack the 
necessary legal means to convince the power-holder, as a majority, of the correctness of their 
positions or views.  
II. Business system 
Controlling the family enterprise is not limited to owning the majority of the business’ shares, 
but also by combining governance and management roles in the enterprise. So, family 
members may be victims of the power-holders’ conducts and decisions. Particularly when 
conflicts arise between self-regarding and other-regarding interests, so power abuse takes 
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place. For instance, power-holder(s) can be the Chief executive officer (CEO), who keeps an 
exclusive control over the business, as well as the signatory rights, without sharing the 
relevant information with other owners, or seeking their consent.802 In addition, the CEOs may 
hide corporate accounts or checkbooks, change locks, or even withhold financial 
information.803 So, they can resort to freeze-out techniques and deprive minority owners of 
any opportunity to significantly partake in the management of the business. 804 This tactic can 
force the minority to sell their ownership shares at a deflated price.805 So, under the pressure of 
the majority, they buy-out their shares at the latter’s quoted price, which is far less than their 
value.806 Although, the dismissed owner(s) may conserve the ownership status as a minority, 
and remain unable to participate meaningfully in the decision making process, whether at the 
level of management or governance. Note, upon the termination of the minority’s service 
family member(s) shall obey a non-competition obligation towards the enterprise.807 So, not 
only they will be frozen-out from their business involvement, but also from working and 
delivering their experience and know-how to the business. However, it is worth mentioning, 
this act constitutes an oppressive conduct that reflects the intentional acts of disloyalty aiming 
at benefiting the majority at the expense of the minority.808 Moreover, sometimes family 
members may face a deadlock situation when CEOs, for example, promote the voting of one 
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faction of family directors that represents some family owners versus other’s position.809 
Furthermore, they may exploit the family business’ financial assets for their self-interest and 
family faction interest, depriving other owners from benefiting. In addition, they may intermix 
business with individual assets,810 or make unilateral decisions, solicit business loans, and use 
them for personal interest; or even lend family members money from the company without 
adopting any formal discretionary process. Further, the surplus may be used for legitimate 
corporate purposes such as expansion and replacement of assets. In addition, excessive 
unreasonable salaries, benefits, and remunerations may be withdrawn without any formal 
board authorization.811 Thus, power-holder(s), in these circumstances, may avoid declaring 
dividends or any other return on their investment in business to the minority. 
Nevertheless, unjust conduct may also take place when nepotism arises, and has adverse 
spillover effects on family and business. Also, it may take a contradictory form when qualified 
family members are prohibited to join the business, as a certain faction fears that they may 
take the lead; particularly when competition surfaces between family members. This may also 
emerge when some family members seem more efficient in business; spend more money, 
time, and energy than others. Then, the interests of active family members could diverge and 
be in conflict with non-active members. Consequently, oppression or oppressive decisions 
seem to hold a wide scope of situations to define an improper conduct.812 However, in many of 
the abovementioned cases, despite opportunistic decisions and conducts, family members 
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hesitate, in the beginning, to recourse to courts seeking justice, for countless interdependent 
family and business concerns. Although, regardless of family members’ expectations that vary 
amongst generations depending on the strength of their family ties, and the one-to-one trust, 
power-holders shall abide by their fiduciary duties towards all beneficiaries. They shall 
promote family and personal trust by acting prudently and vigilantly, as well as balancing the 
scale of all interests, family and business, so the self-interest shall be indirectly fulfilled. 
 2.3.1.5 Unjust enrichment or constructive trust 
Both the civil law and common law systems recognize the legal institution of “unjust 
enrichment” that engenders equitable resolutions when it occurs. They agree on its three 
fundamental elements: 1) Enrichment, 2) a corresponding deprivation, and 3) an absence of 
juristic reason for the enrichment. While fulfilling these conditions, courts seek fairness and 
justice by granting equitable rights813 to the plaintiff through restitution or remedies. So, the 
functionality of law emerges rather than the intentions of the parties,814 and corresponds to 
their contributions.815 However, in addition to the economic elements, courts usually take into 
consideration the type of relationship, namely the supportive relationship816 between the 
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plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the substantial indirect contributions817 and sacrifices 
from which the latter takes benefit at the plaintiffs’ detriment. For instance, the Supreme Court 
of Canada 818 concluded four aspects in determining the contributions of parties in a family 
joint venture: “(i) the mutual effort of the parties; (ii) their degree of economic integration; (iii) 
their actual intent during the relationship; and (iv) the prioritization of the family unit in 
decision-making a list of relevant factors.” 819 However, this list of factors is not restricted. 
Instead, the court usually verifies the wealth created, the imbalance occurring between the 
parties’ joint-energies, the share of wealth, the relevant benefits, in addition to all assets 
accumulated throughout their relationship. Besides, the remedy can be imposed based on the 
notion of “good conscience”, in terms of the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the 
claimant, and the state of mind of the defendant. Whereas, the latter must recognize, or should 
have recognized, that the contributions were not made based on a gift, but with a reasonable 
expectation of sharing the property.820 For instance, according to the leading case on the 
application of a remedial constructive trust in a commercial case, it was considered:  
It thus emerges that a constructive trust may be imposed where good conscience 
so requires. The inquiry into good conscience is informed by the situations where 
constructive trusts have been recognized in the past. It is also informed by the 
dual reasons for which constructive trusts have traditionally been imposed: to do 
justice between the parties and to maintain the integrity of institutions dependent 
on trust-like relationships. Finally, it is informed by the absence of an indication 
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that a constructive trust would have an unfair or unjust effect on the defendant or 
third parties, matters which equity has always taken into account. Equitable 
remedies are flexible; their award is based on what is just in all the circumstances 
of the case. 821 
 
Nonetheless, “if the court finds that unjust enrichment has occurred, the next step is to 
determine the remedy”.822 The Supreme Court of Canada has agreed by majority that 
primarily, the court must recourse to a “monetary award” to compensate the plaintiff, and 
reimburse him with money adequately. Otherwise, if it reveals inadequate, the constructive 
trust remedy takes place,823and the plaintiff will be reimbursed with an interest in property. 
Still, judges expressed caution in awarding a remedial constructive trust, where taking into 
consideration:  
 … A remedial constructive trust will be imposed only if it is required in order to 
do justice between the parties in circumstances where good commercial 
conscience determines that the enrichment has been unjust. But a remedial 
constructive trust is a discretionary remedy. It will not be imposed where an 
alternative, simpler remedy is available and effective. And it will not be imposed 
without taking into account the interests of others who may be affected by the 
granting of the remedy ... 824 
 
However, it is worth noticing, the court has a discretionary authority to determine the quantum 
monetary award. The latter is not limited to the market value, as the court may use either the 
                                                
821 Ellingsen (Trustee of) v Hallmark Ford Sales Ltd., 2000 CanLII BCCA 458 at para 68, online: CanLII 
<http://canlii.ca/t/1d6df> 
822 Supra note 816.  
823 Supra note 816 at 3.  
824 Haigh v Kent, 2013 CanLII BCCA 380 at para 71 [Kent] online: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/t/g09cs> 
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“value received”, or “quantum merit” approach or the “value survived” approach to determine 
the quantum”.825 The former considers “the value of the services provided by the claimant,826 
while the latter refers to the value of the property in light of the claimant's contributions, plus 
the link between the joint efforts of the parties and wealth accumulation. 827For instance, the 
Court of Appeal for British Columbia828 applied the constructive trust remedy instead of the 
monetary award, by adopting the “value survived” approach in order to do justice. In this case, 
Mr. Haigh was involved in an informal, undocumented family business venture. Mr. Kent and 
his son owned a campground and beach resort located on a property of 95 acres of land near 
Powell River in southwestern British Columbia. Mr. Haigh and Mr. Kent were brothers-in-
law, since Mr. Kent was married to the latter’s sister. In 1980, Mr. Kent invited Mr. Haigh and 
his wife to live on the property. They moved accordingly, where Mr. Kent and Mr. Haigh 
started their business relationship that lasted from 1980 till 2004. During these years, Mr. 
Haigh assisted Mr. Kent and was in charge of the resort maintenance and operation. In 2004, 
Mr. Haigh terminated the business relationship unilaterally, and then litigated the Kents, 
claiming a one-acre share of the property based on an express trust, or alternatively the 
imposition of a constructive trust as a remedy for unjust enrichment. In a further alternative, 
Mr. Haigh sought a monetary judgment for the value of the work he performed over the years 
on the basis of the “value survived” approach to quantum merit. Eventually, the BC Court of 
Appeal supported a trial judgment, justifying that the Kents were enriched unjustly at Mr. 
                                                
825 Supra note 816. 
826Supra note 816 at 2.  
827 Kerr, supra note 268 at para 81, 157.  
828Kent, supra note 824. 
 236 
Haigh’s detriment. Correspondingly, it was concluded that the monetary award was 
inappropriate, and the court awarded a 25 per cent of interest in a campground and beach 
resort to a plaintiff who never expected to earn an interest in the property at all. In doing so, 
the BCCA clarified the role of reasonable expectations in an unjust enrichment claim; 
especially, since they were not determinative.829 Also, the court embraced the “value survived’ 
award as a more reasoned approach to bestow shares in business fruits in order to do justice 
between parties. Since, the “value received” award could not be justly assessed in this case, 
considering the variety of services and the lack of records of the plaintiffs’ contributions, 
which lasted for more than 20 years.830  
Ultimately, based on the aforementioned, courts adopt legal institutions that may recognize the 
role of implicit mechanisms in business relationships based on close rapports between the 
parties. However, the reference to the family business as a particular form of business is still 
unassertive, as an unstated recognition of its uniqueness.   
2.3.2 The external bridging social network 
The external social network is one of the collective assets of the family. It reveals the 
productive resources that facilitate the individual and business’ social reaching.831 This capital 
consists of the networks that encompass all external stakeholders, such as customers, 
                                                
829 Timothy Chapman-Smith, “The Constructive Trust: A Just Remedy for Unjust Enrichment?” Case Comments, 
(September 25th, 2013), online: Canadian Appeals Monitor <http://www.canadianappeals.com/2013/09/25/the-
constructive-trust-a-just-remedy-for-unjust-enrichment/> 
830 Supra note 762. 
831 Supra note 693 at 473.  
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suppliers, banks, and other institutions.832 It reflects the quality of trusting individual and 
family relationships built over time833 by the founder and the family, and then transferred over 
generations; stemming from the long-term and stable relationships based on recurrent 
interactions, as well as frequent economic interdependent transactions.834 Considering the 
multiple roles played within the family and business, we can recognize three overlapping 
external social networks; namely, the family, the individual, and  family business networks.835 
Most probably, these relationships are based on formal, informal, and implicit rules, which are 
demarcated by the implicit contract of shared values that guide family members in their 
attitudes, behaviors, and decisions with their interpersonal connections. Notwithstanding, the 
external social networks mainly overlap in the first and second generations, and continue to 
subsequent generations depending on the effort spent to invest in them for the best interest of 
the family business. However, subsequent successors may struggle to continue and develop 
such trustful-based relationships, unless they stick to similar family strategies and rules. 
Particularly, succession is not merely a simple transfer of physical ownership; rather it is a 
process embedded in a web of complex, external social relationships. 836 Maintaining these 
                                                
832 Jane L Glover & Trish Reay, “Sustaining the Family Business With Minimal Financial Rewards: How Do 
Family Farms Continue?” (2015) 28:2 Family Business Review 163 at 164.  
833 Alfredo De Massis, Jess H Chua & James J Chrisman “Factors Preventing Intra-Family Succession” (2008) 
21:2 Family Business Review 183 at 190.  
834Katiuska Cabrera-Suárez, Cruz Déniz-Déniz & Josefa D Martín-Santana, “Family Social Capital, Trust within 
the TMT, and the Establishment of Corporate Goals Related to Nonfamily Stakeholders” (2015) 28:2 Family 
Business Review 145 at 148.  
835 Ritch L Sorenson, “Social capital and family business” in Ritch L Sorenson, ed, Family business and social 
capital (USA: Edward Elgard Publishing, Inc. 2011) 1 at 25.   
836 Isabell Stamm, Book Review of Family Business in West Germany: Corporate Governance and Shareholders 
Relations Since the 1960s by Christina Lubinski  (2011) 24: 2 Family Business Review 184.  
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relationships over generations requires preserving strong family ties, in addition to a family 
business collective-oriented identity. Since, these networks provide all stakeholders (family, 
individuals) as well as businesses with “direct access to economic resources (subsidized loans, 
investment tips and protective markets); they can increase their cultural capital through 
contacts with experts or individuals of refinement (i.e. embodied cultural capital); or, 
alternatively, they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials.”837 In addition, 
the family business, along with all stakeholders will take profit from diverse far-reaching 
benefits that meet the emotional needs of the family by enhancing the family’s image (social 
legitimacy),838along with the greater access to information and business outperformance. 
Therefore, the external social networks based on the family, business, and the founder’s 
(individual) reputation, are considered the prominent customized endowment offered across 
generations. Accordingly, the transmitted networks to subsequent generations belong to the 
whole family and they are not a simple personal property from which only individual owners’ 
inheritors can benefit. Even more, family successors shall incur some obligations to protect 
this capital, namely the duty of vigilance and care, and the duty of non-competition. However, 
seen that protecting the external social networks is interlinked to the moral and intellectual 
capital, I would prefer to illustrate these duties and their consequences in the relevant context, 
afterwards.  
 
                                                
837 Llyod Steier, “Next-Generation Entrepreneurs and Succession: An Exploratory Study of Modes and Means of 
Managing Social Capital”(2001) 14: 3 Family Business Review 259 at 261.  
838 Supra note 835 at 145.  
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2.4 The moral capital  
It was argued that a family business is a cultural concept, which cannot be understood without 
comprehending the family value-based culture and its objectives.839 Once this culture extends 
to the business system, it impregnates all social and economic aspects.  So, it provides the 
enterprise with a powerful foundation of strength,840 steadiness, and success. Therefore, it was 
concluded that families reproduce not only people but values also.841 Yet, family values are 
usually taken for granted, and their role in getting family members together is usually 
overlooked.842 They encompass the complex meaning of principles, symbols, standards, 
assumptions, belief system, expectations,843 and behavioral guidelines that give significance to 
the family system; they are usually observed as “soft issues”.844 However, since they are 
absorbed unintentionally but certainly across generations, family shared-values are rather the 
“harder issues”845 that define the basic human relationships, which transcend to combine with 
business values, so as to create the “moral compass” 846 that guides family members to the 
right path. As such, they generate an “ethical climate” 847 in the business, as the foundation for 
making decisions and developing the family point of view in both the personal and business 
                                                
839 Supra note 51 at 196.  
840 Randel S. Carlock & John L. Ward, When family businesses are best- The parallel planning process for family 
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841 Supra note 81 at 10.  
842 Supra note 451 at 10  
843 Supra note 81 at 55.  
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846 Supra note 560 at 255.  
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aspect. Subsequently, as it was mentioned earlier, family business values initially stem from 
the founders’ beliefs, culture, and conduct. They influence the enterprise “during and beyond 
their tenures”,848 by identifying it in the market, and putting all family members implicitly on 
the same sheet of music. Despite the individual values that change over time, the 
disentanglement between the individual, family, and operating business ethics exposes 
anomalous, and so, the shared-values most often predominate. Thus, these values reveal as an 
intangible mechanism and capital that transforms individuals from self-centered agents into 
responsible decision-makers 849 who commit intentionally to the “common good” 850 of the 
family. Seeing, individuals uphold their collective feelings of shared ownership for those 
values, built on commonalities, such as history, pride, resources, commitment, and family 
name as the source of their connectedness. Hence, they disguise their implied expectations and 
communal goals with this backdrop of collective trusting relationships that shall not be 
challenged by opportunistic behaviors and driven by self-interest.851  
However, the problem resides in the informality of this implicit agreement and the presuming 
compliance with its rules. As, on one hand it stipulates the internal logic of family members,852 
channels their priorities and rationalities, describes their perceptions,853 and governs their 
intra-relationships. On the other hand, it normally assumes that each person pursues harmony, 
respects other family members, and honors the nuclear or extended family; otherwise, any 
                                                
848 Supra note 206 at 10. 
849 Supra note 583 at 13. 
850 Supra note 704 at 263. 
851 Supra note 693 at 466. 
852 Supra note 81 at 10.  
853 Supra note 844 at 69. 
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breach of such implied clauses, is straightaway criticized and blamed by the family; and the 
aberrant family member is presumed, primarily, as shamefaced. However, this agreement 
reveals more ambiguous and unclear upon the multi-generational development of the family. 
Since, over the years, each family develops its own implicit sub-agreement that, somehow, 
differs from other family faction agreement, and from the one applicable within the family of 
origin viz. extended family. Such plurality of implicit agreements reflects the cultural variation 
of each individual across generations. In addition, it highlights the indirect trigging factor of 
conflicts that mostly arise during the succession phase; when a family member expresses 
his/her intense personal and interpersonal issues854 affected by his/her own nuclear family 
background. 
Still, the question that may arise, which value-system is usually applicable in the family 
business in view of the generational development of the family? Seeing, family ties change 
among descendants855 due to distance, the lack of common experiences, divorce, or death; so 
do values. However, by principle, the applicable values are initially those of the family of 
origin, which should synchronize with those of the new generation that controls the business. 
Therefore, it discloses primordial to define clearly family values across generations. Yet, this 
may echo positively within small families and businesses at their earliest stage of 
development, where family ties are strong and values are easily identified. Nevertheless, over 
the years, it is highly recommended that the shared-values be defined in writing and in a 
formal code. Since, family members are less connected; their moral obligations towards the 
                                                
854 Shelley Farrington, Elmarie Venter & Christo Boshoff, “The influence of family and non-family stakeholders 
on family business success” (2010) 3 SAJESBM 32 at 34.  
855 Supra note 486 at 470. 
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business and the family of origin are barely observed. Therefore, a formal document could 
incite them to detect its norms and comply with it effectively.   
Still, in reality, putting these rules into a formal document takes the form of a statement that 
shall turn into a legal commitment that guarantees the longevity of healthy family 
relationships and business. Consequently, taking into consideration that the business belongs, 
firstly, to the family, then to individuals as family members, it is more suitable that the family 
implicit agreement, takes the form of a collective agreement or contract of adhesion. It can be 
firstly established by the senior generation; and then all family stakeholders, whose action may 
transcend into the business and put its reputation at risk, involved or not involved in the 
business, shall commit to it, even if they are not signatories.856 In addition, this collective 
agreement is considered as a living pact that requires a joint effort to be amended and 
developed when appropriate and whenever the need arises; specifically, upon the entry of the 
new generation into business, and the  the generational development in the family.Since, 
nothing but being observed by the family can guarantee the engagement of all members, 
through a consensus to commit and work towards the common goals of the family business.857 
However, it is worth mentioning, the collective family agreement is not a single document that 
governs family members relationships; rather it has different forms and perspectives, and 
diverges in terms of complexity and contents, depending on the family business’ development 
stage and complexity. Most of the time, it could take the form of what is so called “Family 
                                                
856 Art 1379 CCQ: “A contract of adhesion is a contract in which the essential stipulations were imposed or 
drawn up by one of the parties, on his behalf or upon his instructions, and were not negotiable.-Any contract that 
is not a contract of adhesion is a contract by mutual agreement.”  
857 Linda C McClain, “Family constitutions and the (New) constitution of the family” (2006) 75:2 Fordham Law 
Review 833 at 868.  
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constitution, Charter, Creed, Protocol”. Thus, alike any other family agreement, the Family 
code shall be considered as “the foundational formal document”,858and a reference for all 
family members. As, it absolutely seeks to “ unify and hold the family together for decades 
even generations-to come".859 It helps them to deal with unpredicted events, and resolve 
disputes or conflicts accordingly. Particularly, that a family arrangement clarifies the 
expectations of individuals whether from the family or/and from each other, regulates their 
attitudes, and prevents them from mixing their family role and business role. Accordingly, the 
family collective agreement does not create any ambiguity for concerned family 
stakeholders.860 It avoids any incomprehensibility, or abusive clauses that could engender 
damage or be detrimental to any of them.861  
Subsequently, this agreement incurs the duty of vigilance that may hold family members 
                                                
858 Stephen R Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective Families, 1st ed (New York: Franklin Covey company, 
1997) at 93. 
859 Ibid.  
860 Art 1435 CCQ: “An external clause referred to in a contract is binding on the parties. 
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Art 1437 CCQ: “An abusive clause in a consumer contract or contract of adhesion is null, or the obligation 
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accountable once they deviate from its rules, and affect negatively the family and the business.   
Therefore, the breach of any of its clauses, depending on its context, shall generate a list of 
punishments that diverge between families, the consequences of breaches, and their impact on 
the family, business, and on each family member. These policies accentuate the accountability 
of family members towards the family, as a main stakeholder in the family enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the list of correctional measures could start, for instance, from the advice, notice, 
and warning, until the expulsion from business. In addition, these measures shall be applied 
within the family framework, and upon the family board’s decision, by taking into consideration 
the qualified majority of family members’ vote, and sometimes their consensus. Hence, it is 
worthy of note that any family agreement shall be governed by the fundamental legal principle 
of freedom of contract and its relevant restrictions. Also, each family is the best guardian of its 
own interests. Therefore, family agreements can vary between families and family businesses in 
general. However, only the legal recognition of the distinctive identity of the family business can 
guarantee the family commitment to these contracts. Particularly, the legal channels to 
implement them are reachable through the operative laws applicable in all circumscriptions.  
Still, the question that arises in this respect: what may urge family members to commit to the 
informal or formal code of conduct, away from family concerns? Particularly, over time, the 
new generation most often disregards family-concerns in order to act independently, despite the 
negative impact of their behaviors or decisions on the family or business. We believe the 
obedience to this code begins from the legal recognition of the family business’ distinctiveness, 
so, jurists and courts will provide the shared-values with more attention, and re-consider them as 
one of the legal dimensions that shall be respected and then  seek to enforce the clauses of the 
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collective  agreement whenever the breach of family members provokes major damages for the 
family business and the family 
2.5 The intellectual capital  
The intellectual capital encloses three main coexistent resources; namely the patronymic 
name, the reputation, and the know-how (Business secrets). 
2.5.1 The patronymic name 
The patronymic name appears when family members or individual founders lend their name or 
surname to their business; then, this name is called "Eponymous”. Starting from this day, the 
borrowed name does not simply stand as a personal name that identifies the family or family 
members, but it extends to the business as well. Consequently, the “eponymous” aspect 
influences the enterprise’s uniqueness, codifies internal and external relationships, reflects the 
cultural constancy along with the history behind it, and represents a long-term value of the 
enterprise. Thus, it reveals as a brand enrobed with moral values, that “harks back to a time 
when the world seemed safer, more comprehensible, and much less commercial”;862 the 
business birth era. Accordingly, the patronymic name embodies the inestimable capital of time 
and energy, and attaches a hereditary dimension to business that follows family members over 
generations. Moreover, it is the source indicator or the backup for all outstanding trustful 
professional services and products in the market.863 So, in addition to the social facet of the 
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family name, an additional associative economic value is added to the business. Nonetheless, 
such a distinctive dynamic turns out to connect all family members’ stakeholders to the 
enterprise, and enfolds their implied promise to commit towards the society and the market. 
Particularly, even after the patronymic brand attains its distinctiveness in the market, it 
continues to benefit from its descriptiveness.864 Seeing, it reflects the trusting image, 
interlinks the identity of the family and business, and increases the confidence of external 
stakeholders to deal with the family business. 
Therefore, the patronymic name is considered a saleable asset that only family members are 
cognizant of its value.865It echoes an esteemed resource, and the nonfinancial intangible, 
implicit, and inestimable asset that belongs firstly to the founders and business. Afterwards, it 
pursues the whole family, and individuals as family members’ successors and/or inheritors. 
Hence, it creates the main value that holds a sense of prestige, pride and legacy, and allows all 
of them to persist. Correspondingly, labeling the business with such a personal factor 
correlates it with a “triptych” reciprocal relationship created between the individual (founder 
or family members), family, and business; wherein, the behavior of one reflects the other.866 In 
other words, any misleading, misbehavior or misconduct borne by any member of the family, 
involved or not involved in the business could have its impact on both the family and business. 
Thus, it reflects the reputation of the tripartite and provides them with a social and market 
standing. So, the interrelation between the patronymic name and the family business’ 
                                                
864 Ibid at 15.  
865 Andrea Colli, “Contextualizing Performances of Family Firms: The Perspective of Business History” (2012) 
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866 Bernard Logié & Dora Logié-Naville, Leur nom est une marque (Paris: Éditions d'Organisation, 2002) at 27.  
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reputation sheds lights on various legal aspects, and the judicial prospect vis-à-vis the related 
litigations.  
2.5.1.1 The Reputation  
The business’ reputation is a concept built on the idea that business and social communities 
assign a positive standing to the enterprise. Thus, businesses are viewed as social entities 
rather than collectivities of individuals. As such, this accentuates the ability of business to be 
an exchange partner with the society. Establishing a reputation emerges by building and 
maintaining the social support as a resource,867 based on a long-term competitive advantage. It 
is based on a powerful network,868 aiming at attracting external partners, family successors 
into the business, besides promoting an “engaging stakeholder environment”. 869 It creates a 
sufficient closure vis-à-vis the norms, which constantly deliver obligations and 
expectations,870 out of respect to the business community. So, once abiding by the legal 
systems, family and business codes and standards, the reputation reflects a sense of 
responsibility towards the society.871 
Usually, the founding family chooses, wordlessly, to exploit the goodwill of the family by 
using the family name or the founder’s name. They aim at indicating their origins, and 
generating confidence, closeness, attachment, integrity, high quality of work, and 
                                                
867  Supra note 701 at 250.  
868 Supra note 87 at 158.  
869 Ibid at 159.  
870  Supra note 701 at 242.  
871 Supra note 87 at 165.  
 248 
approachability; so as to promote the renown and success of the family business.872 Thus, the 
name represents more the family or the founder rather than the business. Such a statement 
exposes in harmony with the conclusion that  “before one can have a good name, he must have 
a name; before he can build a reputation, he must have an identity to which that reputation 
may attach."873 Therefore, preserving, strengthening, and enhancing the name’ reputation 
ensures business endurance and guarantees the family’s uprightness.874 Such a reputational 
capital contributes implicitly to business performance, through a customer-centric orientation, 
or the access to significant resources, such as credits or investments. 875Correspondingly, the 
reputation depicts the main concern perceived in every decision made by family members 
within the family business. Moreover, it shapes an affective, loyal, and proud relationship with 
all stakeholders that lasts for generations. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on family 
members to behave properly, in a constant way, and with loyalty towards their stakeholders. 
Consequently, the burden of their liability is significant. Hence, the unacceptable and deviated 
conduct or behavior would damage not only the person, nor the family, but also the business’ 
reputation in any way.876 Then, the reputation reveals as the undivided asset of the family, 
which obliges members not to cross the red line. Hence, family members, concerned and 
involved in the enterprise, shall act consciously, cautiously, reasonably, inoffensively, 
prudently and vigilantly with a high level of morality towards their family business. 
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Accordingly, highlighting the uniqueness of the family business could allow jurists and courts 
to observe the said duties and perceive if family members comply with them thoroughly.  
2.5.1.2 The legal perspective of the patronymic name 
The correlation of the family name between the individual, the family and business, incites 
scholars to see the dual value of this name, from both the personal and business perspectives. 
As such, they emphasize its multidimensional legal perspectives. 
The personal name and surname are the attributes of a person. They shall be respected, along 
with the reputation and privacy.877This right is generally immutable,878imprescriptible, 
inalienable,879and unseizable.880 Yet, once the personal name is used as a trade name, it ends 
up becoming a property right, similar to all trademarks. However, the personal name in the 
corporate law develops a brand identity and becomes one of the intangible, valuable and 
imprescriptible assets of the enterprise. Moreover, it reveals as non-transferable, unless within 
the context of a legitimate competition that requires good intentions, or, if the name is 
transferred along with the enterprise. Although, whenever the trade name is a personal name, 
some legislations and judicial decisions require a written explicit consent of the name transfer. 
For instance, we can refer to the first paragraph of section 9 (1) of the Naming Regulation, 
YOIC 2015/07 of Yukon, which stipulates: 
                                                
877 Art 3, 50 CCQ. 
878 Art 51 CCQ: “No change may be made to a person's name, whether to his surname or given name, without the 
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The name of an individual, consisting of a surname and one or more given 
names or initials, may be included in the name of a Yukon organization only if: 
a) the individual or their heirs or legal representative consents in writing to the 
use of the name by the organization; or an organization whose name includes b) 
name of the individual consents in writing to the use of the name …881  
 
However, in the same context, the decision of the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux considered 
that the contract should enclose, evidently, the transfer of the right to use the family name, the 
Court of Cassation of Commerce in France, on June 12, 2007, reversed its decision stating that 
the family name is the trademark cohesive to the company, that encloses various legal 
repercussions: 882 
Vu l'article 1134 du code civil;  
Attendu, selon l'arrêt attaqué, que Mme X... a cédé l'ensemble des parts sociales de 
l'Eurl X... à la société Etablissements Joseph Laveix; que la société cédée a alors 
pris le nom d'Eurl Laveix X... ; que Mme X... embauchée comme salariée, puis 
licenciée, a soutenu qu'elle n'avait pas cédé son nom patronymique et poursuivi la 
société Etablissements Joseph Laveix pour qu'il lui soit fait interdiction d'utiliser le 
nom patronymique X... ;  
Attendu que pour interdire à la société Etablissements Joseph Laveix d'utiliser le 
nom de famille X ..., la cour d'appel relève qu'il résulte des pièces du dossier que 
les parties avaient envisagé que le nom X... serait conservé et précisé qu'il en serait 
fait mention dans l'acte de cession, ce qui n'a pas été fait; qu'elle en déduit que 
compte tenu du comportement des parties lors de la signature de l'acte définitif, il 
ne peut être retenu une volonté même implicite de céder l'usage du nom mais au 
contraire la volonté de l'exclure du champ de la cession;  
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Attendu qu'en statuant ainsi, après avoir constaté que le nom de famille constituait 
le signe distinctif de l'Eurl cédée et que Mme X... n'avait pas interdit son utilisation 
lors de la cession de l'ensemble des parts sociales, la cour d'appel n'a pas tiré les 
conséquences légales de ses constatations. 883 
 
Nevertheless, the courts in the United States consider that any person has the right to use 
his/her name freely, regarding his/her own business, and deprive himself/herself of such rights 
and transfer it to another. However, the transfer of this right cannot be presumed, but it must 
be clearly shown unambiguously, along with a certain and undoubted proof. It was decided 
“The right to use one's own name in business may be given up by contract, but in the absence 
of express language to that effect the intention to part with that right will not be presumed."884 
Accordingly, it is worth mentioning, the company name is usually protected against any 
likelihood of confusion and unfair competition that may be upheld by a third party; whether 
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argued that she had not sell her patronymic name and pursued Joseph Laveix Establishments company to forbid 
her to exploit the patronymic name X ...Whereas, in order to prevent Joseph Laveix Establishments to use the 
family name X…, the court of appeal notes that it is clear from the file documents that the parties considered that 
the name X… would be retained, and outlined that it would be mentioned in the transfer deed, which has not been 
done; it concludes that in view of the conduct of the parties while signing the final act, it could not presume, not 
even an implicit readiness, the transfer the right to use the name, but rather the will to exclude it from the scope 
of the transfer; Whereas, in so ruling, after finding that the surname was the hallmark of the divested sold Eurl 
and Mrs. X ... had not banned its use during the transfer of all company shares, the Court of Appeal did not draw 
the legal conclusions from its findings;[translated by author].  Art 1134 - Les conventions légalement formées 
tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. 
Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise.Elles 
doivent être exécutées de bonne foi. 
884 Supra note 863 at 24.  
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the latter has an identical or nearly identical name within the geographic area, along with 
similar  or identical activities. Thus, when family members use a patronymic name for the 
same business industry and geographic region, a question can arise, who owns the patronymic 
name? Are all family members allowed to use the same name without any restriction?  
Once the patronymic name is registered as a trademark, intellectual property law stipulates it 
as a brand name; it becomes prescriptible, transferable and seizable.885 Correspondingly, it 
was concluded, "When a name is used as a trademark, it risks becoming a symbol of the 
corporation and its past accomplishments and losing its individual identity."886 In this respect, 
The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court recognized, 
While every one has the absolute right to use his own name honestly in his own 
business for the purpose of advertising it," it was "also true that one may so sell 
or part with the right to use his own name as a description or designation of a 
manufactured article as to deprive himself of the right to use it as such, and 
confer this right upon another.887 
 
Consequently, selling the business is not only limited to physical assets, but it also covers the 
rights of the trademark, encumbered with the business’ reputation, and the right of publicity as 
one of the assets related to the mark. 888 In this respect, it is worth noting that in Canada, a 
trademark that holds only names and surnames cannot be registered, save it is proven that the 
goods or services provided have become distinctive under the name or surname. Hence, the 
                                                
885 Supra note 880.  
886 Supra note 863 at 22.  
887 Abraham Clark Freeman, ed, The American State Reports, vol 9 (San Francisco, Calif.: Bancroft-Whitney Co., 
1888) at 686.  
888 Supra note 863 at 3.  
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word has acquired a secondary meaning in the public mind, which is based on a judgment of 
facts. Another exception reveals when a name or surname holds a meaning different from its 
strict denotation, as a name or surname, as a recognizable word, or the name of a community, 
city, town, river, or a castle. In such cases, one can register the last name and associate it with 
the business, as long as there are no other reasons to refuse its registration.889 Furthermore, the 
registered trademark gives its owner the exclusive right to use it throughout the geographic 
area, at the national,890 regional or international level.891 Whereas, it becomes prohibited to 
falsify, mislead, direct attention, and confuse the public to discredit the business, goods, or 
services of a competitor.892 In all cases the question that may arise in the context of family 
business; who owns the trademark?  
Referring to the decision of the Court of Cassation, Chamber of Commerce in France, on 
November 9, 1987, it was decided:  
La Cour d’appel est fondée à ordonner l’annulation de la marque déposée par le 
frère cadet (Michel) et à lui interdire d’utiliser son patronyme à titre de marque car 
un tel dépôt porterait atteinte aux droits du frère aîné (Edouard), déjà titulaire 
d’une marque incluant le même patronyme893 
                                                
889 Art 12, Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13.  
890 Art 19, ibid.  
891 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks , October 23, 1983, TRT/MADRID-
GP/001, Online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/index.html#laws> 
892 Supra note 889, art 7. 
893 Cass Com, 9 Novembre 1987, Bulletin 1987 IV N° 234 at 175, online: Legifrance 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007019118&
fastReqId=1282743098&fastPos=1>. The Court of Appeal is entitled to order the cancellation of the registered 
trademark of the younger brother (Michael) and forbid him to use his family name as a brand title since such a 
deposit would affect the rights of the elder brother (Edouard), already owner of a trademark containing the same 
patronymic name [translated by author]. See also supra note 883.  
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In the same line, the Court of Appeal of Quebec considered: 
Le principe général applicable en l'espèce est qu'une personne peut employer 
honnêtement son nom de famille en affaires, même si une autre personne exerce 
déjà une activité commerciale sous le même nom, et même au risque d'une certaine 
confusion avec un concurrent.  Il y a toutefois une exception: une personne ne peut 
pas utiliser son patronyme si le nom a déjà acquis un sens secondaire au profit 
d'une autre personne.  La preuve du sens secondaire est une question de faits. 
Rappelons qu'un nom de famille - comme tout autre mot appartenant au fonds 
commun de la langue - acquiert un sens secondaire quand il peut être associé aux 
produits ou services d'une seule personne, et uniquement de cette personne.  
Pensons par exemple à des patronymes célèbres comme Ford, Chanel ou 
McDonald. 
L'auteur Fox précise qu'il faut faire une distinction entre le droit de faire affaires 
sous son patronyme et le droit d'employer son patronyme comme marque de 
commerce. 894 
[According to] Harold G. Fox:  
“There is thus a difference between the right of a man to trade under his own name 
and his right to use that name as a trademark on his goods. The latter right is 
narrower and more restricted than the former…. But where there is honest use, 
                                                
894 Kisber & Co. Ltd v Ray Kisber & Associates Inc., 1998 CanLII 12807 [Kisber] online: CanLII 
http://canlii.ca/t/1n9ss>.  The general principle applicable in this case is that a person can use his surname for 
business honestly, even if another person already carries on his business under the same name, even at the risk of 
confusion with competitor. However, there is one exception: a person cannot use his patronymic name if the 
name has already acquired a secondary meaning for the benefit of another person. The proof of secondary 
meaning is a question of fact. As a recall, a family name - just like any other word… - acquires a secondary 
meaning when it can be associated with products or services of one person and only that person. Consider, for 
example the famous surnames such as Ford, Chanel or McDonald…[…]In the same decision, the court 
mentioned the difference between trading under the patronymic name and using the latter as a trademark 
[translated by author]. 
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and the plaintiff's name has not acquired secondary meaning, the use that the 
defendant makes of his own name in a similar business will not be interfered with 
even if some confusion results. ….Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada held 
that Ray could use his surname in its corporate name, starting from the date he 
precedes it with his first name. We can therefore conclude that "Ray Kisber & 
Associates" is a name consistent with law, because it is sufficiently different from 
"Kisber & Co.". Ray is therefore entitled to use the name Kisber in the name of his 
companies.895 
Correspondingly, referring to the British Court of Appeal, it was considered that:  
If a family or individual establishes a business under its, his, or her name and 
then sells the business, then a relative of that family or individual (who may have 
had nothing to do with the original business or sale) may effectively be prevented 
from setting up a competing business under his or her name.896 
 
However, the law of “passing off”897 applicable in the United Kingdom requires the claimants 
to bring evidence: 1) of the goodwill attached to their goods or services, under an identifying 
mark, and that 2) the defendant has falsified the public by leading them to believe that his or 
her goods or services are those of the claimant, and that 3) the misrepresentation has caused 
                                                
895 Kisber, ibid.  
896 Jason R Boyarski et al, “Family name trademarks addressed by British court” (2002) 14:3 Intellectual Property 
& Technology Law Journal 34. 
897  Passing off is a common law tort usually used to enforce unregistered trademark rights, and to protect the 
goodwill of a trader from a misrepresentation. In Canada it is statutorily codified under sub-section 7 (b) of 
Canada’s Trademarks Act, which provides that:  No person shall (a) make a false or misleading statement tending 
to discredit the business, wares or services of a competitor; (b) direct public attention to his wares, services or 
business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion in Canada, at the time he commenced so to 
direct attention to them, between his wares, services or business and the wares, services or business of another; 
(c) pass off other wares or services as and for those ordered or requested; (d) make use, in association with wares 
or services, of any description that is false in a material respect and likely to mislead the public as to (i) the 
character, quality, quantity or composition, (ii) the geographical origin, or (iii) the mode of the manufacture, 
production or performance  of the wares or services; or (e) do any other act or adopt any other business practice 
contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage in Canada.”See art 7, Trademarks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13. 
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damage to the claimant. Hence, it is worth noting, the misrepresentation shall not be 
intentional, or supported by instances of actual confusion; although, such instances usually 
provide persuasive evidence. 898 
Nonetheless, if a family member works for some period in a family business, then he/she 
terminates the relationship with the enterprise and seeks to establish the same or a related 
business. In the United States, family names are considered as descriptive marks; courts 
clearly have made an intensive effort, in terms of disputes that arise between family members 
within the context of family name trademarks. They weigh all surrounding circumstances, the 
competing interests of involved family members, while protecting the consuming public from 
the likelihood of confusion in a geographic limitation. So, the court distinguishes between the 
senior generation and junior generation in terms of oldness, and the contribution of family 
members to the goodwill of the family name trademark. 899 In summary, the main concerns can 
be stated as below:  
• “The junior family member use is actually a continuation or expansion of a pre-
existing concurrent use to which the senior family member user has given express 
or implied consent;  
• The junior family name user has prior experience in the family business or has 
otherwise contributed to the goodwill associated with the family name;  
                                                
898 Supra note 896. 
899 Christopher P Bussert, “Family feud: The tension between family names and trademarks” (2009) 99:6 The 
trademark reporter- The Law Journal of the International Trademark Association 1388 at 1394.  
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• The junior family name user has made efforts to distinguish the junior user’s 
family name trademark from the well-known family name trademark of the senior 
user;  
• The senior family name user previously transferred rights in the family name to 
another party and then later attempted to re-enter the same field under the same 
family name in some capacity; 
• The businesses of the senior and junior family name users are geographically close 
or are geographically remote; and  
• The entire set of circumstances indicates that the junior family name use is based 
on an honest and straightforward desire, by the junior family name user to build on 
a personal reputation, earned by demonstrated skill, experience, or years of 
participation in an industry, or that the junior family name use is based on a bad 
faith intent to free ride on the reputation of a better-known party.”900 
In Canada, the Court of Appeal of Quebec provided that the unfair usage of the patronymic 
name should be a fraudulent act, seeking to deceive people. The patronymic name shall be 
distinctive, having a good will, and acquire a secondary meaning for the ordinary customers 
(not the careful or educated customer) or unwary purchaser (not the careless or inattentive 
persons). Accordingly, in order to stop the unfair competition, it was proposed: 
[…] une mesure de redressement soit ordonnée afin de faire cesser la concurrence 
déloyale exercée par les intimés.  L'interdiction d'utiliser le nom Kisber ne me 
paraît pas toutefois une mesure appropriée, en l'espèce.  Le nom corporatif Ray 
Kisber & Associates n'est pas contesté.  Les intimés ont acquis le droit de faire 
affaires sous ce nom à condition de ne pas provoquer de la confusion dans l'esprit 
de la clientèle.  Comme la confusion constatée résulte substantiellement des 
                                                
900 Ibid at 1415.  
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annonces publicitaires destinées au public, il me paraît que l'injonction devrait être 
limitée à des mesures assurant la présence d'éléments distinctifs dans les annonces, 
circulaires et tous les autres documents publiés par les intimés de manière à ce que 
1) le nom Kisber n'ait pas un caractère prédominant, 2) que les mots Ray Kisber & 
Associates soient placés sur une seule ligne, 3) qu'ils soient écrits selon des 
caractères identiques et qu'en plus, 4) il soit indiqué sous le nom corporatif qu'il 
s'agit d'une compagnie indépendante de Kisber & Co.  901 
 
Correspondingly, the patronymic name encloses all intangible assets previously mentioned. It 
reflects the stability of the business and the connectedness within the family. Thus, being 
borrowed as the trademark from the family, it does not belong to individuals; rather it goes to 
the whole family and business. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the patronymic name 
shall be, firstly, authorized by the founding family, as a group. As such, it can standardize the 
usage conditions within the shared-value system boundaries, so as to control family members’ 
conduct and behavior. Then, any misconduct or misbehavior that may discredit the family 
name, allows the family to deprive the disobeying family member from utilizing it in business 
and being under-shadowed by it. Particularly, all family name bearers mirror the core of the 
family being-the form of storytelling-compressed history. Therefore, they shall act according 
to such, as a symbol of identity, reputation, and accomplishments. 902 
                                                
901 Kisber, supra note 894. [..]a remedy is ordered to stop the unfair competition from the respondents. The 
prohibition to use the name Kisber does not however seem to me an appropriate measure in this case. The 
corporate name Ray Kisber & Associates is not disputed. The respondents have acquired the right to do business 
under that name provided it does not cause confusion in the minds of customers. As noted, confusion resulting 
substantially advertisements intended for the public, it seems for me, the injunction should have been limited to 
measures that ensure the availability of the distinctive elements in the ads, flyers and other documents published 
by the respondents. So that, 1) the name Kisber was not a prominent feature, 2) that the words Ray Kisber & 
Associates are placed on one line, 3) they are written by the same characters, and that, in addition, 4) it is stated 
under the corporate name that it is an independent company Kisber & Co [translated by author]. 
902 Supra note 863 at 16.  
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Moreover, since family members can easily acquire all benefits from their familiarity with the 
business industry’s environment, in addition to the family name and reputation, it is 
convenient to protect the rights of the family business of origin. This protection could take the 
form of the equitable rights and royalty fees, required from every family member who intends 
to establish a business holding the patronymic family name, and invests in the same industry, 
or field of business. These equitable rights may encompass the right of overseeing if family 
members respect the trade rules made by the founding family. Additionally, the royalty fees 
shall be paid to the family business of origin, in counterpart of profits generated from its 
reputation in the market.  
2.5.2 The know-how and trade secrets  
The business’ specific knowledge or trade secrets built over time are the key strategic assets 
within the family business. Whereas, the predominance of family ties, trust, and shared-
identity provide only family members with great access to delicate information, knowledge, 
resources, and the trade secrets of the family business. 903 So, the alignment between family 
membership and business involvement grants family members access to such confidential 
resources of commercial value.904 For instance, the information consists of the expertise, 
industry-specific skills, capabilities, types of products or services, marketing and financial 
strategies, and political approaches. In addition, it encloses the stratagems taken to solve 
                                                
903 Luo Xiaowei Rose & Chung Chi-Nien, “Leadership succession and firm performance in an emerging 
economy: successor origin, relational embeddedness, and legitimacy” (2001) 38:5 Journal of Management 
Studies 719 at 729, online: INSEAD <http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=49345> 
904 Anuja Rajbhandary, “ Protecting trade secrets through family businesses: A case study on Nepal” (1996) 16:4 
International review of law and economics 483 at 484.  
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problems, the customer and suppliers’ lists, a slogan, or a suggestion for a method of 
advertising. Also, all future plans, weaknesses, strengths, process, formula, industrial 
knowhow, or any other information or idea of a scientific nature, as well as the expenditure of 
time and money, trial and error. All are considered amongst the trade secrets to be 
protected.905 However, it is worth noting, the element of secrecy is essential, so any 
information that grasps the public knowledge is not considered a trade secret. Yet, very often, 
family members, involved or not involved in business, know almost everything about the 
enterprise informally, as they talk openly about business and the way family leaders respond 
to business matters. Moreover, as it was previously explained, family businesses are most 
often motivated to hire family members so as to protect the trade secrets viz. the know-how of 
running the business against opportunism.906 Particularly, hiding information from competitors 
could provide a distinct advantage in the business world.907 Legally speaking, courts 
differentiate between general information and secret information. The latter comprises some of 
the following factors: “ (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the 
extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the 
information to the holder of the secret, and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or 
money expended in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information can be properly acquired or duplicated by others; and (7) whether the holder of 
                                                
905 David Vaver, “Civil liability for taking or using trade secrets in Canada” (1981) 5:3 The Canadian Business 
law Journal 253 at 255.  
906 Supra note 904 at 483.  
907 John T Cross, “Trade Secrets, Confidential Information, and the Criminal Law” (1991) 36 McGill L. J. 524 at 
526.  
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the secret and the taker treat the information as secret”. 908 In this respect, a convincingly 
accepted decision considered, “He who has received information in confidence shall not take 
unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it without 
obtaining his consent ".909  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed "the court will not allow any man 
unjustly to appropriate to himself the value earned by the labors of another".910 However, this 
economic valuable asset reveals as more substantial under the lack of any formal contract that 
can protect business trade secrets within the family business. Particularly, it is subject to any 
future competition from a family member whenever he/she decides to leave the business or 
even not to join it. For instance, once family members have access to the customers or 
suppliers’ list, built usually on “informal bilateral contracts”, 911 they can solicit them 
individually for their personal interest based on their family name, values, and the family 
reputation in a specific industry. This act should be considered as an act of competition against 
the family business of origin. In this respect, it was ruled by the Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts “a probate court have had the authority to order a spouse to enter into a non-
compete order when the family business was awarded to one spouse as part of a divorce.” 
912As, in the context of a divorce proceeding, the husband and wife both sought sole 
                                                
908 Supra note 905 at 256. 
909 Seager v Copydex, [1967] 1 WLR 923 at 931.   
910Rathwell v Rathwell, [1978] 2 SCR 436, 1978 CanLII 3 (SCC) at 456 [Rathwell] online: CanLII 
<http://canlii.ca/t/1mkb9> See also Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR 834, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), online: 
CanLII<http://canlii.ca/t/1mjvp> 
911 Supra note 904 at 485.  
912 Monica Velazquez, “United States: Better To Have Loved And Lost.... But Not With Your Non-Compete” 
(April 3, 2013) Strasburger & Price, L.L.P, online: Mondaq 
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ownership of a family business - a feed and grain store. The probate judge awarded the 
business to the husband. In an effort to shore up the value of the existing good will in the 
business, the husband requested that the judge order the wife, a veterinarian, not to operate a 
competing business. The judge denied the request on the sole ground that he lacked authority 
to grant such relief. Accordingly, it was decided:  
 […] the Legislature has given probate judges broad authority with respect to the 
division of marital property […] Although, we have located no Massachusetts case 
that holds that a probate judge has specific authority to impose non-compete 
orders, courts in other jurisdictions that have examined similarly broad grants of 
authority have so held […] (upholding authority of trial judge to impose non-
compete covenant where necessary for fair and just division of marital property). 
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reasoned, “Without such an agreement, 
the substantial value of the intangible goodwill would be lost or the parties would 
be left to compete in recapturing this portion of their marital property. 
As our Supreme Judicial Court held more than one century ago, “[G]oodwill is 
property, and is a valuable asset in [an individual's] business.” […] As such, the 
goodwill of a business is part of the marital property subject to equitable 
distribution, and a probate judge may exercise his equitable authority as necessary 
to effect the distribution. […] (in context of concluding that probate judges had 
authority to order restitution and retroactive child support even in absence of 
specific express statutory authority, we commented that “[t]he equity powers of a 
probate judge are ‘broad and flexible, and extend to actions necessary to afford 
any relief in the best interests of a person under their jurisdiction’”), […] Of 
course, the terms of any such order must be “reasonable and no broader than 
necessary to protect the good will included in the valuation and transfer.” 
[…] So much of the amended judgment as held that the probate judge had no 
authority to consider whether to order the wife not to compete with the family 
business is vacated, and the case is remanded for consideration of whether a non-
compete order is appropriate in this case.913 
 
Accordingly, each family member shall avoid any competing act or rivalries that may 
highjack, confuse, or drive away regular customers or suppliers, for instance, from dealing 
                                                
<http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/230420/Contract+of+Employment/The+RelationBack+Doctrine+A+Sui
t+In+Time+Saves+Related+Claims> 
913 Cesar v Sundelin, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 721 (2012) online: Massachusetts Cases 
<http://masscases.com/cases/app/81/81massappct721.html> 
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with the family business. However, a noncompetition agreement is usually known as a written 
contract, limited by time and geography. It is usually signed between two parties, an employer 
and an employee, or a buyer and a seller, wherein the second party agrees to commit to avoid 
any act that may damage the first party in the market. Yet, it is admitted that informal 
relationships between family members do not generate any formal written non-compete 
contracts. The questions that may arise in this context, can a non-competition agreement be 
informal?  
The courts usually focus on emphasizing two main conditions to emphasize the trade secret 
contravention, namely 1) the secrecy of the information, 2) the means by which it was 
acquired, and used. 914 Thus, in a family business it is crucial to underline the nature of 
information in question, as a third condition; seeing every single detail known by a family 
member could be a sword against the family and the family business if it was not used 
correctly. Particularly, as mentioned above, family members are usually tied by an implied 
family agreement based on common values, shared identity, family trust, and implicit 
expectations to be protected against any unexpected external event. So, any acquaintance of 
the secret business information belongs firstly to the family. Consequently, any use of this 
information shall be upon the latter’s approval.  
Likewise, according to the fundamental principles of contract law, only the signatories can be 
bound by its restrictions in terms of time and geography. Nevertheless, applying these 
conditions within the context of the family business may raise a query; can this agreement 
bind the non-signatories family members who already know the trade secrets, all confidential 
                                                
914 Rathwell, supra note 910  
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information? Precisely, family members (non-signatories of a franchise agreement) know the 
trade secrets, hold the family name, and have goodwill in the society and the market; so they 
can easily establish the so-called “competitive business” to the franchisor. In addition, a lack 
of documentation between the former franchisee and family members operators of the new 
“competitive” business emerges.915 Referring to the international arbitration agreements, for 
instance, non-signatories can be bound based on various theories,916 such as incorporation by 
reference,917 assumption of obligation, agency,918 piercing the corporate veil (alter ego)919 and 
estoppels.920 By analogy, courts recognize these theories within the non-compete agreement, 
                                                
915 Michael R Gray & Jason M Murray, “Covenants not to compete and nonsignatories: Enjoining unfair 
conspiracies” (2006) 25:3 Franchise Law Journal 107 at 108, online: Murray Law, P.A. 
<http://www.murraylawpa.com/files/CovenantsNottoCompeteandNonsignatories.pdf 
916 James M. Hosking, “The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial 
Arbitration: Doing Justice without Destroying Consent” (2004) 4:3 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
469 at 485, online: Pepperdine University 
<http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=drlj> 
917 “The contractual agreement between a party and the non-party incorporates the arbitration clause by 
reference”. See Aradia Fitness Canada Inc. v Dawn M. Hinze Consulting Ltd., 2008 CanLII BCSC 839 at 29 
[Aradia] online: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/t/1z66p>.  
918 Traditional principles of agency law may bind a non-signatory to arbitration, Aradia, ibid at 29.2 
919 “The corporate relationship between a parent and its subsidiary may be sufficiently close as to justify piercing 
the corporate veil and holding one corporation legally accountable for the actions of the other”; see Aradia, ibid 
at 29.3 
920 “Non-signatories [may be] bound to arbitration agreements under an estoppel theory ...by knowingly 
exploiting the agreement, the [plaintiff] was estopped from avoiding arbitration despite having never signed the 
agreement."
 
The Court also referred to "an alternative estoppel theory" where "[a] signatory was bound to 
arbitrate with a non-signatory and the non- signatory's insistence because of the 'close relationship' between the 
entities involved, as well as the relationship of the alleged wrongs to the non-signatory's obligations and duties in 
the contract . . . and [the fact that] the claims were 'intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying 
contract obligations. Aradia, Ibid. See also, CE International Resources Holdings LLC v Yeap Soon Sit, 2013 
BCSC 1804, online: CanLII <http://canlii.ca/t/g0s23>. 
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based on franchising transactions, which occur between a family member as a vendor, and the 
franchisor. They do not restrict their analysis and decisions on the technicality of the 
agreements, the contractual provisions, or the parties. Rather, seeking fairness requires from 
them binding non-signatories whenever they benefit, “either directly921 or indirectly from the 
agreement, whether they aided and assisted the vendor not to commit to the contractual 
obligations or restrictions imposed by the agreement”. 922 However, it is worth noting, courts 
look beyond the relationship between family members as it does not automatically bind the 
non-signatory, but inspect the circumstances which encircle the competing enterprise that 
increase the likelihood, and confuse customers to decide on binding, or not, the non-
signatories. 
Here, Ms. Everett exploited, or benefitted from, the contractual relationship her 
husband and EAGB had with [the Franchisor]. EAGB presumably was profitable 
because of the [Franchise Agreement]. As Matt's spouse and co-owner of EAGB, 
Ms. Everett had a right to share in the profits. But this benefit was indirect; it 
derived from her ownership interest in EAGB and/or her marriage, not directly 
from the Franchise Agreement. This is not the kind of benefit that would bind her 
to the Franchise Agreement; otherwise, [the Franchisor] would have no reason to 
have the owner of the legal entity operating the franchise separately sign the 
Franchise Agreement in his individual capacity…. Absent evidence that the non[-
]signatory directly benefitted from the agreement, “a signatory may not estop a 
non[-]signatory from avoiding arbitration regardless of how closely affiliated that 
                                                
921 For instance, the theory of estoppel requires bringing evidence that the non-signatory received a direct benefit 
from the agreement itself. 
922 Emma Cano, Darci E Cohen & Diane Green-Kelly, “Unsigned Obligations: When Are Non-Signatories 
Bound?” (Paper presented at the 37th Annual Forum on Franchising, American Bar Association, Seattle, WA, 
October 15 – 17, 2014) at 34.  
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non[-]signatory is with another signing party.923  
 
In another decision, the court enjoined the wife as a non signatory, and pierced the 
corporate veil by concluding: “Mr. Lucas cannot be allowed to do indirectly, through 
his wife and her controlled corporation, that which he covenanted not to do himself.” 
924 Additionally, it was decided:“A non-signatory to a covenant will be bound 
because a covenant or will not be allowed to do through others what he or she could 
not do directly.” Therefore, the court will enforce a covenant against a non-signatory 
to the extent he assists the signatory violate “the covenant not to compete.” 925 
Consequently, the trade secrets belong to the founding family.  Accordingly, any 
family member who aims to build his/her business under the patronymic name, and 
who holds the trade secrets shall:  
1- Get the approval from the family of origin as a group  
2- Inquire if there is any non-compete contract that binds the family to operate 
a business under its name. 
3- Pay the royalty fees for the founding family against the use of the trade 
secrets,  
4- The family may undertake the supervision over the new family member’s 
business, so as to ensure maintaining the good quality of the services or 
products provided in the market, and avoid any further reputational damage.  
                                                
923 Ibid at 8. 
924 Ibid at 23. 
925 Ibid at 22. 
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Also, the family shall be transparent towards all family members, and discuss with all family 
members any potential contract that may be signed with any non-family member, related to its 
standing within the market and the society. Seeing, all are concerned and the repercussions of 
any legal agreement pursue each of them as a group, and as individuals.  
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3. The legal taxonomy of the family business 
The family business is “neither an anachronism – as conventional neo-classical economics 
suggest – nor a viable replacement for the modern managerial corporation. It is, however, a 
valuable member of the set of institutional forms available to entrepreneurs within a market 
economy”.926 Therefore, it proves convenient to change the legal perception towards this 
enterprise from “praeter legem” to “intra legem”; so, governments, legislators, and judicial 
authorities reexamine their policies to promote it in order to protect its stability and longevity. 
This act could generate exceptional outcomes at the level of the family, as they could urge 
families to build positive and healthy relationships that will resonate in business, the society, 
and the market. Then, the costs incurred, due to the limitless conflicts and litigations that arise 
everyday between family members concerned by a family business, will be reduced.  
Moreover, love and trust usually incite family members to decide informally and irrationally 
in comparison to “legal actors”.927 They organize their relationships and make business 
decisions by preferring their self-determination to the rule of law.928 Therefore, their action 
reveals very often as a matter of “fact” rather than “law”. During happy times, where resorting 
to the law seems an act of skepticism; however, once the devil harasses family and business 
relationships, it becomes the sword or the defensive line for the litigants. Accordingly, the 
legal taxonomic identification of this enterprise will encourage family members to believe that 
the family business is a matter of law, escorted with an economic value, and empowered with 
                                                
926 Supra note 2 at 76. 
927 Supra note 113 at 813.  
928 Jean-Guy Belley, “Les obligations ajuridiques”: des oubliées du code civil? “ in Vincent Caron et al, Les 
oubliés du code civil du Quebec, (Qc: Thémis, 2014) 143 at 147.  
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their soft-heartedness, emotional, and relational bonds. Hence, founders and successors will be 
provided with an additional sense of responsibility to act efficiently and determinedly not only 
for their personal interests, but also towards the family, business, society, and the economy.  
Based on the earlier thorough analysis, it becomes clear that family business concept emerges 
when the sole proprietors or the founders stop seeing the business as a personal possession, 
and the intention to keep it in the family arises. Thus, they begin to nurture their prospect in 
the family amongst the new generation. Once family members show their interest or start 
planning accordingly, the “family business” transpires. Accordingly, it discloses based on the 
intention of the senior generation and the will of the subsequent generation to belong to the 
enterprise, most often as a potential future successor or inheritor of the family legacy and 
patrimony. Then, the interest of the family combines with the personal or individual interest; 
and family members begin acting for “Them” as a family, and for “Themselves” as 
individuals. Hence, the combination between all subsystems gives birth to a distinctive new 
organizational entity, namely the “family business”. Consequently, this enterprise cannot 
function as a family business unless it has the following constructs and mechanisms:  
1. Family ownership   
2. Family control 
3. Family values  
4. Family trust  
5. Affectio societatis familiaris  
6. Family name 
7. Family reputation 
8. Family internal and external networks  
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9. Family know-how 
10. Family involvement, as family members serve the business in a way that exceeds 
normal expectations in order to help the business succeed.  
All these constructs reflect “Familiness” as the major characteristic that differentiates this 
enterprise. However, it is convenient to translate this characteristic legally so as to accentuate 
the distinctive nature of this enterprise, and the legal consequences that may generate 
accordingly.  
3.1 The legal nature of the family business 
Scholars outline that the family business reveals as a collective psychological ownership. It is 
defined as “a socially constructed cognitive structure coupled with an emotional or affective 
sensation.”929 Considering, the collective sense of possession allows family members to 
socially and jointly identify, invest interdependently, and act together seeking a collective 
interest. Moreover, the collective possession discloses as the extensions of ‘‘the family’’ that 
reflects the “ us”, and provides its members “with such cues and help orient them to contexts, 
give meanings to experience, and guide their action as collective entities, the meaning and 
motivation for collective possession is found in the sense of social identity.” 930  The family 
collective sense of ownership is applicable informally and unconsciously by most families, 
and intentionally by others. Likewise, the inheritance systems and estate tax laws applicable in 
many countries are considered the main engine that turns such a collective sense into a fact. 
As such, it becomes the family undivided property, and remains emergent for a long time upon 
                                                
929 Noora Rantanen & Liro Jussila, “F-CPO: A collective psychological ownership approach to capturing realized 
family influence on business” (2011) 2:3 Journal of Family Business Strategy 139 at 140.  
930 Ibid at 142. 
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the legator’s death.  As, some families believe that keeping the ownership within the family as 
a legacy can create a moral value more than a financial value. Nevertheless, it is worth noting, 
the family collective undivided ownership is a forgotten legal institution. It was recognized by 
ancient civilizations, namely the Romans or even beyond, and known by “the natural co-
ownership” established between siblings upon the father’s death. They were declared as 
“heredes sui”- inheritors who had to express their approval to keep the property undividable 
within the family, in the form of a collective co-ownership. Hence, their property was not 
considered as an individual ownership, rather it belongs to the family, whereby individuals act 
as fiduciaries and representatives of the family.931 They sign as witnesses within the family 
framework. The fundamental norm that governed their natural co-ownership was “equality” 
between all co-owners over generations. Family co-owners were entitled with the rights of 
“tenancy and survivorship”, so as to benefit from the collective ownership throughout their 
lives without any right of disposal. Moreover, the same rights used to be transferred to 
subsequent inheritors. Furthermore, the family collective co-ownership was protected, as it 
endowed relatives with the “right of retrieval” and the “right of pre-emption”. They could 
retrieve the property and replace the buyer, if the latter was a non-family member. However, it 
is worth noting, women were excluded from the right of survivorship, but could benefit from 
the right of tenancy, in order to keep the family property within the family. Still, referring to 
the ancient era, we can cite article 34 of the Ashnona Code, before Hammurabi:“if a brother 
wanted to liquidate his share by selling it, and his brother is interested to buy it, the latter shall 
                                                
931 Igorʹ Mikhaĭlovich Dʹi︠a︡konov, “The rise the despotic state in Ancient Mesopotamia”, in Igorʹ Mikhaĭlovich 
Dʹi︠a︡konov, Ancient Mesopotamia: socio-economic history: a collection of studies (Moscow: Nauka Pub. 
House, Central Dept. of Oriental Literature, 1969) 173 at 177. 
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pay half the price that should have been paid by a stranger”; so as the property remains within 
the family.932 However, it is noteworthy that the family collective ownership is still regulated 
and effective in two countries, namely in Switzerland and Egypt.  
For instance, the family undividable property is recognized and regulated in the Swiss Civil 
Code (SCC) from the section 336 to 348.933 Based on these regulations, family members are 
allowed to tie a body of assets to the family, by placing all or part of an inheritance or other 
property under a joint ownership of undivided shares.934 They own them collectively for a 
limited or indefinite duration.935 This legal institution shall be officially well defined in a 
public deed signed by all co-owners and their representatives.936 The joint-ownership binds 
co-owners together in a common economic activity. 937 Unless otherwise provided, they enjoy 
equal rights in the co-owned property, and during their joint ownership, they cannot seek the 
division of the property or dispose of their own share.938 However, if the co-owner is bound to 
an unlimited period, he or she may terminate the joint co-ownership providing a six months 
advance notice, or if the property is an agricultural enterprise, such a notice must always 
expire on a spring or autumn date in accordance with local custom. 939All family co-owners 
can regulate the affairs of the joint ownership in undivided shares, collectively. Moreover, 
                                                
932 [Translated by author]. See Bassam Majid Suleiman ELObaji, ﻜﻠﻣﺔﯿ ةﺮﺳﻷا -ـ دﺔﺳار ﺔﻧرﺎﻘﻣ  (Jordan: Dar ElHamed 
for publishing and distribution, 2009) at 22.  
933 Swiss Civil Code (SCC) (10 December 1907) (Status as of 1 January 2016) 
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19070042/index.html> 
934 Art 336 SCC.  
935 Art 338, para 1.SCC 
936 Art 337 SCC. 
937 Art 339, para 1 SCC. 
938 Art 339 SCC. 
939 Art 338, para 2-3 SCC. 
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they are jointly and severally liable for debts encumbering such property.940 Each of them may 
take ordinary administrative actions on their own initiative.941 However, they can appoint one 
or more of them to act as manager(s) and representative(s) in order to run all external dealings 
and economic activities.942 The dissolution of the joint ownership in undivided shares can take 
place by agreement or a notice of termination, or upon the expiry period; if it is not renewed 
implicitly. 943 Also, it takes place on realization of a co-owner's share of the property that has 
been foreclosed, or when a co-owner is declared bankrupt, or upon the request of a co-owner 
for good cause.944 According to the Egyptian code, the family collective joint ownership is a 
written agreement concluded between family members who have common consanguinity, 
kindred-ship interest, and business. Family members give birth to this institution willingly, for 
an unlimited period or a limited period that shall not exceed 15 years.945This period is 
renewable only upon its expiration.946 During the limited period, family members’ co-owners 
cannot divide the property and exit from the collective ownership, unless there are serious 
reasons subject to the court’s discretion. However, co-owners cannot sell their shares in the 
collective ownership to a stranger unless with the consensus of all family members. If the 
collective ownership is for an unlimited period, co-owners shall notify all co-owners six 
months in advance of their exit from the joint-ownership. The majority can appoint their 
                                                
940 Art 342, para 1-2 SCC. 
941 Art 340 SCC. 
942 Art 341 SCC. 
943 Art 343 SCC. 
944 Art 343 SCC. 
945 Art 852, 853 Egyptian Civil Code, (1948). 
946 Supra note 932 at 205.  
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representatives to manage the collective joint ownership, diligently, vigilantly, and cautiously 
for the best interest of the undividable joint ownership. The dissolution of the collective 
ownership in undivided shares can take place if its duration was terminated, or in case of the 
property annihilation, or by consensual agreement. In addition, it occurs based on a notice of 
termination, or upon the death of a co-owner, unless it is predetermined that inheritors replace 
the co-owner. Likewise, if one of the co-owners were placed under guardianship, the 
collective ownership can be dissolved unless it is specified to remain, providing the exit of the 
latter through his/her representative. Upon the dissolution, the undividable collective 
ownership turns into a joint ownership, and then it will be divided between co-owners equally 
or depending on each one’s ownership shares. 947 
Based on the abovementioned analysis, although the family business is usually run with a 
collective spirit, still the individual perspective cannot be neglected at all stages of the 
enterprise’s development. Therefore, it is problematic to consider the family business as a pure 
collective ownership. Instead, it is a hybrid type of ownership, which embraces both individual 
and collective characteristics.  
3.1.1 The distinctive nature of the family business ownership 
The dynamic of “Familiness” mirrors the convoluted identity in which the family should not 
be perceived through the membership of its individuals anymore, but as an independent 
stakeholder. Moreover, it is a Sovereignty-owner or Royalty-owner that incorporates 
tangible and intangible assets into business, explicitly and implicitly seeking the family 
interest, in priori, and then business interest. Therefore, the family reflects the collective 
                                                
947 Ibid at 230.   
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undividable ownership that escorts the individual ownership in the enterprise.  However, the 
notion of a collective ownership is interdependent, and a sophisticated dynamic that shall be 
seen consciously and cautiously explained in order to avoid conflicts and tensions between all 
players within the enterprise. Principally, based on the above-said, the family is not a legal 
person, but it is at the highest rank of institutions’ scale.948 Therefore, the royalty rights of its 
ownership shall take a distinctive form.  
Accordingly, we will suggest a few characteristics borrowed from different legal institutions, 
arrangements or mechanisms, which could justify the royalty ownership of the family within 
the family enterprise.  
3.1.1.1 Family patrimony 
The family patrimony is a legal institution recognized within the context of marriage; it is 
limited to the spouses and in some cases to incapable minors, as it was explained earlier. It is 
convenient to extend the context of this institution and apply it within the family business, by 
endowing the family as a group, and a royalty owner, with such a patrimony, so as to 
recognize its right to be a legitimate decision-maker. Moreover, the patrimony by 
appropriation circumscribes most the collective ownership through which the family group 
possesses the patrimony.  They own it collectively, while family members, as individuals, own 
nothing. In other words, the joint hands of the group creates what is so-called Family Hand, 
that has the lone right to dispose of the assets indivisibly, and perceive the family business’ 
common interests. Such a major factor will never individualize to become in the hands of an 
independent being, unless the family business is transformed into a simple business, or upon 
                                                
948 Supra note 608 at 245.  
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its dissolution. So, all assets become owned jointly and divisibly, and can be divided between 
family members equally or as predetermined in the family collective joint ownership deed.  
However, the question that may arise; who is the family, that has the patrimony by 
appropriation and acts as a royalty-owner in the family business? It is the founding family and 
its kindred descendants, unless it is otherwise determined in the family deed or agreement.  
Moreover, the royalty ownership can also act as such for a limited period, or for an unlimited 
period. The limited period may not exceed 10 years, as it reflects the generational 
development by decades. The period limitation reveals as a great mechanism that urges 
families to re-think and reconsider their family partnership in the family business. However, 
even if the family collective ownership is unlimited, the family shall convene within a 
maximum of 15 years in order to revise the family agreement and approve or amend it where 
need be, or every time a change occurs in the family, such as a generational development that 
occurs in business. This agreement shall take the form of a collective family agreement, as a 
contract of adhesion, by which family members shall abide even if they are not signatories.  
The family patrimony by appropriation can be the novelty that reduces agency costs, creates a 
balance between majority and minority, and identifies the role of the family in business. It 
justifies the distinctiveness of the family business and renounces the classification as an 
individual ownership; seeing the business belongs firstly to the family, and then to the 
individuals. In addition, it urges families to overcome the informality in business, and turn out 
to adjust their business to market requirements.  
3.1.1.2 The royalty-ownership 
By analogy to the estate-freeze institution, the royalty-shares are preferred frozen shares, 
having nominal values and associated with special voting rights. Thus, they shall be kept 
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within the portfolio of the company deprived of any circulation or exchange. Also, these 
shares have special voting rights to approve all matters pertaining to the family, and may 
affect, for instance, family ties, family reputation, family business sustainability. Such voting 
rights stem from the extra benefits and capitals captured from the family, and serve to keep the 
eye of the latter on the business. Besides, as other types of shares, the royalty-shares grant the 
family with ownership legal rights within the company. Essentially, it is suitable to cite the 
rights: to receive dividends, to examine corporate books and records, the right to claim a share 
of the proceeds from the sale or liquidation, to accuse unfair acts and sue illegal actions. Thus, 
we will expose the essential rights that could have specific ramifications on the family 
business.  
a) The right to receive dividends 
The right of the family as a shareowner to receive dividends is like any other individual or 
legal person owners’. However, since the royalty-shares reflect a special category of shares 
within the family business, it is recommended that the entitlement to dividends bestowed on 
the family as a patrimony by appropriation be directly transferred into the “Royal reserve 
fund”. The latter could be designed to confront all risks faced by the family because of 
business, namely the reputational risk, illiquidity risk, succession risk, and management risk. It 
is the defensive line against any unexpected risk faced by the family due to family members’ 
actions or decisions. In addition, this fund may be used to offset any business crisis that may 
occur and threaten the longevity of the family legacy. It is worth mentioning, such a medium 
shall not disclaim individuals’ liabilities towards the business or the third party. Rather, as the 
family always shoulders the burdens and bears the drawbacks or lapses of family members, 
this mechanism reveals as a formal interpretation of its role towards the family and business. 
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Also, it guarantees the best interest of individual-shareowners as family members; since it 
enables them to receive recurrent benefits directly from the business’ dividends, and does not 
necessitate the decision to reinvest in their accounts anymore, particularly when these owners 
represent the minority within the business.  
b) The royalty-shares liability 
Since the family is not a juristic person, its liability towards third parties in terms of its 
royalty-shares shall be limited. This measure is more suitable to the specific role of the family 
within the business, which shall not surpass the family business’ threshold. Particularly, any 
asset owned by family members outside the business is nothing but an individual property, and 
does not belong to the family as a whole, even if this property is jointly shared.  
c) The preemptive right 
The preemption clause is the provision that allows an owner to acquire the shares in priority 
before they are sold to an outsider. The royalty ownership may endow the family with the pre-
emptive right to purchase family members’ shares, or any co-owners’ shares, in case a co-
owner intends to exit the family business. The seller shall notify the family in advance, so the 
family informs all family co-owners as first beneficiaries. The latter shall show their interest to 
buy these shares within a limited period; otherwise, the family will have the second-rank 
preemptive right to purchase them. However, it is worth noting, the pre-emptive right clause 
may be stipulated according to family needs and aspirations. In all cases, the family shall 
approve the co-owner(s) shares’ purchase in priori. Since, shares ownership has an impact on 
the family business stability and may affect family relationships, or business control that could 
extend to the enterprise reputation and its position in the market.   
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3.1.2 Governance structure of the family business 
The royalty-shares engender governance measures that allow the family to echo its voice, and 
to vote for its shares. These measures shall be initiated through the “Family Board or 
Council”. A body that deliberates the stances of the family, in all matters related to long-term 
family interests, and its role within the business. It is a supervisory board aimed at protecting 
the legacy, the reputation, and the longevity of the family business. This board embraces 
representatives of each family faction and generation. It convenes quarterly, so as to follow up 
and make decisions to be approved unanimously, and then transferred to owners’ ordinary and 
extra-ordinary meetings and the board of directors, via “family representatives” elected by the 
family board. These representatives transmit the family vision to the above-said bodies that 
may diverge from the one of the family members, as individuals. Thusly, this procedure 
renders the voice of the family, as a group, to be legal and mandatory, no longer perceived as a 
simple advisory opinion. Consequently, the family protects its right to remain on top of affairs 
by playing an effective role pertaining to the business decision-making process. 
Correspondingly, this could be considered as a relief for individual family members; since it 
alleviates, if not removes, the family burden from their shoulders. It separates them from 
representing the family bloc, and, suitably, their individual roles and interests emerge 
unreservedly. Moreover, this mechanism creates equilibrium within the family enterprise, and 
adjusts the misconception between family members as successors. Particularly, the main 
conflicts that most often arise revolve around the struggle of the desire to keep strong 
connections with the family, and their “individuality” seeking their self-interest. It emphasizes 
the collective aspect of the family’s interest, by reminding individual owners that this 
enterprise belongs to the whole family, and is not only an individual privilege endowed to 
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some family members over others. Particularly, whenever abusive expropriation from a 
minority takes place. Since, as mentioned above, the family business succession is not just a 
simple transfer of the financial assets but also a transmission of other intangible human, social, 
and cultural capitals and assets. Nevertheless, the voting rights of the family as a royalty 
shareowner may be privileged with the veto power over all matters that have a direct impact 
on the family, whether among the owners meetings or the board of directors. For instance, we 
cite the affairs that contradict the family values or culture, or affect the family reputation or 
put the family enterprise at risk, or in case of any abusive or oppressive decisions against the 
minority. 
3.2 The legal definition of the family business 
Till this date, there is no widely accepted definition of family business.949 Though, countless 
are the endeavors to draw up the right definition; they vary as much as disciplines and fields 
do.950 Therefore, defining the family business is considered “the first and most obvious 
challenge facing [the] researchers”.951 Particularly, each definition generates significant 
implications and could raise a multitude of questions. However, most definitions focus on 
ownership, or ownership and management involvement of family owners, or the generational 
transfer.952 As such, some scholars suggested that five criteria can define a family business: 
“percentage of ownership, voting control, power over strategic decisions, involvement of 
                                                
949 Joseph H Astrachan, Sabine B Klein & Kosmas X. Smyrnios, “The F-PEC Scale of Family Influence: A 
proposal for solving the Family Business definition problem”(2002) 15:1 Family Business Review 45.  
950 Stefan P. Bornheim, The organizational form of family business (USA: Kluwer Academic publishers, 2000) at 
13. 
951 Supra note 949 at 254. 
952 Supra note 20 at 19.  
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multiple generations, and active management of family members”. 953 Others conclude that a 
business is classified as a family business only when “the family retains the voting control of 
the business, and multiple generations of family members are involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the firm”.954 Also, family assumptions and values, and the consideration of 
decision-makers to family members’ issues, opinions and needs, were underlined in the 
labeling. However, the broadest definitions necessitate the effective influence and strategic 
control of the family and the intention to keep the business in the family, along with a slight 
daily family involvement in business operations.955 Besides, it was referred that family 
business arises when  “ownership and managerial control are both concentrated within a 
single-family unit”.956 Again, it was concluded, a family business transpires when: “1) 
Ownership control (15 per cent or higher) by two or more members of a family or a 
partnership of families; 2) Strategic influence by family members on the management of the 
firm, whether by being active in management, by continuing to shape the culture, by serving 
as advisors or board members, or by being active shareholders; 3) Concern for family 
relationships 4) The dream (or possibility) of continuity across generations”.957 The 
aforementioned definitions show the multi-dimensional perspective of scholars who excel by 
emphasizing and adopting the main components of such an enterprise. However, these 
                                                
953  Melissa Carey Shanker & Joseph H Astrachan, “Myths and realities: Family businesses’ contribution to the 
U.S. economy – a framework for assessing family business statistics” (1996) 9:2 Family Business Review 107 at 
108.  
954 Supra note 206 at 4. 
955 Supra note 953 at 110.  
956 Reginald A Litz, “The family business: Toward definitional clarity” (1995) 8:2 Family Business Review 71 at 
74.  
957 Supra note 66 at 7.  
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amongst other angles were taken into consideration by international and local authorities the 
world over, while drawing the definition of this family business. It is convenient to cite some 
of them, for instance:  
• In 2008, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Family Business definition 
appeared in the family business governance handbook. It was defined as follows:  
A company where the voting majority is in the hands of the controlling 
family; including the founder(s) who intend to pass the business on to their 
descendants.  Where family business term refers to “family firm”, “family 
company”, “family-owned business”, “family-owned company”, and 
“family-controlled company.958 
 
• In the United States, the US Internal Revenue Service offers a more generational 
ownership-based definition to enable the calculation of taxes on deceased estates; in 
order for the Qualified Family-Owned Businesses to benefit from estate taxes 
deduction. According to the section 502 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997: 
 A qualified family-owned business includes a sole proprietorship as well 
as an entity such as a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company 
that conducts a trade or business. If the business is an entity rather than a 
sole proprietorship, the decedent and his or her family members must own 
any of the following: (1) at least 50 per cent of the entity; (2) at least 30 per 
cent of an entity in which members of two families own 70 per cent; or (3) 
                                                
958 Sanaa Abou Zeid, The IFC Family Business Governance Handbook, (Washington: IFC, 2008) at 12, online: 
IFC < 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/6a9001004f9f5979933cff0098cb14b9/FamilyBusinessGovernance_Handbo
ok_English.pdf?MOD=AJPERES > 
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at least 30 per cent of an entity in which members of three families own 90 
per cent.959 
 
•  In Canada, on October 10, 2008, Lieutenant Governor in Council approved Ontario 
Regulation (350/08), containing amendments to Regulation 697, R.R.O 1990960 under 
the Land Transfer Tax Act R.S.O. 1990, by which it was provided an exemption from 
land transfer tax on certain transfers of land from an individual to his or her family 
farm and family business corporation. So, it was clarified that in order to qualify the 
family business corporation, it must be a Canadian-controlled private corporation.  
A family business corporation now means a corporation:  which is a 
Canadian-controlled private corporation within the meaning of the 
Income Tax Act, and all of whose issued shares other than directors’ 
qualifying shares are owned by members of the family of an 
individual.961 
While the “farming assets” of the family farm corporation were limited to the financial and 
physical assets by including: 
 (a) Land, buildings, equipment, machinery, and livestock that are used 
chiefly in farming by the corporation, 
                                                
959 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Public Law 105–34, Aug. 5, 1997, online:  US Government publishing office 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ34/pdf/PLAW-105publ34.pdf> 
960 R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 697: Exemption(s) – for certain conveyances of family farms or family businesses- under 
Land Transfer Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.6, online: < http://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900697> 
961 Ibid at 1. 
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(b) Any right or license granted or issued under any Act of the Legislature 
that permits or regulates the production or sale of any commodity or thing 
produced, raised or grown through farming, 
(c) The building in which a shareholder or one or more members of his or 
her family reside who are engaged in farming if that building is on land that is 
used or is contiguous to land used in farming by that shareholder or those 
members of his or her family, 
(d) Shares in another family farm corporation, and 
(e) Trade accounts receivable, supplies, and inventory of commodities or things 
produced, raised, or grown through farming; 962 
However, it is worth noting, according to this regulation, the legislator enlarges the definition 
of the family by including  
“with respect to an individual (a) the individual, (b) the individual’s spouse, (c) 
the individual’s child, (d) the individual’s father, mother, brother or sister or any 
spouse or descendant of such brother or sister, (e) the brother or sister of the 
individual’s father or mother or any descendant of any such brother or sister, (f) 
the father, mother or any brother or sister of the individual’s spouse or any 
descendant of any such brother or sister, (g) the individual’s son-in-law or 
daughter-in-law, (h) the individual’s grandfather or grandmother, (i) the 
individual’s grandchild or great-grandchild or the spouse of any such grandchild 
or great-grandchild, or (j) a corporation all of the issued shares of which except 
for directors’ qualifying shares are owned by an individual or individuals, each of 
whom is related to the individual to whom the expression is being applied in the 
manner described in any of clauses (a) to (i);963 
 
                                                
962 Ibid. 
963 Ibid. 
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• Upon the appointment of the European national authorities, the European Commission 
and experts in the family business field ended up by drawing a definition for the family 
business in the European sphere. So, it was proposed that family business is a firm of 
any size if:  
1) The majority of decision-making rights are in the possession of the 
natural person(s) who established the firm, or in the possession of the 
natural person(s) who has/have acquired the share capital of the firm, or in 
the possession of their spouses, parents, child, or children’s direct heirs.  
2) The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct.  
3) At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in 
the governance of the firm.  
4) Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person 
who established or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or 
descendants possess 25 per cent of the decision-making rights mandated by 
their share capital. 964 
Although, it is noteworthy, the proposed definition includes family businesses which have not 
yet gone through the first generational transfer, in addition to sole proprietors, and self-
employed, providing there is a legal entity which can be transferred.  
• In the United Arab Emirates, and particularly in Dubai, based on UAE’s existing 
economic laws pertaining to the establishment of a company in the UAE, and taking 
into consideration that businesses should bear at least 51 per cent UAE ownership, the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Dubai ended up with the following definition. 
The family business in Dubai is:  
                                                
964 Europe, European Commission, Final report of the Expert Group- Overview of Family- Business-relevant 
issues: Research-Networks, Policy Measures and Existing studies, European Commission-General for Enterprise 
and Industry (Europe: European Commission – Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General, November 2009) at 
4, online: European Commission-Enterprise and Industry < 
 http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10388/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native > 
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a business in which at least 51 per cent of the shares are owned by one 
single UAE family and at least one member of the management team is 
drawn from the family that owns the business. Where “Family” includes 
the household (HH) consisting of the husband (head of HH), his wife and 
their siblings; the HH parents; his brothers and sisters and their siblings. 965 
• In Lebanon, referring to the Lebanese soft Code of Corporate Governance issued in 
2006 by the Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), family business was defined 
in the appendix E as:  
The Family owned businesses whereby the family has a majority 
ownership in the business and/or the family is in management positions of 
the business and/or whereby the family dynamics influence decision-
making and the long-term direction of the business. Where “family 
members” refers to any member related by blood and/or by marriage to one 
another. 966 
 
However, most of these definitions are based on the distinction between family businesses and 
non-family businesses, and depend on the multidimensional researchers’ perspectives, which 
all differ from the legal concerns in terms of the taxonomy, rights, obligations and the 
emergence of justice and fairness. Yet, this comparison reveals incommensurate, since each 
system has its own dynamics, mechanisms (tangible and intangible), operational rules, 
                                                
965 Belaid Rettab, Tarek Abu Fakhr & Marietta P Morada, “Family businesses in Dubai, Definition, structure and 
performance” (2005) Data Management and Research Department, Chamber of commerce and Industry- Dubai 
Working Paper at 11, online: Chamber of Dubai < 
http://web.dubaichamber.ae/LibPublic/Family%20Businesses%20in%20Dubai%20Definition%20Structure%20P
erformance.pdf> 
966 Supra note 306 at 18, online: Hawkamah <https://hawkamah.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/lebanon_cg_2006.pdf> 
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challenges and specific problem-solving measures. Thus, both enterprises represent the 
balance scales that guarantee world-market stability.  
Accordingly, based on the thorough analysis of the family business, it becomes clear that the 
concept of the family business emerges when the sole proprietors or the founders, stop seeing 
the business as a personal possession, and intend to keep it in the family. As such, they begin 
nurturing their prospect in the family amongst the new generation.  Once family members 
show their interest or start planning accordingly, the “family business” transpires. Thus, it 
discloses based on the intention of the senior generation and the will of the subsequent 
generations to belong to the enterprise, most often, as potential future successors or inheritors 
of the family legacy and patrimony. Then, the interest of the family combines with the 
personal or individual interest; and family members begin acting for “Them” as a family, and 
for “Themselves” as individuals. Hence, the combination between all subsystems, family, 
business, ownership, and individuals gives birth to a distinctive new organizational entity, 
namely the “family business”. Consequently, a family business can be defined as follows  
I. The family business is a mixed ownership, whereas the family, as a group, is a 
mandatory royalty-owner, and more than one family member as individuals, co-
owners or involved in business, and “familiness” or family capital affects the 
decision-making in the enterprise. It reveals as an enterprise of any size, and legal 
form, listed or not listed. 
II. The majority of the decision-making rights in a family business may be in the 
possession of: 
 288 
a. The natural person(s) who established the firm has/have the intention to 
keep the majority of shareholding rights or control for the family and its 
members, aiming at its longevity amongst offspring, or 
b. The family as a group, and individuals, natural person(s), as family 
member(s) who has/have acquired the shared-capitals by inheritance, or 
succession, bequest, donation or purchasing, or 
c. A “legal person” or “a patrimony by affectation” owned and/or run by 
family members who have the intention to keep the majority of shareholding 
rights or control for the family and its members, aiming at its longevity 
amongst offspring.  
III. The “intuitu familiae” reveals as the main concern for family members to join the 
family business.  
IV. The “affectio societatis familiaris” describes the common will of family members to 
share the ownership of the family business.  
V. The family business governance is of two-fold: The family governance and Business 
governance. At least one representative of the family is formally involved in the 
business governance.  
VI. At least one family member or a representative of the family shall be involved in the 
business management.  
 
 
  
Conclusion 
Amin Maalouf quoted in his book, “In the name of Identity”:  
 “Identity can't be compartmentalized. You can't divide it up into halves, 
thirds, or any other separate segments. I haven't got several identities: I've 
got just one, made up of many components in a mixture that is unique to 
me, just as other people's identity is unique to them as individuals”.967  
Correspondingly, by analogy, a family business has a unique identity that cannot be compared 
to non-family counterparts. It cannot be perceived as a simple business, neither as a family; it 
is simply a family business, which has a unique typology. Appropriately, legislators shall not 
undervalue this enterprise as a distinctive legal institution, considering its primordial impact 
on all economic, social, and political arenas. So, it turns out to be inevitable to less expose 
judges to its complexity vis-à-vis the absence of recognition or the ambiguity that encounters 
its concept. Besides, it reveals undesirable to disregard the autonomy that governs the informal 
dealings or even the simulated legal arrangements concluded between family members at their 
discretion, regardless of legal stipulations. Also, one should not forget the emotional intentions 
that lead family members to be engaged and commit, in order to be part of the family and 
business legacy, and protect it. In addition to the illogical decisions made, very often, for the 
sake of the family’s interest, irrespective of business and legal concerns. Thus, these 
circumstances amongst others, disclose as main sources of family conflicts and litigations, 
which engender costly repercussions at all levels. Therefore, it becomes necessary to refrain 
                                                
967 Amin Maalouf, In the name of Identity: Violence and the need to belong, 1st ed (New York: Arcade, 2012) at 
2. 
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from   resolving the proceedings based on the conventional business law channels. Seeing, 
they have often manifested an inadequacy towards both the family and business. Moreover, 
considering the overlapping complexity between financial and emotional relationships, family 
business conflicts are similar to marriage dissensions. 968 Since, the family law has integrated 
legal mechanisms to organize and protect the institution of marriage, it is highly recommended 
to interfere in the family business arena, and develop the standards that respond to its needs 
correctly. Considering, business should not be observed in isolation of the family and vice 
versa. 969 Particularly, if family law surpasses its limits and treads into the corporate law 
threshold, judges would reveal more flexible and adaptable while making justice.  
Furthermore, nothing can make a difference more than the changes made in the governance 
and ownership structure of the family business. These changes shall begin by acknowledging 
the family business as a hybrid ownership that holds two different stakeholders, namely the 
family, as a group, and individuals, as a family and non-family members. This recognition 
shall make a radical reform in nature, by creating the equilibrium and providing all 
stakeholders with their relevant rights; particularly, considering the generational development 
of the family business and the great impact of trust variation between family members, as well 
as the motives behind joining the enterprise. All these aspects can increase the complexity of 
interactions and relationships amongst different stakeholders, and create new dynamics that 
necessitate specific structures and policies.  
Accordingly, the aforementioned analysis that highlights the authenticity of the family 
business can help all jurists (researchers, scholars, advisors, lawyers, judges, mediators or 
                                                
968 Supra note 370 at 287.  
969 Supra note 327 at 64. 
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arbitrators), to visualize and deal with it based on its uniqueness. Hence, the perspective of 
jurists, the decision-making process, and the outcomes, vis-à-vis this enterprise shall 
extremely change. Hence, jurists will see the family enterprise in a singular eye, adequately, in 
respect of its proper dynamics, and not treat it as an exception970 any longer.  
Consequently, as it was argued, “the rational-actor model of standard law and economics lacks 
the conceptual resources necessary to fully appreciate the nature of private ordering within a 
family business.” 971Encouraging these enterprises requires a legal taxonomy that engenders 
concrete consequences. Since, nothing can render the family business a source of weakness in 
the market more than the lack of identification of it as a business legal form different from its 
non-family counterparts. However, it is worth noting, the abovementioned analysis and the 
suggested rules are not legally eccentric, nor innovative, rather they are an amalgam of 
different legal institutions that already exist within the legal and judicial framework, but 
adapted to fit the context of the family business. However, despite the differences between the 
civil law and common law systems, in terms of the reasoning, argumentation, means, and 
approaches that diverge, both seek the same objective; namely fairness and justice.  Moreover, 
their norms and values remain the same.972 Along the same lines, both systems fail to 
recognize the uniqueness of the family business, and its distinctiveness from non-family 
counterparts. Thus, seeing all family businesses around the world tackle similar problems, 
conflicts, litigations, and challenges, both systems can admit the unique constructs and 
definition of this enterprise, but apply it differently.  
                                                
970 Supra note 38 at 1193.  
971 Ibid at 1194.  
972 Supra note 137 at 840. 
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However, this fundamental action should take the form of enhancing the awareness of policy 
and lawmakers of the factual significance and peculiarities of family businesses. Thus, they 
will be encouraged to establish the appropriate legal infrastructure that rectifies the gap and 
deficiency. Since, despite the excellence of researchers and scholars and their 
multidisciplinary studies in this field, still the recognition of the distinctiveness of the family 
business by lawmakers reveals as modest. Therefore, no one can make a serious step forward 
in this field more than jurists; otherwise the ‘family business” will remain in a vicious circle. 
Accordingly, various legal measures could be taken at this level, such as: 
1- Drawing a clear, simple, comprehensive, and operational legal definition that convenes 
the original taxonomy of this enterprise.  
2- Institutionalizing the family business by creating the legal framework that guarantees 
its longevity. As such, by emphasizing its constructs, dynamics, and mechanisms, and 
organizing its structure in terms of governance, succession planning, and conflicts 
resolution. 
3- Creating and improving the legal ecosystem in response to the family enterprise’s 
needs, by encouraging legal policies in terms of employment, taxes, social 
responsibility, inheritance, ownership, and finance. 
4- Forming an official framework, such as a body that creates the bond between 
governments and family businesses, in order to protect the latter and improve their 
status based on empirical and statistical studies. 
We propose a Central Office for Family Business, to which this enterprise should adhere.  
This authority could be created in partnership with private and public sectors, aimed at 
guaranteeing the stability and ensuring the basis of family businesses for a sustaining social 
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and economic growth. It will be entitled to issue the necessary recommendations and circulars 
to adhering family businesses in order to promote their performance and structures; 
particularly on the level of governance and raising awareness regarding succession and 
business intergenerational transfer planning. As, for example, the ‘Overdrachtspakket’ 
(transfer package) of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands is a one of a kind 
measure taken by the public sector. Through this measure, once the entrepreneur is 55 years 
old, he/she will be reminded of the importance of succession planning, as well as the 
appropriate procedures to be taken in this regard. 973 
Besides, a noteworthy example is the ‘Family Contract’ published by the Ankara Chamber of 
Industry (Turkey), which clearly defines the potential problems faced by the family business 
and recommends some solutions to alleviate the damaging consequences that threaten the 
business’ survivability. In addition, in Spain, the regional government of Valencia provides 
financial support to companies willing to develop family protocols.974 
We believe that this study reveals as a foundation for further legal multidimensional studies. 
As it shows the family business as a fertile field for jurists and researchers to explore, and 
investigates each component and dynamic through which this enterprise operates. Moreover, 
advanced empirical evidence is desired in order to prove the efficiency of the ecosystem 
theory and verify it valuably.   
Yet, family and non-family businesses represent the balance scales that guarantee the world-
market stability. The absence of legal nomenclature for the family business does not render it 
                                                
973 Austria, Austrian Institute for SME Research, Overview of Family Business Relevant Issues, by Irene Mandl, 
Contract No. 30-CE-0164021/00-51 (Vienna: European Commission, 2008) at 140.  
974 Ibid at 128. 
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inexistent. By analogy to categorizing the different types of enterprises and organizations, 
family business should be considered as a new type of enterprise that generate specific made-
to-order advantages and constraints. Lacking its definition reveals as the main source of its 
authentic forgetfulness. However, its neglect is often costly and engenders risky economic, 
social, and personal consequences. Therefore, the challenging question that arises in this 
respect; isn’t it time to clear away the legal mist of the family business? 
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